Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenged the FCC's three revisions to the interpretation of Section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 224. Section 224 provided a variety of advantages to certain types of firms seeking to attach their wires, cable, or other network equipment to utility poles. The FCC's Order allowed incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share the benefits of some of Section 224's provisions; reformulated the ceiling on the rate that pole-owning utilities could charge "telecommunications carriers" seeking to make pole attachments; and moved back the date as of which compensatory damages started to accrue in favor of parties filing successful complaints against utilities. The court upheld the FCC's view that ILECs were "providers of telecommunications services" for purposes of section 224(a)(4). Because the FCC's methodology was consistent with the unspecified cost terms contained in section 224(e), and the FCC's justifications were reasonable, the telecom rate revision warranted judicial deference. Petitioners' arguments regarding the refund period had no serious statutory basis. The court considered petitioners' many subsidiary arguments and found them all to be without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "American Electric Power Serv. Corp., et al v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants, almond producers, claimed that the Secretary of Agriculture, seeking to prevent the spread of salmonella, exceeded his authority in requiring California almonds sold domestically to be treated with heat or chemicals. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary. The court affirmed, finding that appellants have waived their claims by failing to raise them during the rulemaking process. View "Koretoff, et al v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the interaction between the NRC's regular decommissioning process of a licensed nuclear facility and a statutory provision (section 2021 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021) authorizing the NRC to transfer regulatory authority over classes of nuclear materials located within a state to the government of that state. In regards to the basic standards for decommissioning, the court's inability to understand the key regulatory materials purportedly guiding the agency exercise of control over decommissioning required a remand. The court found no legal error in the remainder of the Commission's Order. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., et al" on Justia Law

In this case, FERC reviewed rates resulting from an auction process and concluded that though the rates were not contract rates, they warranted the Mobile-Sierra doctrine presumption anyway. The NEPGA and State Petitioners petitioned for review. Because the NEPGA lacked standing, the court dismissed its petition for review. The court rejected the merits of the State Petitioners' arguments where FERC did not exceed the bounds of its considerable discretion by adopting the public interest standard for deciding whether a given Forward Capacity Auction rate was just and reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the State Petitioners' petition for review. View "New England Power Generators Assoc., Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellees sued the District, their employer, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The District argued on appeal, inter alia, that it was entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments. Appellees' counsel made four inappropriate arguments: three after the district court had sustained objections. The first three arguments were "golden rule" arguments and the fourth argument was a "send a message" argument. As the district court's efforts to cure the resulting prejudice were insufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caudle, et al v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Prior to Freeman v. United States, the district court denied defendant's 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) sentence. The court held that it had jurisdiction of defendant's appeal notwithstanding his release from incarceration and the commencement of his term of supervised release; defendant's appeal was not moot because applying the amended version of the supervisory release provision would be impermissibly retroactive and, in not applying this amended provision, it becomes likely that defendant's term of supervisory release could be impacted by the outcome of this appeal; it remained for the district court to address the pre-amendment inter-circuit conflict as to which of two provisions on supervisory release applied to defendant in considering his pending motion to reduce his supervisory term; in the absence of necessary overlap between the reasoning of the plurality and concurring opinions in the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman to discern a narrower opinion that constituted binding precedent, defendant qualified for relief under section 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Epps" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, possession of a firearm during dangerous offenses, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contended that the district court's self-defense instruction erroneously diluted the government's burden of proof. The court held that the jury instruction did not contradict any precedent of the court or the Supreme Court. Nor did it contravene any clear legal norm. Therefore, the court concluded that the instruction was not plainly erroneous and there was no need to consider the remaining elements of the plain error standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Purvis" on Justia Law

In Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, juror officer Suzanne Bailey-Jones unceremoniously removed Peter James Atherton from grand jury service after an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) reported the complaints of other members of the grand jury. The district court concluded that appellees, Bailey-Jones and the AUSA, were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their respective motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the judgment because Atherton failed to convince the court that he had a clearly established constitutional entitlement to a more comprehensive termination process when he was excluded from jury service. View "Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners, HPBA and NPGA, sought review of two recently promulgated rules that they believed expanded the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6201 et seq., to include decorative fireplaces. The court agreed with the HPBA that the DOE's interpretation of decorative fireplaces as "Direct heating equipment," a specifically enumerated class of covered products under the Act, contravened the EPCA's statutory scheme and, in turn, clear congressional intent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Assoc. v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law