Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed jury convictions of numerous crimes that arose from appellants' bank-robberies including subduing innocent bystanders with gratuitous gunplay, pistol whipping a victim, and peppering a pursuing police car with bullets. At issue was whether the admission of "other crimes" evidence was in error where the evidence was offered for an impermissible purpose and where its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Also at issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support one appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) that he carried the AK-47 with two handles and even if the government satisfied its burden of proof as to this issue, the government failed to show he knew the gun was capable of firing automatically. The court held that there was no error in admitting evidence of appellants' commission of three carjackings, theft of forty cars, and use of false names, as well as marijuana cultivation and distribution, where the evidence was relevant to prove appellants' association and the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice. The court also held that evidence of the "Silver Spring" carjacking did not amount to grave error and that the prejudice resulting from the carjacking was slight when compared to the evidence of the violence acts for which appellants were indicated. The court further held that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant carried a machinegun and that section 924(c) did not require proof that appellant knew the weapon was a machinegun. The court finally held that appellants' numerous other claims were without merit.

Plaintiffs, two scientists, brought a suit to enjoin the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") from funding research using human embryonic stem cells ("ESCs") pursuant to the NIH's 2009 Guidelines ("Guidelines"). At issue was whether the preliminary injunction was properly granted where the district court concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the Guidelines violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, an appropriations rider that barred federal funding for research in which a human embryo was destroyed. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and held that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail because Dickey-Wicker was ambiguous and the NIH seemed reasonably to have concluded that, although Dickey-Wicker barred funding for the destructive act of deriving an ESC from an embryo, it did not prohibit funding a research project in which an ESC would be used.

The Chamber of Commerce and the National Automobile Dealers Association petitioned for review of a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") granting California a waiver from federal preemption under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). At issue was whether Article III of the Constitution granted the court jurisdiction to decide the case. The court dismissed the petition for review without reaching its merits and held that even if the EPA's decision to grant California a waiver for its emissions standards once posed an imminent threat of injury to petitioners, the agency's subsequent adoption of federal standards eliminated any independent threat that may have existed.

The Pacific Regional Director of the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service ("Director") caused four oil and gas leases off the coast of California, for which appellants had originally paid the United States over $140 million, to expire. The Director later testified that he based his decision solely on political considerations and that absent such considerations, he would have extended the leases instead. At issue was whether the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") should have adopted the decision the Director said he would have made absent political influence in order to cure the Director's original decision of political taint. The court affirmed the district court's decision and held that the IBLA fulfilled its role and appellants received all they were entitled to, i.e., an agency decision on the merits without regard to extrastatutory, political factors.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and ordered to pay $160,000 in restitution to the Naval Research Laboratory ("Research Laboratory") when he stole computer equipment over the course of ten years as an employee of the Research Laboratory. At issue was whether the costs of the Research Laboratory's internal investigation constituted necessary expenses that were incurred during participation in the investigation and prosecution of the offense under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("Act"), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The court reversed the district court's judgment ordering restitution and held that the text of the Act did not authorize restitution for the costs of an organization's internal investigation at least when the internal investigation was neither required nor requested by the criminal investigators or prosecutors.

Appellee filed an action against appellants, sisters who were traveling together aboard Pan Am Airways Flight 73 when Libyan terrorists hijacked the plane and held it for sixteen hours on the tarmac in Pakistan, seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitrarion Act ("Arbitration Act"), 9 U.S.C. 4. While the suit was pending, the United States and Libya reached a diplomatic settlement where Libya agreed to deposit $1.5 billion into a settlement fund and Congress provided for the implementation of the settlement fund for all terrorism-related litigation against Libya in American courts. At issue was whether the district court properly granted a motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Arbitration Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to compel and held that the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, did not prevent the district court from ordering arbitration of the underlying dispute.

Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc. and other providers (collectively "appellants") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") upholding the denial of their reimbursement claims arising from the merger of Presbyterian Health Services Corporation ("Presbyterian") and Carolina Medicorp, Inc. ("Carolina"). At issue was whether the denial of the reimbursement claims was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the denial of the reimbursement claims and held that the district court properly concluded that it was neither arbitrary and capricious nor contrary to law for the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("Administrator") to find that appellants were not entitled to reimbursement where, in the merger between Carolina and Presbyterian, no bona fide sale took place and the parties were related.

Argentina appealed the district court's dismissal of its motion to extend where Argentina had violated a Bilateral Investment Treaty when it implemented several emergency measures in response to the nation's financial crisis. An arbitration panel determined that Argentina was liable to National Grid PLC, ("National Grid") which had been operating in Argentina under the auspices of the treaty. At issue was whether National Grid forfeited its timeliness defense, whether the district court erred in treating Argentina's motion to extend as moot, and whether the district court erred in ultimately finding service to be untimely. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in granting a confirmation motion without first giving Argentina the opportunity to raise defenses available under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court rejected Argentina's argument that National Grid had forfeited its timeliness defense where it had expressly preserved this defense in the joint stipulation and then raised it in its first responsive pleading. The court also held that the district court had no authority to grant Argentina's motion to extend time to serve notice and therefore acted within its discretion in treating the motion as moot. Absent any evidence of timely service of notice, the court affirmed the dismissal of Argentina's motion to vacate the arbitral awards. The court further affirmed National Grid's cross-motion for recognition of the arbitral award where Argentina had ample time to raise defenses but made no attempt to raise such defects in the district court.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

Appellee sued the Broadcasting Board of Governors ("Board") after the Board terminated her contract alleging violations of the First and Fifth Amendments when she appeared in a music video that criticized the United States' involvement in Iraq. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendants' motions for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that, while it may be ultimately established in this case that the governmental interest involved was sufficient to outweigh appellee's constitutional right and allowed the Board to take action, it was not sufficiently established at this stage to have required the district court to uphold the assertion of qualified immunity and dismiss the action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of defendants' claims based on qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings.