Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies.The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions.Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives. After each relative interviewed with a consular officer, their visa applications were placed in administrative processing, requiring additional information. Both applicants submitted the required information but experienced lengthy delays. Eventually, after sixteen months, one applicant and his spouse filed a complaint alleging unreasonable delay; the other applicant and his son did the same after seven months. Both sought to compel the Department of State to adjudicate the applications.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The court applied factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC to determine whether there had been an unreasonable delay and ruled that neither complaint met the standard. The applicants appealed the dismissals.While the appeals were pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Department of State finished processing the applications: one applicant received his visa and entered the United States, while the other was refused a visa due to inadmissibility for terrorist activities, with no waiver available. The Court of Appeals held that these events rendered both appeals moot, as no effectual relief could be provided. The court found that neither of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation or “capable of repetition yet evading review”—applied. The court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. The court also declined the appellants’ request to create a new exception to mootness for unreasonable delay claims. View "Mehneh v. Rubio" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request.Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

CenturyTel of Montana, Inc., a telecommunications provider and subsidiary of Lumen Technologies, maintained a longstanding collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 768, covering technicians in northwest Montana. In 2021, concerns arose among various union locals that Lumen was deploying non-union National Technicians to perform work within the jurisdiction of union-represented employees. In response, Local 768 requested detailed information from CenturyTel about the presence and activities of these technicians, aiming to monitor possible violations of the bargaining agreement. After repeated requests and partial responses from the company, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging CenturyTel’s failure to furnish information necessary for the union to carry out its representational duties.The National Labor Relations Board’s administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing, at which testimony established that non-union technicians had worked within the union’s jurisdiction and that the union’s information request was relevant to potential grievances. The ALJ credited the union’s account of communications and found that the requested information was “plainly aimed at ascertaining” possible contract violations. The ALJ rejected the employer’s arguments that the union had failed to show an objective basis for its request and that all relevant information had already been provided. As a result, the ALJ concluded that CenturyTel had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered the company to provide the requested information and post a notice of the violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Board’s order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the union had a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence, that the information was relevant to its duties. The court denied CenturyTel’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. View "CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection LLC manages an extensive electrical grid across thirteen states and the District of Columbia. To ensure competitive market conditions and compliance with regulatory standards, PJM employs Market Monitoring Analytics LLP as its independent market monitor (IMM). For several years, IMM attended meetings between PJM’s Board of Managers and the Liaison Committee, a nonvoting body designed to facilitate communication between PJM Members and the Board. However, PJM began enforcing the Liaison Committee’s charter provision, restricting attendance to end-use customers and regulated utilities, thereby excluding IMM from future meetings.After this exclusion, IMM filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), arguing that PJM’s action violated Section IV.G of its tariff, which IMM interpreted as granting it the right to participate in such stakeholder processes. FERC reviewed the complaint and dismissed it. The Commission determined that Section IV.G only applied to decision-making bodies within PJM that handle proposed revisions to tariffs or market rules, not to the Liaison Committee, which functions solely as a communication forum and does not engage in decision-making or voting.IMM subsequently petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of FERC’s decision. The Court, before addressing the merits, examined whether IMM had standing to challenge its exclusion. The Court held that IMM failed to demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury resulting from its inability to attend the Liaison Committee meetings, as IMM retained access to all market data required for its monitoring functions and had alternative avenues for communication with the Board. The Court further found that IMM had not shown any expenditure of resources to counteract the alleged harm. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to IMM’s lack of standing. View "Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC" on Justia Law

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases concern the constitutionality of statutory limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Both agencies are composed of members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and statutes prohibit the President from removing members except for cause. The NLRB oversees labor relations and union elections, with powers including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of affirmative remedies. The MSPB administers federal employment disputes and can issue final orders, award a range of remedies, and promulgate certain regulations.After the President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB and Cathy Harris from the MSPB—without alleging the statutory grounds for removal—Wilcox and Harris challenged their removals in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that the statutory protections against removal were constitutional under the precedent of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, declared Wilcox and Harris remained in office, and enjoined the government from interfering with their roles. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s orders pending appeal, signaling skepticism about the constitutionality of the removal restrictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments. The court held that, under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The court found that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise powers that are executive in nature and go beyond the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions contemplated in Humphrey’s Executor. Consequently, statutory restrictions on the President’s removal authority for members of these boards are unconstitutional. The court ordered that the removal protections for NLRB and MSPB members be disregarded. View "Harris v. Bessent" on Justia Law

Derrek Arrington was convicted by a jury of assaulting a Park Police officer with a deadly weapon—specifically, using a car to trap and drag the officer before shooting him in the face—and for being a felon in possession of a stolen firearm. He received a 240-month prison sentence for these offenses. After completing his federal sentence, Arrington remained incarcerated because his actions violated parole from a prior armed robbery conviction in D.C. Superior Court, resulting in an additional 11-year sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia originally imposed the 240-month sentence. Years later, after Arrington had served his sentence for the assault and firearm convictions, a different district judge vacated the original sentence and resentenced Arrington, again imposing the 240-month term. The resentencing judge decided to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 140-175 months, citing the extreme moral depravity of Arrington’s actions, including the severe and permanent injuries caused to the officer. The judge also referenced Arrington’s criminal history and questioned whether the Guidelines adequately accounted for the felon-in-possession charge.Arrington appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the resentencing judge failed to consider his rehabilitation during his incarceration. The court found that, while the judge’s oral remarks could be interpreted as ambiguous, the record did not show that the judge ignored the rehabilitation evidence. The appellate court held that any error was not plain and that the upward variance was justified by the egregious nature of the conduct. The court also determined that any error regarding consideration of the firearm conviction was harmless. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Arrington" on Justia Law