Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Brown, Markus Maly, and Peter Schwartz were tried and convicted by a jury for assaulting police officers on the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021. They traveled separately to Washington, D.C., and participated in the riot following then-President Trump’s rally. Evidence showed that Maly and Schwartz assaulted officers on the Lower West Terrace, with Schwartz throwing a chair and both using pepper spray. All three later entered the Tunnel, where they used pepper spray against officers and attempted to push through the police line.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Schwartz’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and to sever the trials. The court found that the FBI had compelled Schwartz to unlock his phone but ruled that this act was not testimonial. The jury convicted all three defendants on all counts, and the district court sentenced Schwartz to 170 months, Maly to 72 months, and Brown to 54 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Brown’s and Maly’s convictions and Brown’s sentence. It vacated Schwartz’s conviction on the 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) charge and remanded for resentencing. The court also held that compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone violated the Fifth Amendment and remanded to the district court to determine which, if any, of Schwartz’s counts of conviction must be vacated due to this error. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the defendants used pepper spray and, in Schwartz’s case, a chair as deadly or dangerous weapons. The court also upheld the district court’s refusal to give a special unanimity instruction for Maly’s Section 111 counts and found no abuse of discretion in Brown’s sentencing. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law

Aclara Meters LLC owned the license for the Somersworth Hydroelectric Project on the Salmon Falls River between New Hampshire and Maine from 2016 to 2023. In 2019, Aclara sought to surrender its license to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After conducting an environmental assessment, FERC authorized the surrender in 2023. American Whitewater, a conservation organization, requested a rehearing, arguing that two dams from the Project should be removed as a condition of surrender. FERC denied the request, leading Whitewater to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for relief, claiming that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The Commission's environmental assessment concluded that approving the surrender as proposed would not significantly affect the environment, thus an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary. FERC found that removing the dams was unfeasible due to the local municipalities' reliance on the reservoir for water supply and other needs. The Commission also determined that the benefits of keeping the dams outweighed the environmental and recreational benefits of their removal. FERC's decision was based on the public interest, considering the water supply, firefighting needs, and potential impacts on local infrastructure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied Whitewater's petition for review. The court held that FERC's analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Commission reasonably determined that dam removal was unfeasible and appropriately assessed the public interest. The court found that FERC's decision to approve the license surrender without dam removal was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with its policies and precedents. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

The State of Indiana approved a plan to retire a coal-fired facility and replace it with wind and solar energy sources, supplemented by two new natural gas turbines to ensure grid reliability. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a natural gas pipeline to serve these turbines. The Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana challenged FERC’s approval, arguing that FERC’s environmental analysis was unreasonable and inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). The core claim was that FERC should have analyzed non-gas alternatives before approving the pipeline.The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission initially denied CenterPoint Energy’s proposal for an 850-megawatt natural gas unit due to inadequate consideration of alternatives. CenterPoint then modified its plan to include wind generation and applied to build two smaller gas-fired turbines, which the Indiana Commission approved. CenterPoint contracted with Texas Gas Transmission for a 24-mile pipeline to supply natural gas to the new units. Citizens Action intervened in the FERC proceeding, raising environmental concerns. FERC prepared an environmental impact statement and approved the pipeline. Citizens Action’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law, leading to the current petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC acted lawfully and reasonably in its environmental analysis and public convenience and necessity determination. FERC was not required to consider non-gas alternatives outside its jurisdiction and properly identified the project’s purpose as supporting CenterPoint’s new natural gas units. The court also found that FERC’s use of emissions percentages and the absence of a significance label were reasonable and consistent with NEPA. The petition for review was denied. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Jonathan Joshua Munafo pleaded guilty to two charges related to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 33 months in prison, within the agreed U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months. Munafo appealed, arguing that the government breached his plea agreement by not dismissing a pending misdemeanor assault charge in D.C. Superior Court and by referring to his past statements and affiliations during sentencing.The district court for the District of Columbia had accepted Munafo's guilty plea and sentenced him based on the agreed guidelines. Munafo did not raise the issue of the pending misdemeanor charge until after his sentencing, and the court did not rule on it, suggesting instead that Munafo's counsel discuss it with the U.S. Attorney's Office. Munafo also objected to the government's sentencing presentation, claiming it breached the plea agreement by including information beyond the agreed-upon Statement of Offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Munafo forfeited his objection regarding the dismissal of the misdemeanor charge by not pressing it before the district court. Additionally, the court found that the plea agreement did not support Munafo's interpretation that the government was required to dismiss the pending charge. The court also held that the government's references during sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, as the agreement allowed both parties to describe fully the nature and seriousness of Munafo's misconduct.Munafo's claim that his sentence appeared to be based on his constitutionally protected political speech and affiliations was also rejected. The court noted that Munafo had waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the statutory maximum or guidelines range, and he did not make a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice. The court affirmed Munafo's sentence. View "USA v. Munafo" on Justia Law

