Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers v. NLRB
A dispute arose regarding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) rule on when one entity is considered a joint employer of another entity’s employees. The NLRB determined that Google was a joint employer of Cognizant employees working on Google’s YouTube Music platform and ordered both companies to bargain with the employees’ union, the Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers of America, Local 9009 (AWU). Google and Cognizant refused to bargain, leading the NLRB to conclude that this refusal violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The employers petitioned for review, arguing they were not joint employers, but the contract under which the employees provided services to Google expired, rendering the petitions and the Board’s cross-applications for enforcement moot. The Union also petitioned for review, contending that the NLRB’s remedies were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the expiry of the Google-Cognizant contract meant there was no longer any relationship to support the joint-employer finding, making the case moot. The court dismissed Google’s and Cognizant’s petitions and the Board’s cross-applications as moot and vacated the order below. The court also dismissed as jurisdictionally barred the part of AWU’s petition seeking review of the NLRB’s decision to sever the issue of a make-whole remedy for employees and dismissed as moot those parts of AWU’s petition seeking prospective remedies.The court denied the remainder of AWU’s petition, concluding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by ordering only the customary remedies. The court emphasized that the Board’s choice of remedies is primarily within its province and subject to very limited judicial review. View "Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers v. NLRB" on Justia Law
Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers
Samuel Shanks and Taylor Lambert, former employees of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, filed pro se lawsuits against the Union alleging discrimination. Shanks, who worked in accounting for over twenty years, claimed discrimination based on disability, race, color, and sexual orientation, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliation. Lambert, his niece, alleged wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination based on race, religion, and gender. Both claimed violations of various civil rights laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Union removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Shanks and Lambert appealed the dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals in part but appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of claims that were not suited for summary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and concluded that the allegations of racial discrimination related to the Union’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were plausible. The court found that the Union’s two-stage roll-out of the policy disproportionately affected Black employees, who were given less time and fewer resources to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court held that the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims based on race were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including those based on sexual orientation, gender, and religion, as well as Shanks’ hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the racial discrimination claims. View "Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law
Moharam v. TSA
Fahmi Ahmed Moharam, a dual United States-Yemeni citizen, frequently travels between the two countries. In 2017, he was denied boarding a flight from Saudi Arabia to the U.S. and learned through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) redress process that he was on the No Fly List. The government provided minimal information, citing national security concerns, and stated that his designation was based on his activities in Yemen from 2011 to 2017. After petitioning for review, the government informed him that he was no longer on the No Fly List and would not be relisted based on the currently available information.The TSA is mandated by statute to identify individuals who may pose a threat to civil aviation or national security and prevent them from boarding aircraft. The TSA also manages the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), which allows individuals to appeal their inclusion on the No Fly List. Moharam appealed through TRIP and was initially informed that he was on the list due to concerns about his activities in Yemen. Despite his requests for more information and administrative review, the TSA maintained his status on the list until the government later removed him.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Moharam's removal from the No Fly List rendered his petitions for review moot, as the court could no longer provide effective relief. The court noted that the government’s assurance that Moharam would not be relisted based on the same information addressed the issue of potential recurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, as the relief sought was no longer redressable. View "Moharam v. TSA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC
Entergy companies petitioned for review of three orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC had rejected tariff changes proposed by Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), arguing that the new tariff would grant Entergy excessive market power. Entergy contended that FERC’s decisions were arbitrary and capricious.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Entergy’s opening brief did not address the issue of standing, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite. This omission violated Circuit Rule 28(a)(7), which requires petitioners to set forth the basis for their claim of standing in their opening brief. As a result, Entergy forfeited any arguments in support of standing.The D.C. Circuit Court dismissed the petitions for review, stating that Entergy lacked standing. The court emphasized that Entergy’s failure to discuss standing in its opening brief constituted a forfeiture of the argument. Even if the court were to consider the standing arguments Entergy later advanced, the company did not demonstrate the necessary concrete, imminent, and redressable injury. The court concluded that dismissal was the appropriate consequence for Entergy’s failure to establish standing. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law
Sierra Club v. DOE
The Alaska LNG Project sought authorization from the Department of Energy to export up to twenty million metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year for thirty years. The Department initially authorized the Project to export LNG to free-trade countries in 2014 and later to non-free trade countries in 2015, subject to environmental review. In 2023, the Department issued a final order approving the Project’s export application, concluding that the approval was consistent with the public interest despite uncertainties regarding environmental impacts.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had previously authorized the construction and operation of the Project’s facilities, including an 800-mile pipeline and associated infrastructure, after preparing an extensive environmental impact statement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC. The Department of Energy adopted FERC’s impact statement and issued its own supplemental environmental impact statement in response to Executive Order 13990.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Department of Energy’s final order. The court found that the Department had properly adopted FERC’s environmental impact statement and complied with NEPA. The court also upheld the Department’s finding of substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts, associated with the Project’s exports. The court concluded that the impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries were not reasonably foreseeable and that the Department’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence.The court denied the petitions for review, affirming the Department of Energy’s authorization for the Alaska LNG Project to export LNG. View "Sierra Club v. DOE" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law
United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia
Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia, a leader of the Mexican drug-trafficking organization Los Cuinis, coordinated shipments of tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine into the United States over a decade. He used various methods to conceal the drugs and employed violence and threats of violence in his operations. In 2016, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. He was arrested in Uruguay, where he fought extradition for four years. Despite his arguments against extradition based on the potential for a life sentence in the U.S., he was eventually extradited without any assurances from the U.S. regarding his sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Gonzalez-Valencia to life imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge without a plea agreement. The court calculated his base offense level and applied several enhancements, resulting in a recommendation of life imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines. Gonzalez-Valencia appealed his sentence, raising procedural and substantive claims, including objections to his criminal history category and the application of sentencing enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Gonzalez-Valencia's objections to the sentencing enhancements did not constitute plain error and that his argument regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause was not supported by clear legal precedent. The court also rejected his claim that the district court was required to comply with Uruguay's condition against a life sentence, noting that the U.S. made no such assurances. The court affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that there was no reversible error or grounds for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, International Law
Ateba v. Leavitt
A journalist, Simon Ateba, sought preferred access to the White House Press Area through a special press credential known as a "hard pass." The White House issues hard passes only to reporters accredited by either the Supreme Court Press Gallery or a congressional press gallery. Ateba applied for membership in the Senate Daily Press Gallery as a prerequisite to securing a hard pass, but his application was still under consideration. In the meantime, he accessed the Press Area with a daily pass, which required him to wait for an escort. Ateba argued that the White House Hard Pass Policy violated the First Amendment because it burdened his access and conditioned fuller access on accreditation by the Senate Daily Press Gallery, which he claimed exercised unbridled discretion.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the White House. The court concluded that while Ateba had suffered a cognizable First Amendment injury, the White House acted reasonably under the First Amendment by outsourcing part of its press-credentialing process. The district court also ruled that the Senate Daily Press Gallery did not impermissibly exercise discretion in deciding who could become a member and that extraordinary procedural protections were not constitutionally required.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the White House Hard Pass Policy was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. It found that the policy's reliance on external credentialing bodies was reasonable given the White House's lack of its own vetting system. The court also determined that the Senate Daily Press Gallery's membership criteria, including the "of repute" standard, did not confer unbridled discretion because it was guided by concrete rules. Additionally, the court held that the First Amendment did not require the gallery to set a deadline for processing membership applications. View "Ateba v. Leavitt" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law
Asante v. Kennedy
California collects a fee from in-state hospitals and uses the revenue, along with federal Medicaid funds, to provide subsidies to California hospitals serving Medicaid beneficiaries. Out-of-state hospitals near the California border, which sometimes serve California Medicaid beneficiaries but do not pay the fee, sought access to these subsidies. They argued that their exclusion violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and federal Medicaid regulations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the out-of-state hospitals' arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The hospitals appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the QAF program does not discriminate against interstate commerce because it does not tax out-of-state hospitals, and the supplemental payments are based on in-state provision of medical care. The court also found that the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as California could rationally decide to target subsidies to in-state hospitals serving a disproportionate share of Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Lastly, the court concluded that the QAF program does not violate federal Medicaid regulations, as the regulation in question pertains to base payments for specific services rendered to beneficiaries, not supplemental subsidies like the QAF payments. View "Asante v. Kennedy" on Justia Law
Healthy Gulf v. FERC
Driftwood Pipeline LLC sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to build two new natural gas pipelines in southwestern Louisiana. FERC granted the approval, concluding that the project would serve a market need and that its benefits outweighed its adverse environmental impacts. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club challenged this decision, arguing that FERC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Section 7 certificate to Driftwood Pipeline LLC, determining that the project was required by public convenience and necessity. FERC also published an environmental impact statement, concluding that the project would have some adverse environmental impacts but none that were significant. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied when FERC did not act on it. They then petitioned for review, raising challenges under NEPA and the Natural Gas Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC adequately considered the environmental effects of the project, including its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, and found that FERC's refusal to characterize the significance of these emissions was reasonable. The court also found that FERC's determination of market need was supported by substantial evidence, including precedent agreements and an independent market study. The court concluded that FERC had properly balanced the project's benefits against its adverse effects and denied the petition for review. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law
Thaler v. Perlmutter
A computer scientist, Dr. Stephen Thaler, created an artificial intelligence system called the "Creativity Machine," which autonomously generated an artwork titled "A Recent Entrance to Paradise." Dr. Thaler submitted a copyright registration application to the United States Copyright Office, listing the Creativity Machine as the sole author and himself as the owner. The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its policy that only works authored by humans are eligible for copyright protection.Dr. Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court affirmed the Copyright Office's denial, holding that human authorship is a fundamental requirement under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court also rejected Dr. Thaler's argument that he should own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as the work was never eligible for copyright protection in the first place. Additionally, the court found that Dr. Thaler had waived his argument that he should be considered the author because he created and used the Creativity Machine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Copyright Act requires all eligible works to be authored by a human being. Since Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine, a non-human entity, as the sole author, the application was correctly denied. The court did not address the argument that the Constitution requires human authorship, nor did it consider Dr. Thaler's claim that he is the author by virtue of creating and using the Creativity Machine, as this argument was waived before the agency. View "Thaler v. Perlmutter" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Copyright, Intellectual Property