Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff contended that his supervisor at the Department of State gave him negative performance reviews in retaliation for his opposition to discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that because plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he opposed a practice that could "reasonably be thought" to violate Title VII, he failed to satisfy the first element of his cause of action. Plaintiff also failed to establish the third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: that the employer took a materially adverse action against the employee "because" the employee opposed a protected practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "McGrath v. Clinton" on Justia Law

This case was before the court on appeal and cross-appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering attorney Leonard Suchanek to pay his former client, Kevin So, an amount representing a portion of the legal fees Suchanek collected from So, plus interest. Suchanek began representing So and So's agent, Lucy Yan Lu, in July 2006 despite the fact that he was already representing Land Base, a California entity that had entered into an agreement with So that was signed by Lu, to make investments on So's behalf. The court concluded that Suchanek violated Rule 1.7 by simultaneously representing So and Land Base in July and August of 2006; the district court's analysis of the second conflict period, between August 2007 and January 2008, was also sound; and the district court's order requiring Suchanek to deposit the trust funds in the registry was proper in light of Suchanek's history of moving So's money, without authorization, into other bank accounts - sometimes spending it rather than returning it to So or to So's trust account. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings as they pertained to Suchanek's appeal. In regard to So's contention that the district court erred in ordering disgorgement of only some of the fees Suchanek collected, the court concluded that the district court's error in assessing the conflict between Lu and So influenced the scope of the remedy it selected. The district court should have awarded a larger sum if it had correctly found a conflict during other parts of the representation. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further review and issuance of a supplemental remedy, greater than the amount already ordered. View "So v. Suchanek" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of a decision of the Board affirming the findings of an ALJ that petitioner committed eight unfair labor practices (ULPs) in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5). The Board filed a cross-application for enforcement. The court granted the petition in part and set aside the Board's findings that petitioner committed ULPs when it prematurely declared impasse and unilaterally implemented a wage increase on September 1, 2005. The court denied the petition and granted enforcement as to the remaining ULP findings because petitioner had forfeited any objection thereto. View "Laurel Bay Health & Rehab. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a one-count information charging a conspiracy with three objects: bribery of federal officials; money-or-property mail and wire fraud; and honest services mail and wire fraud. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his "motion to amend or modify his plea agreement." The court affirmed the denial of the motion because courts were not authorized to order modification or amendment of plea agreements. View "United States v. Scanlon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a DEA special agent, was presenting in front of a group of about 50 children and parents at a community center, where he displayed his DEA-issued firearm while discussing gun safety, when his firearm accidentally discharged and shot him in the thigh. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the DEA alleging that disclosure of the four minute, nine second video-recording of plaintiff's presentation on internet websites and on the DEA's internal e-mail system violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the DEA on both claims. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiff failed to establish the elements of his Privacy Act claim - specifically, that the video was retrieved from a system of records and that the disclosure was intentional or willful. The court also held that plaintiff's FTCA claim failed because he did not establish all of the elements under Florida law for the tort of invasion of privacy by public disclosure of a private fact where the video contained no private facts and where the accidental discharge was a matter of public concern. View "Paige v. Drug Enforcement Admin." on Justia Law

El Paso operated an interstate pipeline that transported natural gas to California and other western states, and Freeport shipped gas on El Paso's pipeline to power its various mining, smelting, and refining facilities. El Paso and Freeport separately challenged several orders of the Commission issued in connection with El Paso's 2005 rate filing and subsequent settlement. The court denied the petition for review and held that the Commission's reasoning was sound when it found that the CAP Orders had neither changed the bargain underlying the 1996 Settlement nor abrogated Article 11.2 of the Settlement. The court also held that the Commission reasonably determined the converted FR contracts were "amended" within the meaning of that term in Article 11.2; Article 11.2 applied to turnback capacity; the applicable rate cap for turnback capacity was determined by the shipper's delivery point; Article 11.2 did not apply to capacity created by the Line 2000 project; and where the Commission adopted the presumption that the capacity of El Paso's system on December 31, 1995 was 4000 MMcf/d. The court further found that the Commission's approval of the Settlement appropriate under the so-called Trailblazer Pipeline Co. approach. Accordingly, the Commission's orders were not arbitrary or capricious and the petitions for review were denied. View "Freeport-McMoran Corp. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant, an African American man employed by the IRS, alleged that the IRS discriminated against him on the basis of race and gender when it awarded a temporary detail and then a permanent promotion to a white female employee. Appellant also claimed that the IRS retaliated against him when he pursued the matter with the Equal Employment Opportunity office. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on all claims. The court agreed that appellant failed to exhaust his claim regarding the temporary detail and so affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment. But because the court concluded a reasonable jury could find that the government's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying appellant the permanent promotion was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the discriminatory promotion claim and remanded to allow that claim to proceed to trial. And because the court concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of retaliation, the court remanded that claim for further proceedings. View "Hamilton v. Geithner" on Justia Law

The petition for review before the court arose from a dispute between the IURC and PJM, which, subject to the Commission's oversight, operated the market for wholesale electricity in the District of Columbia and all or parts of 13 states, including Indiana. The IURC petitioned for review of an order of the Commission approving the tariff of PJM. The court dismissed the petition insofar as it challenged the order on grounds that the IURC did not raise with sufficient specificity in its request for rehearing by the Commission pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 825l(b). In all other respects, the court denied the petition because the IURC had not shown the Commission acted unreasonably. View "Indiana Utility Regulatory Comm. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Republic of Argentina appealed the denial of its motion to vacate an arbitral award on the principal ground that the arbitral panel exceeded its authority by ignoring the terms of the parties' agreement. The court held that where, as here, the result of the arbitral award was to ignore the terms of the Bilateral Investment Treaty - between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Argentina - and shifted the risk that the Argentine courts might not resolve BG Group's claim within eighteen months pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Treaty, the arbitral panel rendered a decision wholly based on outside legal sources and without regard to the contracting parties' agreement establishing a precondition to arbitration. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders denying the motion to vacate and granting the cross-motion to confirm, and vacated the Final Award. View "Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC" on Justia Law

Roger Rudder, two other adults, and two juveniles sued the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police officers for using excessive force against them at the 2008 Caribbean Carnival Parade in violation of their civil rights. The district court dismissed their suit with prejudice. The court concluded that, although plaintiffs unambiguously conceded all their common law claims, the juvenile plaintiffs' common law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice because those claims were not time-barred. The complaint also alleged facts stating facially plausible claims against two officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "Rudder, et al. v. Williams, et al." on Justia Law