Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases concern the constitutionality of statutory limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Both agencies are composed of members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and statutes prohibit the President from removing members except for cause. The NLRB oversees labor relations and union elections, with powers including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of affirmative remedies. The MSPB administers federal employment disputes and can issue final orders, award a range of remedies, and promulgate certain regulations.After the President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB and Cathy Harris from the MSPB—without alleging the statutory grounds for removal—Wilcox and Harris challenged their removals in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that the statutory protections against removal were constitutional under the precedent of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, declared Wilcox and Harris remained in office, and enjoined the government from interfering with their roles. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s orders pending appeal, signaling skepticism about the constitutionality of the removal restrictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments. The court held that, under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The court found that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise powers that are executive in nature and go beyond the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions contemplated in Humphrey’s Executor. Consequently, statutory restrictions on the President’s removal authority for members of these boards are unconstitutional. The court ordered that the removal protections for NLRB and MSPB members be disregarded. View "Harris v. Bessent" on Justia Law

Derrek Arrington was convicted by a jury of assaulting a Park Police officer with a deadly weapon—specifically, using a car to trap and drag the officer before shooting him in the face—and for being a felon in possession of a stolen firearm. He received a 240-month prison sentence for these offenses. After completing his federal sentence, Arrington remained incarcerated because his actions violated parole from a prior armed robbery conviction in D.C. Superior Court, resulting in an additional 11-year sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia originally imposed the 240-month sentence. Years later, after Arrington had served his sentence for the assault and firearm convictions, a different district judge vacated the original sentence and resentenced Arrington, again imposing the 240-month term. The resentencing judge decided to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 140-175 months, citing the extreme moral depravity of Arrington’s actions, including the severe and permanent injuries caused to the officer. The judge also referenced Arrington’s criminal history and questioned whether the Guidelines adequately accounted for the felon-in-possession charge.Arrington appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the resentencing judge failed to consider his rehabilitation during his incarceration. The court found that, while the judge’s oral remarks could be interpreted as ambiguous, the record did not show that the judge ignored the rehabilitation evidence. The appellate court held that any error was not plain and that the upward variance was justified by the egregious nature of the conduct. The court also determined that any error regarding consideration of the firearm conviction was harmless. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Michael Lawrence Rosebar was convicted of multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud, wire fraud, and first-degree fraud after misrepresenting himself as a licensed home improvement contractor and misappropriating funds from homeowners over a seven-year period. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Rosebar was found guilty on several counts and sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and thirty-six months of supervised release. His sentence was calculated using a criminal history category of II, which included two status points for committing the offenses while on probation.Rosebar appealed his conviction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. After the Sentencing Commission amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines with Amendment 821, which changed the calculation of status points for defendants with fewer criminal history points, Rosebar filed a motion in the district court seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10. The district court found Rosebar eligible for a reduction but, after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), denied the motion, citing the seriousness of his offenses, their impact on victims, and his lack of remorse.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly followed the required two-step inquiry, considered all relevant factors, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the sentence reduction. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Rosebar’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "USA v. Rosebar" on Justia Law

A commuter airline that had provided federally subsidized air service to a small community in West Virginia for several years sought to continue serving that community under the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) solicited bids for a new three-year EAS contract. Four airlines, including the incumbent, submitted proposals. The DOT evaluated the applications based on five statutory factors: reliability, agreements with larger carriers, community preferences, marketing plans, and total compensation requested. After reviewing the proposals and soliciting input from the local community, which favored a different airline, the DOT selected a new carrier that offered larger aircraft, a codeshare agreement with a major airline, and a subsidy request within the competitive range.The incumbent airline challenged the DOT’s selection in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and exceeded its statutory authority. The petitioner contended that the DOT failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory factors and improperly chose a more expensive proposal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). On the merits, the court found that the DOT’s findings regarding each statutory factor were supported by substantial evidence and that the agency’s reasoning was adequately explained. The court concluded that the DOT’s selection process was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and that the agency did not exceed its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and upheld the DOT’s selection of the new EAS carrier. View "Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to amended energy efficiency standards issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for consumer furnaces (specifically, residential non-weatherized gas furnaces and mobile home gas furnaces) and certain commercial water heaters under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). Petitioners, including trade associations, manufacturers, and energy providers, argued that the new standards would effectively eliminate non-condensing appliances from the market, claiming these products offer unique features and performance characteristics not available in condensing models. They also contended that DOE failed to provide adequate economic justification for the new standards and did not comply with procedural requirements during rulemaking.Previously, DOE had issued a series of proposed rules and interpretive rules regarding whether non-condensing technology constituted a protected performance characteristic under EPCA. After public comment and a period of shifting interpretations, DOE ultimately concluded in its 2021 Interpretive Rule that non-condensing technology does not provide a unique performance-related feature compared to condensing appliances. DOE then promulgated final rules in 2023 amending the efficiency standards for both consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. Petitioners sought review of these actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that DOE’s interpretation—that non-condensing appliances do not offer performance characteristics or features substantially different from condensing appliances—was reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that DOE’s economic justification for the amended standards was robust and supported by substantial evidence (and, for commercial water heaters, by clear and convincing evidence). Additionally, the court determined that DOE provided an adequate opportunity for public comment. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding DOE’s rules. View "American Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law

