Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Robert Goodrich liquidated his stock portfolio due to concerns about the financial market's reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in significant financial losses. Goodrich had an investment account with U.S. Trust Bank of America Private Wealth Management, managed by Matthew Lettinga. Despite advice from Lettinga to avoid liquidation, Goodrich insisted on selling his portfolio. Goodrich later sued Lettinga and Bank of America, claiming gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, arguing that he was not adequately informed of the risks involved in liquidating his portfolio.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Goodrich's claims of gross negligence and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, finding them implausibly pleaded. The court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed but later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Goodrich had explicitly instructed the sale of his portfolio, which precluded liability under the terms of the investment agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The appellate court held that the investment agreement's exculpatory clauses were enforceable and that Goodrich's explicit instruction to liquidate his portfolio shielded the defendants from liability. The court also agreed that Goodrich failed to plausibly allege scienter, a necessary element for his claims under the D.C. Securities Act, and found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's limitation of discovery to the dispositive issue of whether Goodrich instructed the sale. View "Goodrich v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

David O’Connell filed a class action lawsuit against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for fraudulent solicitation of donations. O’Connell alleged that USCCB misled donors about the use of funds collected through the Peter’s Pence Collection, which were purportedly for emergency assistance but were instead used for investments and other purposes. O’Connell claimed that if he had known the true use of the funds, he would not have donated.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied USCCB’s motion to dismiss the case, which was based on the church autonomy doctrine. The District Court found that O’Connell’s claims raised a secular dispute that could be resolved using neutral principles of law, without delving into religious doctrine. The court emphasized that it would not address purely religious questions if they arose during litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed USCCB’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the collateral order doctrine did not apply. The court held that the church autonomy defense could be adequately reviewed on appeal after a final judgment, and that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not conclusive or separate from the merits of the case. The court emphasized that the church autonomy doctrine does not provide immunity from suit but serves as a defense to liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "O'Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

Advocacy Holdings, a company that helps clients influence public policy through its online platform OneClickPolitics, sued its former CEO, Chazz Clevinger, for breaching a noncompete agreement. Clevinger, who resigned in 2023, allegedly stole Advocacy’s customer list, started competing businesses, solicited Advocacy’s customers, and created a near duplicate of Advocacy’s platform. Advocacy sought a preliminary injunction to stop Clevinger’s actions, claiming irreparable harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia partially denied Advocacy’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that Advocacy had not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court did, however, enjoin Clevinger from using Advocacy’s platform design and interface but allowed him to continue operating his competing businesses and soliciting Advocacy’s customers. Advocacy appealed the partial denial of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Advocacy had not shown irreparable harm. The court noted that financial injuries, such as loss of customers, are typically remediable through monetary damages and do not constitute irreparable harm. Additionally, the court found that Advocacy’s claims of reputational harm were unsubstantiated and that the stipulation of irreparable harm in the noncompete agreement was forfeited because Advocacy did not raise it in its initial motion. The court also declined to consider Advocacy’s sliding-scale argument for evaluating preliminary injunction factors, as it was raised too late. The court concluded that without a showing of irreparable harm, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. View "Clevinger v. Advocacy Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Accuracy in Media (AIM) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seeking records about American service members who were prisoners of war (POWs) or missing in action (MIA) from the Vietnam War and potentially still alive in Laos or Vietnam. The CIA conducted a search using specific terms but did not find any responsive records. AIM challenged the adequacy of the CIA's search, arguing that the search terms were insufficient.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, concluding that the search terms used by the CIA were reasonably likely to yield the requested records if they existed. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' evidence did not significantly suggest that the requested files were in the CIA's current operational files.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found that the CIA's search terms were inadequate. The court noted that the search terms omitted key terms such as "Laos," "live sighting," "imagery," "reconnaissance," and "rescue," which were relevant to the FOIA request. The court also found that the CIA did not adequately explain why certain terms were used and others were omitted. The court held that the CIA failed to show beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the CIA and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, requiring the CIA to either conduct a new search or provide a supplemental affidavit with adequate search terms and explanations. View "Hall v. CIA" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) rule on when one entity is considered a joint employer of another entity’s employees. The NLRB determined that Google was a joint employer of Cognizant employees working on Google’s YouTube Music platform and ordered both companies to bargain with the employees’ union, the Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers of America, Local 9009 (AWU). Google and Cognizant refused to bargain, leading the NLRB to conclude that this refusal violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The employers petitioned for review, arguing they were not joint employers, but the contract under which the employees provided services to Google expired, rendering the petitions and the Board’s cross-applications for enforcement moot. The Union also petitioned for review, contending that the NLRB’s remedies were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the expiry of the Google-Cognizant contract meant there was no longer any relationship to support the joint-employer finding, making the case moot. The court dismissed Google’s and Cognizant’s petitions and the Board’s cross-applications as moot and vacated the order below. The court also dismissed as jurisdictionally barred the part of AWU’s petition seeking review of the NLRB’s decision to sever the issue of a make-whole remedy for employees and dismissed as moot those parts of AWU’s petition seeking prospective remedies.The court denied the remainder of AWU’s petition, concluding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by ordering only the customary remedies. The court emphasized that the Board’s choice of remedies is primarily within its province and subject to very limited judicial review. View "Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Samuel Shanks and Taylor Lambert, former employees of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, filed pro se lawsuits against the Union alleging discrimination. Shanks, who worked in accounting for over twenty years, claimed discrimination based on disability, race, color, and sexual orientation, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliation. Lambert, his niece, alleged wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination based on race, religion, and gender. Both claimed violations of various civil rights laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Union removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Shanks and Lambert appealed the dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals in part but appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of claims that were not suited for summary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and concluded that the allegations of racial discrimination related to the Union’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were plausible. The court found that the Union’s two-stage roll-out of the policy disproportionately affected Black employees, who were given less time and fewer resources to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court held that the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims based on race were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including those based on sexual orientation, gender, and religion, as well as Shanks’ hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the racial discrimination claims. View "Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law