Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia.After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

A private health insurer that participates in the Medicare Advantage program consolidated two of its contracts in 2024. One of the pre-existing contracts (“consumed contract”) had provided a Special Needs Plan (SNP) and received a star rating for that measure in 2023, while the other (“surviving contract”) did not. After consolidation, the insurer’s new contract offered an SNP for 2025. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates star ratings for consolidated contracts by taking the enrollment-weighted mean of measure scores from the consumed and surviving contracts. Initially, CMS excluded the consumed contract’s SNP data for the 2025 star rating, but after the insurer’s request, CMS included the data, resulting in the same overall rating as before.The insurer challenged this calculation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that including the consumed contract’s SNP data violated the statute, regulations, and agency guidance, and that CMS failed to adequately explain a change in calculation methodology. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CMS, finding that the agency’s actions complied with applicable law and guidance, and that no further explanation for the calculation was required.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CMS properly applied its regulations and guidance by including the consumed contract’s SNP measure score in the calculation. The court also found that the methodology provided accurate information to beneficiaries, as required by statute, and that CMS did not make a policy change triggering a requirement for further explanation. The district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of CMS was affirmed. View "HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company, together with a healthcare research organization and a kidney patient advocacy group, challenged regulatory actions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) concerning the Medicare payment system for end-stage renal disease (ESRD). The dispute arose after CMS included oral-only drugs, specifically XPHOZAH—a drug manufactured by the company for treating hyperphosphatemia in dialysis patients—within the bundled payment for renal dialysis services under Medicare, effective January 1, 2025. Previously, such oral drugs were reimbursed separately under Medicare Part D.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contesting both the inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundled payment regulation and the specific identification of XPHOZAH as a renal dialysis service. They asserted these actions were arbitrary, exceeded statutory authority, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. CMS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law expressly bars judicial review of the Secretary’s “identification of renal dialysis services included in the bundled payment.” The district court agreed, finding that both the regulation and the identification of XPHOZAH fell within the statutory bar to judicial review because they constituted “identifications” as defined by the statute and were within the agency’s delegated authority. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(G), clearly precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s identification of renal dialysis services, including oral-only drugs and XPHOZAH. The court found that CMS acted within its statutory authority, and therefore, further judicial review was barred. The district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act.Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029.Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision.After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a 2025 policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that expanded the use of expedited removal nationwide. Under the new policy, certain noncitizens who lack valid documentation, have not been admitted or paroled, and cannot demonstrate at least two years of continuous presence in the United States are subject to expedited removal. The policy was accompanied by an internal memorandum providing guidance to immigration officers on its implementation. Plaintiffs, including Make the Road New York, alleged that some of their members were subject to removal under this policy and claimed it violated statutory and constitutional rights, specifically the Due Process Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, halting the implementation and enforcement of the 2025 Designation and the accompanying memorandum. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claim, reasoning that the procedures at issue posed a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests for affected noncitizens, and that additional procedural safeguards were warranted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s stay. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the challenge was timely. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the challenged directives did not violate due process under the applicable Mullane standard, which requires procedures reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, but not the additional protections the district court required. Finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s stay. View "Make The Road New York v. Mullin" on Justia Law