Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this civil enforcement action, a jury found appellant aided and abetted a securities fraud by his former employer in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78t(e). At issue was whether the district court erred in allowing appellant's trial to proceed in the District of Columbia pursuant to the "co-conspirator theory of venue." The court held that the SEC failed to lay venue in the District of Columbia under the "straightforward language of [section 78aa]." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court on the basis of improper venue in light of Olberling v. Illinois Central and the district court was instructed to dismiss the case without prejudice.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where he maintained that he had not understood that he was pleading guilty to conspiracy and in failing to order a competency hearing before doing so. The court held that, because it found no taint in the taking of defendant's plea, nor any unreasonableness in the district court's determination that defendant had failed to assert a viable claim of innocence, the court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea without first holding a competency hearing or ordering another examination where the district court had the opportunity, over the course of six hearings, to speak with defendant and observe his demeanor and where there was nothing in the record before the court to give it "reasonable cause" to believe that defendant might be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent under 18 U.S.C. 4241(a). Accordingly, the district court's denial of defendant's motion was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for multiple bank robberies and contended that his trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b), 3162(a)(1), that the district court erred in limiting the scope of his counsel's closing argument, and that the court further erred in admitting evidence of an additionally, uncharged bank robbery. The court held that the district court did not violate defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial Act when it did not dismiss his indictment pursuant to the 30 day complaint-to-indictment clock where it applied the exception in section 3162(h) and held that May 23, 2008 was an excluded day because the government made an oral motion to commit defendant to the custody of the Attorney General on that day. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of counsel's closing argument regarding the "best practices" standard for law enforcement officers and DNA evidence. The court further held that, even if it were erroneous, the admission of evidence of the uncharged bank robbery in Virginia was harmless because it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A), case, a Texas death-row inmate sought information from the FBI that he alleged might corroborate his claim that four other men actually committed the quadruple homicide for which he was convicted. At issue was whether the FBI's Glomar response was permitted under FOIA Exemption 7(c), which permitted agencies to withhold information contained in law enforcement records to protect against unwanted invasions of personal privacy. The court held that the public had an interest in knowing whether the federal government was withholding information that could corroborate a death-row inmate's claim of innocence and that interest outweighed the three men's privacy interest in having the FBI not disclose whether it possessed any information linking them to the murders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's approval of the FBI's Glomar response and, with minor exceptions, affirmed the district court's rejection of appellant's other arguments.

The District of Columbia filed this suit to recover its attorneys' fees from a lawyer who brought an administrative complaint against the District on behalf of a student with special educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). At issue was whether the District was a "prevailing party" under the IDEA in this suit. The court held that the facts in this case followed closely in the wake of the court's precedent in District of Columbia v. Straus where that court held that the district was not a "prevailing party" where its own change of position was what had mooted the dispute, causing the case to be dismissed. Therefore, the court held that the District, in this case, was not a "prevailing party" where the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) authorized an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation for the student, which mooted the only issue before the hearing officer. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment ordering the lawyer to pay attorneys' fees was reversed.

Petitioners petitioned for review of a regulation promulgated by the EPA setting performance standards for new and existing hospital/medical/infection waste incinerators ("HMIWI"). Petitioners argued that the data set EPA used to establish these standards was flawed, that the agency's pollutant-by-pollutant approach to setting target emissions levels was impermissible, and that the agency acted arbitrarily when it removed a provision exempting HMIWI from complying with the standards during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. The court held that the EPA's decision to use emissions data from the HMIWI units remaining in operation after the implementation of the 1997 standards, once it determined that the data set upon which it had relied in 1997 was flawed, was reasonable. The court held, however, that it did not have jurisdiction to review the challenges to the EPA's long-standing practice of setting emissions floors based on emissions levels achieved by the best performing unit or units for each individual pollutant, and to the agency's removal of an exemption from compliance with emissions limitations during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. Accordingly, the petitioned was dismissed in part and denied in part.

Bondholders of the failed Washington Mutual Bank ("WAMU") alleged that JPMorgan Chase ("Chase"), through a series of improper acts, pressured the federal government to seize WAMU and then sell to it the bank's most valuable assets, without any accompanying liabilities, for a drastically undervalued price. The bondholders asserted three Texas state law claims in Texas state court, but after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") intervened in the lawsuit, the case was removed to federal district court. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint, finding that 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) jurisdictionally barred appellants from obtaining judicial review of their claims because they had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). The court held that the suit fell outside the scope of the jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(13)(D) because the complaint neither asserted a claim under FIRREA nor constituted an action for payment from, or seeking a determination with respect to, the assets of a depository institution for which the FDIC was receiver. Consequently, the court did not reach alternative arguments and therefore, reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from the discovery in an unrelated case that the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") had paid hospitals less than they were due because it had miscalculated the disproportionate share hospital ("DSH") payment. Appellants, a group of hospitals that received DSH payments, filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ("PRRB") seeking full payments for the fiscal years 1987-1994. At issue was whether the district court lacked jurisdiction in the matter and whether the Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a), allowed for equitable tolling. The court held that a decision by the PRRB denying jurisdiction was a final decision subject to judicial review by the district court. The court also held that, given the factors emphasized in United States v. Brockamp did not apply to the facts presented, and without any other reasons for rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling, the court found that equitable tolling was available under 1395oo(a). The court noted that whether tolling was appropriate in this particular case, however, was a different question for the district court to answer on remand. The court also rejected appellants' alternative arguments and therefore, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, a pimp who prostituted underage girls, was convicted of various federal sexual abuse crimes and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Defendant appealed the denial of his request to unseal the records of two material witnesses, claiming that the First Amendment guaranteed a right of access to material witness proceedings. The court assumed arguendo that the qualified First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings extended to material witness proceedings. The court held that, even so, under the First Amendment access precedents, the public was not entitled to the records here, which contained "substantial amounts of material of an especially personal and private nature relating to the medical, educational, and mental health progress" of the victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders of the district court.

This appeal stemmed from a short sale transaction that raised UTA Management's outside basis in the UTAM partnership. On October 13, 2006, more than six years after the filing of UTAM's 1999 partnership return, but less than six years from the filing of the individual partner's 1999 individual return, the IRS mailed a notice of final partnershp administrative adjustment to DDM Management, UTAM's "tax matters" partner, pertaining to UTAM's 1999 tax year. At issue was whether the mailing of a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment by the IRS tolled an individual partner's limitation period under I.R.C. 6501. The court held that the six-year limitations period applied with regard to the individual partner's 1999 return and that the assessment period, suspended pursuant to I.R.C. 6229(d), was the partner's open assessment period under section 6501. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court on the statute of limitations issue was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.