On January 6, 2021, Darrell Neely, a radio host, entered the U.S. Capitol building during the riot that disrupted the certification of the 2020 presidential election. Neely spent over an hour inside the Capitol, during which he stole items belonging to the U.S. Capitol Police. He was later indicted and convicted of five misdemeanor offenses, resulting in a 28-month prison sentence. Neely appealed, challenging the denial of three pretrial motions on statutory and constitutional grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Neely's motions to dismiss certain charges, transfer venue, and suppress a confession. Neely argued that the statute under which he was charged did not apply to his conduct, that he could not receive a fair trial in the District of Columbia, and that his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The District Court rejected these arguments, leading to Neely's conviction and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Neely's appeal. The court held that the statute in question did apply to Neely's conduct, as it did not specify that only the Secret Service could restrict the relevant areas. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court determined that Neely's Miranda rights were not violated, as there was no evidence of a deliberate two-step interrogation strategy by the FBI. Finally, the court upheld the denial of the motion to transfer venue, finding no presumption of jury prejudice. Consequently, the court affirmed Neely's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Neely" on Justia Law

James Little participated in the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, where he roamed the Senate Gallery, took photographs, and sent messages to his family and friends. He pleaded guilty to one count of Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, a violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G), which carries a maximum punishment of six months in prison or five years of probation. The district court initially sentenced him to 60 days in prison followed by three years of probation.Little appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by imposing both imprisonment and probation for a single violation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court resentenced Little to 150 days in prison, giving him credit for the 60 days already served and an additional 30 days for the time spent on probation.Little appealed again, claiming that his new sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with Little's arguments. The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the imposition of additional punishment because the time Little served on the original sentence was credited against his new sentence. The court also found that Little had no legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence because he had appealed it. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Little's new sentence of 150 days in prison. View "USA v. Little" on Justia Law

Aenergy, S.A. (Aenergy) sought damages from the Republic of Angola for unpaid work related to power turbines to be installed in Angola. Aenergy had previously entered into contracts with Angolan utility subsidiaries to construct, supply, and maintain power plants and water infrastructure. The contracts involved General Electric (GE) turbines and were financed by a credit line from GE Capital. Aenergy alleged that a GE accounting error led to forged contract amendments, resulting in the Angolan government terminating the contracts and seizing turbines.Aenergy initially filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Angola was an adequate alternative forum for the dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Aenergy could bring similar claims in Angola, even if the breach-of-contract claim was time-barred. Aenergy's requests for rehearing and certiorari were denied.Aenergy then filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing on breach of contract for unpaid work. The district court dismissed the case, citing issue preclusion based on the prior SDNY and Second Circuit rulings. The court also conducted a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that Angola remained the appropriate forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that issue preclusion applied because the adequacy of Angola as an alternative forum had already been determined in the previous litigation. The court found that Aenergy's trimmed-down complaint did not change the forum non conveniens analysis, and the Supreme Court of Angola's subsequent dismissal of Aenergy's administrative action did not alter the adequacy of Angola as a forum. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

Howard University’s Board of Trustees amended the institution’s bylaws to remove trustee positions that had been filled by alumni, students, and faculty for several decades. A group of alumni sued the University and the Board in D.C. Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the Board’s amendment was ultra vires because it violated the governing bylaws. Howard removed the case to federal court, arguing that the governance dispute hinged on the University’s federal charter. The alumni moved to remand the case back to state court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the alumni’s motion to remand, holding that the suit implicated a significant federal issue under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. The District Court then granted Howard’s motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals determined that the case did not arise under federal law nor present a significant, disputed federal issue under Grable. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Jenkins v. Howard University" on Justia Law