Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In three challenged orders, the Commission addressed a "traffic pumping" scheme in which the holder of the filed tariff entered into contractual arrangements with conference calling companies and charged the interexchange carrier the tariff rate for providing switched access service. Farmers, the holder of the tariff, petitioned for review. As a threshold matter, Farmers, joined by intervenor, contended that the Commission lacked authority to overturn its decision in Farmers I because it failed, as 47 U.S.C. 405(b) required, to act within 90 days on Qwest's petition for partial reconsideration and consequently, Farmers I became a final appealable order. The court held that the contention was based on a misreading of the statute. The merits question was whether the Commission properly determined that Farmers was not entitled to bill Qwest for access service under Farmers' tariff because Farmers had not provided interstate "switched access service" as that term was defined in Farmers' federal access tariff. The court held that the Commission, upon considering factors within its expertise, could reasonably conclude that Farmers' relationships with the conference calling companies had been deliberately structured to fall outside the terms of Farmers' tariff and therefore reasonably rejected such services as tariffed services. Therefore, deference to the Commission's determination was appropriate. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Farmers and Merchants Mutual Telephone Co. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence of 60 months' imprisonment resulting from her convictions of possession of stolen mail and aggravated identity theft. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court failed to consider two mitigating arguments she advanced. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the record reflected that the district court in fact considered both arguments and provided a reasoned basis for defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Locke" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing heroin. At issue was whether defendant could qualify under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5) without disclosing the fate of the sample provided by the seller but not delivered in the transaction, or the origin of the sample that he did deliver to the buyer. The court agreed with the district court that defendant did not qualify for safety-valve relief where defendant's omission of the information at issue concerned his offense of conviction and was essential to safety-valve relief. View "United States v. Danso" on Justia Law

An association of doctor-owned equipment providers challenged regulations issued by the Secretary that effectively prevented its members from obtaining Medicare reimbursement for their services. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that under the particular circumstances of this case, the Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. exception applied and the association could invoke the district court's federal question jurisdiction without first seeking administrative review under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(h). View "Council For Urological Interests v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

PSEG challenged orders of the FERC accepting the results of an auction for electric generation capacity conducted by ISO New England. In those orders, FERC approved ISO New England's determination that PSEG's resources in Connecticut could not reduce their capacity supply obligation because doing so would endanger the system's reliability. FERC also held that ISO New England could reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity. The court held that because the latter holding was based on tariff provisions that the FERC thought were clear but now conceded were ambiguous, and because in the course of construing those provisions it failed to respond to PSEG's facially legitimate objections, the petition was granted and the orders were remanded for further consideration. View "PSEG Energy Resources & Trade, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of a decision and order of the Board, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement. The Board found, among other things, that petitioners violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by implementing new terms and conditions of employment before reaching a lawful impasse in collective bargaining negotiations. The court held that because substantial evidence supported the Board's findings, the petition for review was denied and the Board's cross-application for enforcement was granted. View "Wayneview Care Center, et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellants were arrested for speeding in excess of 30 mph above the posted speed limit and subsequently filed a class action on behalf of all individuals who have been arrested and subjected to criminal penalties for such speeding in the last three years. Appellants alleged that the district's traffic enforcement policies denied them the equal protection of law and thus violated the Fifth Amendment. Specifically appellants objected to the district's policy of subjecting motorists who speed in excess of 30 mph over the speed limit to different penalties, depending on how they were caught. The district court granted the district's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the district court's judgment, but on different grounds. The court held that appellants' claim lacked merit because their challenge could not survive rational basis review where the district's traffic policy neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted a suspect class. View "Dixon, et al. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Board found petitioner had acted unlawfully by unilaterally reducing the hours of its full-time respiratory department employees. The Board ordered petitioner to rescind the hours reduction, bargain with the labor union representing the affected employees, and make whole any employee for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered (2004 Order). An ALJ subsequently determined that petitioner owed 13 current and former employees roughly $105,000 in backpay to compensate them for the unlawful hour reduction and the Board adopted the ALJ's findings without elaboration, ordering petitioner to pay (2011 Order). Petitioner appealed the 2011 Order and the Board cross-applied for enforcement. The court granted in part the Board's cross-application for enforcement with respect to all issues except the matter relating to interim earnings. The Board did not err in applying a backpay remedy to those employees hired into the bargaining unit after petitioner unlawfully reduced the employees' hours; and the Board correctly held the Union's failure to communicate with petitioner did not toll the employer's liability, because petitioner had not rescinded the unlawful unilateral reduction in hours when it sought to negotiate with the Union. However, the Board did not adequately explain its failure to consider interim earnings when calculating the backpay award. Therefore, the court vacated the Board's backpay computation and remanded so the Board could amplify its position on interim earnings. View "Deming Hospital Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant, which sought review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., claimed that the Secretary's delegee failed to disapprove appellant's reimbursement request within 60 working days, as required by the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395rr(b)(7), because the delegee did not notify appellant of its asserted disapproval within the 60-day time period. Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary. The court concluded that the notification of appellant within 60 days was not necessary for the disapproval to be effective and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gundersen Lutheran Med. Center v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

This case involved a motion for fees and costs under section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(f), which authorized courts to award costs of litigation whenever they determined that such award was appropriate. In the underlying litigation, movants intervened on behalf of petitioners who were challenging EPA rules regulating mercury emissions from power plants. The court vacated the mercury rules and agreed with petitioners that the rules violated the Act. Movants subsequently sought the court to order the EPA to pay their fees and costs. The court concluded that movants merited a fee award because they contributed to the proper implementation and administration of the Act or otherwise served the public interest. The court declined, however, to weigh in on the appropriate amount. Instead, the court directed the parties to its Appellate Mediation Program. View "State of New Jersey, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law