A non-profit watchdog organization sought disclosure of formal written opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After initial litigation, the dispute narrowed to three categories of OLC opinions: those resolving interagency disputes, those concerning the adjudication or determination of private rights, and those interpreting non-discretionary legal duties. OLC opinions are considered authoritative within the Executive Branch, but are rarely published.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims seeking disclosure of OLC opinions concerning private rights and non-discretionary legal duties, finding these were not subject to FOIA’s reading-room provision because they did not constitute “working law” unless adopted by the agency. However, the district court held that OLC opinions resolving interagency disputes were disclosable, reasoning that OLC’s process for resolving such disputes was adjudicative in nature and that agencies effectively adopted these opinions by agreeing in advance to abide by them. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on this category, and both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that none of the OLC opinions sought by the plaintiff were subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA’s reading-room provision. The court found that OLC’s opinions do not constitute “final opinions made in the adjudication of cases” nor “statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency” unless the agency takes further action to adopt the advice as its own working law. The court reversed the district court’s judgment requiring disclosure of opinions resolving interagency disputes and affirmed the dismissal of claims regarding private rights and non-discretionary duties. View "Campaign for Accountability v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Several national securities exchanges challenged a 2024 rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that lowered the cap on fees exchanges may charge investors for executing orders. The SEC had previously set a cap of 30 mils ($0.003) per share for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.3% of the quotation price for stocks below $1. In 2024, after gathering new data and considering market developments, the SEC reduced these caps to 10 mils for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.1% for stocks below $1. The SEC explained that the changes were necessary to address market distortions and to align fee caps with reduced minimum tick sizes, thereby promoting price transparency and market efficiency.After the SEC adopted the new rule, several exchanges petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The SEC agreed to stay the amendment pending judicial review. The exchanges contended that the SEC lacked authority to impose an industry-wide fee cap and that, if it had such authority, it was required to proceed on an exchange-by-exchange basis. They also argued that the SEC’s decision-making was arbitrary, particularly in its assessment of market effects and its choice of the 10-mil cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which grants the SEC broad discretion to regulate the national market system, including the power to set universal access-fee caps. The court further found that the SEC’s rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably considered relevant issues, explained its decision, and relied on both economic theory and empirical data. The petition for review was denied. View "Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

A police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., was involved in two separate incidents within five days, during which he used neck restraints—specifically, trachea and carotid artery holds—on two individuals while on duty. Both incidents occurred at McDonald’s restaurants, and in each case, the officer initiated physical contact and applied prohibited neck restraints, despite the individuals not posing an immediate threat or actively resisting arrest. The officer was aware that such holds were forbidden by department policy, and in one instance, had been warned about his conduct just days before repeating it.A grand jury indicted the officer on five charges related to these events. Before trial, three charges were dropped. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial, after which the officer was convicted on two counts of depriving individuals of their rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The jury found that the officer acted willfully, used excessive force, and caused bodily injury. The court sentenced him to concurrent six-month prison terms and supervised release. The officer moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury instructions on willfulness were improper and that the evidence was insufficient. The District Court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the officer’s challenges. The court held that the jury instructions on willfulness were not plainly erroneous, as precedent allows conviction under § 242 for conduct done in reckless disregard of constitutional rights. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings of excessive force and willfulness, and that no impermissible amendment or variance of the indictment occurred. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and the officer’s convictions. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law