Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Tyler and his wife filed suit seeking damages from various companies that manufacture products containing asbestos that he had been exposed. After Tyler died from a form of lung cancer caused by asbestos, Stephen Wannall became the personal representative of Tyler's estate. Honeywell was named in the suit as the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, which manufactured brake shoes that Tyler used in helping friends, family, and neighbors perform automobile repairs for over 50 years. Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish the causal link required under Virginia law between Tyler's exposure to Bendix brakes and his disease. The district court denied the motion. While the parties were preparing for trial, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued Ford Motor Company v. Boomer, which rejected the "substantial" cause standard that the parties had previously understood as controlling, and ruled instead that plaintiffs must demonstrate that "exposure to the defendant's product alone must have been sufficient to have caused the harm." Honeywell moved for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment in light of Boomer. Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not seek leave to file a new declaration of their expert under Rule 26(e). Nor did plaintiff move under Rule 56(d) for permission to take additional discovery in response to Honeywell's motion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Honeywell's motion to strike the new expert declaration and its renewed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Boomer. View "Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in state court, challenging the foreclosure proceedings that ultimately resulted in the sale of his property. Defendants removed to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying leave to amend plaintiff's complaint to add additional federal claims; vacated the district court's orders relating to the state-law claims against Chase and Shapiro & Burson because the D.C. statutory and common law claims against the bank and its foreclosing agent should have been decided by the local courts; and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to Superior Court for determination of plaintiff's state-law claims against those parties. View "Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug possession offenses and firearm offenses, appealed the district court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argued that the government's search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to search his residence. Even assuming that the law enforcement officer's affidavit in this case did not support a finding of probable cause, this case falls within the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon where the affidavit relies overwhelmingly on the confidential informant (whose reliability defendant does not question) and the records checks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

The family of Reverend Dong Shik Kim filed suit against the North Korean government, by invoking the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, alleging that it abducted him, confined him to a political penal-labor colony, tortured him, and killed him. The court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment. The court concluded that admissible evidence demonstrates that North Korea abducted Reverend Kim, that it invariably tortures and kills political prisoners, and that through terror and intimidation it prevents any information about those crimes from escaping to the outside world. Requiring a plaintiff to produce direct, first-hand evidence of the victim's torture and murder would thwart the purpose of the terrorism exception: holding state sponsors of terrorism accountable for torture and extrajudicial killing. Accordingly, the court found plaintiffs' evidence sufficiently "satisfactory" to require a default judgment. View "Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on Justia Law

In 2008, EPA revised and strengthened the standards for ozone under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. At issue are two challenges to EPA's regulations: first, EPA allowed affected regions more time to attain the new ozone standards as compared with the previous revision; and second, EPA revoked certain requirements, known as transportation conformity requirements, applicable to areas that had yet to attain governing ozone standards or that had recently come into attainment but remained under obligations aimed to prevent any reversion to nonattainment status. The court concluded that both challenged aspects of EPA's regulations exceed the agency's authority under the CAA. With regard to the attainment deadlines, all statutory indications militate against allowing the agency's lengthening of the periods for achieving compliance with revised air quality standards. With regard to the revocation of transportation conformity requirements, the terms of the statute straightforwardly require maintaining those requirements for affected areas. Accordingly, the court vacated the pertinent portions of the EPA's regulations. View "NRDC v. EPA" on Justia Law

101 environmental groups filed a petition with EPA asking it to regulate spent lead bullets and shot. The environmental groups invoked section 21 of the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601(a)(1), which allows any person to petition EPA for a rulemaking proceeding to regulate "chemical substances" that "present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment[.]" The district court held that EPA had authority to classify the petition as non-cognizable under the Act and dismissed the complaint. The court disagreed with the district court where nothing in section 21 allowed EPA to dismiss the petition as non-cognizable. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the judgment because the environmental groups have suggested no way in which EPA could regulate spent lead bullets and shot without also regulating cartridges and shells, precisely what section 3(2)(B)(v) of the Act prohibits. View "Trumpeter Swan Society v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law

Bus driver Bumpass hit the brakes as he approached a stop sign. Robinson, a standing passenger on the bus, fell backward and broke her leg. Robinson sued WMATA, claiming that Bumpass violated WMATA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) and that the “jerk” caused by Bumpass’ application of the brakes was of such extraordinary force that his negligence could be inferred. Bumpass admitted that he did not check his mirror before leaving the stop that morning. He knew there were several open seats up front, he said, and he assumed Robinson had sat down by the time he closed the doors and started driving. Robinson testified that the bus was going “fast, faster than normal buses,” and that it “was jerking and then [there] was an abrupt stop.” The district court rejected a jury award of $404,713.28. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could not have decided in Robinson’s favor. Robinson failed to establish a causal relationship between Bumpass’ deviation from SOPs and her injury; unusual and extraordinary force cannot be inferred from mere descriptive adjectives and conclusions alone. View "Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Brown, a black female law professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law (DCSL), had worked for DCSL in various capacities for more than 20 years when she applied for tenure and promotion. The Faculty Evaluation Committee recommended tenure and transmitted her application to Dean Broderick, who initially recommended that the Committee withdraw its approval due to the sparseness and quality of Brown’s legal scholarship. Once Broderick learned that a law journal agreed to publish another of Brown’s articles, she endorsed the recommendation and forwarded her approval to then–Interim Provost Baxter, who rejected the application. President Sessoms agreed that Brown should not be awarded tenure and did not submit Brown’s application to the Board. Around the same time, the administration considered the tenure application of McLain, a white male. Brown alleges that McLain had “no legal publications” but that Broderick did not insist that he satisfy the three-publication requirement, as Broderick had with Brown’s application. The Board awarded him tenure and a promotion to full professor. Brown sued. The district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal of Brown’s D.C. Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 claims and affirmed dismissal of her other claims. View "Brown v. Sessoms" on Justia Law