Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Air Force petitioned for review of the decision and order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA") that a union proposal for uniform cleaning was a negotiable condition of employment. Based on a recently discovered Conference Report, the Air Force contended that the expenditure under 5 U.S.C. 5901(a) of funds was not authorized for the provision of services related to uniforms and statutory silence did not leave it discretion to do so. At issue was whether the court lacked jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7123(c) to entertain the Air Force's petition because the Air Force failed to present its new interpretation of the uniform statutes. The court held that the Air Force's belated discovery of a constructional appropriations bar was an extraordinary circumstance under section 7123(c) that permitted consideration of an argument not presented by the FLRA. Were the exception not to apply, the FLRA's order would, in effect, permit the Air Force, by contract with the union, to authorize the expenditure of funds beyond what Congress had approved and therefore, the court granted the petition for review. Accordingly, whether as a matter of the plain text of the two uniform statues, or the Air Force's permissible interpretation of any statutory ambiguity to which the FLRA must defer, the Air Force correctly maintained that the union's uniform cleaning proposal was non-negotiated because the statute the Department of Defense administered did not authorize such payments for appropriated funds.

Appellant, a Yemeni detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant claimed there was insufficient evidence to find that he was part of al-Qaida and that the district court relied on evidence outside the record, abused its discretion in denying additional discovery, and committed various legal errors. The court affirmed the district court's denial and held that a preponderance of the evidence unmistakably showed that appellant was part of al-Qaida in light of his guesthouse and military training camp admissions, his carrying a rifle at the behest of camp superiors, and his suspicious movements and implausible narrative of his final capture in the company of at least one known al-Qaida operative.

The United States Postal Service ("USPS") filed a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission ("Commission") to exceed the annual Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers ("CPI-U") cap pursuant to section 201(d) of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 ("PAEA"), Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198. At issue was whether the Commission erred in denying the exigent rate request on the ground that the USPS failed to demonstrate that the proposed rate adjustments were "due to" the cited "extraordinary or exceptional circumstances." The court held that, although the Commission correctly construed "due to" to require a causal relationship between the exigent circumstances' effects on the USPS and the amount of the above-cap rate increases, it incorrectly concluded the plain meaning of that phrase required the proposed rate adjustments to be "tailored to offset the specific effects of the claimed exigency." Therefore, the court remanded to the Commission so that it could exercise its discretion to construe the ambiguous language of section 201, explaining the extent of causation the Commission required the USPS to demonstrate between the exigent circumstances' impact on the USPS' finances and the proposed rate increase.

The families of two American contractors beheaded by terrorists in Iraq sued the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria") in federal court and when Syria did not respond, the district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of the families. At issue was whether the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) order was in error and its default judgment void. Also at issue was whether remand was appropriate to give the district court opportunity to grant further relief of Syria. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the families adequately effected service of process against Syria when they first filed suit under former section 1605(a)(7) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1602, et seq., where, before the district court entered judgment, the families removed to convert their action and proceeded under the new section 1605A in accordance with section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. The court also held that under section 1083 of the NDAA, the families did not have to serve Syria anew because the statutory text did not treat converted claims as new claims for relief. The court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2) did not apply in this case given the FSIA's specific statutory service of process provision. Accordingly, there was no need to remand the case to grant Syria other relief.

Appellant appealed his conviction of seven counts of bank fraud and four counts of immigration fraud whereby he filed hundreds of applications for labor certification containing false representations that various shell companies he controlled would employ his alien clients and he reproduced counterfeit checks to draw on his clients' banks accounts involving hundreds of thousands of dollars. At issue was whether the district court erred in determining that appellant's waiver of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was unequivocal and voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The court held that the district court might have been well advised to inquire about appellant's waiver of counsel on the same day it accepted the waiver, but in viewing the proceedings as a whole, the court concluded that the district court's colloquy was constitutionally adequate to confirm that he voluntarily chose to represent himself and did so knowingly and intelligently. The court also held that, assuming there was a Sixth Amendment right to prepare a pro se defense upon self-representation, appellant failed to show he was denied adequate access to business records seized by law enforcement or that he was prejudiced in his defense by limitations on access to those materials and other government discovery. The court further held that all but one of appellant's challenges to the enhancements imposed by the district court in sentencing lacked merit and as to that enhancement, there was insufficient evidence to show that appellant was a leader under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. Accordingly, the court confirmed the conviction and remanded for resentencing.

Appellant filed a suit against appellees, including the police officer that arrested her, alleging violations of her First and Fourth Amendment rights where the officer arrested her when she refused to stop what she described as "silent expressive dancing" inside the Jefferson Memorial. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that appellant was lawfully arrested for violating the reasonable regulations that govern the Jefferson Memorial, a nonpublic forum reserved for the tranquil commemoration of Mr. Jefferson's legacy, and that the officer had probable cause to make the arrest and used reasonable force to subdue her without injury after she twice refused his lawful orders.

A California local exchange carrier ("LEC") filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") alleging a violation of 47 C.F.R. 20.11(b) when the LEC unilaterally set a rate and began billing petitioner, a provider of commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS") in California, for the cost of terminating its traffic. At issue was whether the FCC erred in allowing a state agency to determine the rate for traffic that was wholly intrastate pursuant to section 20.11(b). The court held that the FCC's policy of allowing state agencies to set such rates was consistent with the dual regulatory scheme assumed in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which granted the FCC authority over interstate communications but reserved wholly intrastate matters for the states.

A jury found David Safavian, Chief of Staff of the General Services Administration ("GSA"), guilty on four counts of a five-count indictment where his convictions were related to a golf trip he took with Jack Abramoff, a lobbyist, who had asked Safavian for information about two properties the GSA owned. At issue was whether Counts Three and Five should be vacated on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; whether Counts Two and Five should be vacated on the grounds that the government failed to prove Safavian's false statements to the ethics officer and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") were materially within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(1); and whether a new trial should be granted on Count One and Count Three where the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding the cost of the private plane. The court held that so long as Safavian's false statements were capable of influencing the course of the FBI's investigation, those statements were material within the meaning of section 1001(a)(1). The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in presuming vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution or in holding that the government overcame that presumption when it offered two reasons why the addition of Count Five was not vindictive. The court further held that its reasons for rejecting Safavian's arguments pertaining to Counts One, Two, and Three were the same as those of the district court and did not need to repeat them.

Plaintiff, a shareholder in Avenir Corporation ("Avenir"), brought a shareholder derivate suit naming Avenir and its three principal officers ("principals") as defendants and alleged that the principals engaged in various forms of financial misconduct as Avenir's managers. At issue was whether the district court properly granted attorney's fees for abuse of discretion to plaintiff where plaintiff originally filed in Superior Court and defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. 1441, where Avenir's primary place of business was in D.C., and where the district court found removal improper under section 1441(b). The court held that the district court improperly awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff where Avenir was a nominal defendant and defendants' reasoning had at least some logical and precedential force behind it.

The Polm Family Foundation ("Foundation") filed a suit in district court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). At issue was whether the Foundation qualified as a public charity under section 509(a)(3) of the IRC. The court held that, in light of the broad purposes mentioned in the Foundation's articles of incorporation, the court agreed with the government that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Foundation would receive oversight from a readily identifiable class of publicly supported organizations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foundation did not qualify as a public charity under section 509(a)(3).