Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities.The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

A biotechnology company developed a gene therapy for two hereditary blood disorders, which may negatively affect patients’ fertility. To address potential deterrence due to fertility concerns, the company created a program offering up to $70,000 for fertility services to patients receiving the therapy. The program was initially limited to privately insured patients, as the company was concerned it might violate federal healthcare statutes if extended to federally insured patients. To clarify the legality, the company requested an advisory opinion from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the program did not violate relevant statutes and, alternatively, qualified for statutory exceptions.After significant delays and exchanges, HHS issued an unfavorable advisory opinion, concluding the program violated both the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Beneficiary Inducement Statute (BIS), and denied immunity from enforcement. The company sued HHS and its officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the advisory opinion and the regulations governing timing for advisory opinions. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the program violated the AKS and deferring to HHS’s reasoning regarding the BIS exception, while dismissing the challenge to the timing regulations as moot after the opinion was issued.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment for HHS regarding the AKS, holding that the program constituted prohibited remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the therapy. However, it reversed as to the BIS, finding HHS’s determination arbitrary and capricious due to its failure to explain why the statutory exception did not apply. The court also held that the company had standing to challenge HHS’s timing regulations and that those regulations unlawfully evaded the statutory deadline. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

Eric Flannery owns and operates The Big Board, a bar and restaurant in Washington, D.C. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the District imposed masking and proof-of-vaccination requirements for restaurants and bars. Flannery publicly criticized these policies, and The Big Board refused to comply. After the mandates were lifted, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 6C (ANC 6C) formally opposed renewal of The Big Board’s liquor license, citing concerns such as impact on property values and public safety. Flannery and The Big Board attempted to resolve the protest but received little cooperation. Investigators found no evidence supporting ANC 6C’s stated concerns. Ultimately, ANC 6C withdrew its protest after an unproductive mediation session.Flannery and The Big Board sued ANC 6C commissioners in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for Flannery's public criticism and the restaurant's noncompliance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that The Big Board’s refusal to comply with the mandates was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a causal link between Flannery’s protected speech and ANC 6C’s protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. The court agreed with the district court that The Big Board’s noncompliance was not inherently expressive conduct under the First Amendment. However, it found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Flannery’s public criticism—protected speech—was a but-for cause of ANC 6C’s protest, based on statements by a commissioner and lack of evidence supporting the protest’s grounds. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flannery v. Eckenwiler" on Justia Law

The case arose after the District of Columbia’s Child and Family Services Agency, facing a large budget shortfall in 2010, laid off 115 employees as part of a reduction in force. This included eliminating two support positions and creating a new, hybrid role with fewer positions and different qualification requirements. The agency also terminated additional employees across various divisions based on management assessments. A group of former employees, disproportionately Black, filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that these employment practices had a disparate racial impact in violation of Title VII and D.C. law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify specific employment practices as required for a disparate impact claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit revived the disparate impact claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently challenged two discrete employment practices. On remand, the district court found the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact but again granted summary judgment to the District. The court found the agency’s employment practices were consistent with business necessity and that the plaintiffs failed to propose an adequate alternative practice with less disparate impact.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under Title VII, an employer satisfies the business necessity defense if the challenged employment practice reasonably fits with its legitimate interests. Applying this standard, the court found both disputed practices fit legitimate governmental interests in reducing costs while maintaining services. Because the plaintiffs did not identify an equally effective alternative practice with less disparate impact, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the District. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Manufacturers of medical and digital devices, represented by two trade associations, challenged a regulation enacted by the Librarian of Congress under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The regulation, known as the medical device repair exemption, allows certain third parties to circumvent technological protection measures on medical equipment software for the purpose of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair. The associations contended that this exemption threatened their copyrights by enabling independent service organizations to access and use software that, they argued, was primarily intended for repair and maintenance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed some of the associations’ claims, including those under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), on sovereign immunity grounds and found the rulemaking was within the Librarian’s authority and not unconstitutional. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part, directing the district court to evaluate the APA claims. After further rulemaking and additional arguments, including discussion of Supreme Court precedent and the renewal of the exemption, the district court granted summary judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress. The court concluded that the exemption was consistent with the DMCA, the fair use doctrine, and was supported by the administrative record.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the Librarian’s adoption and renewal of the medical device repair exemption were not arbitrary or capricious under the APA. The court found the Librarian’s application of the statutory fair use factors reasonable, including determinations that the use was transformative, the software was primarily functional, the amount of use was justified, and the exemption did not harm the market for the original works. The judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress was affirmed. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

A soldier deployed in Afghanistan in 2009 left his post without permission to report leadership deficiencies, was captured by a Taliban-allied group, and held hostage for five years. His disappearance prompted a search mission that injured several American servicemembers. In 2014, he was released in exchange for five detainees at Guantanamo Bay, an event that sparked political debate. Upon return, he faced court-martial charges for desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. He pled guilty, and the presiding military judge imposed a dishonorable discharge, rather than the lengthy prison sentence sought by the prosecution.After the court-martial, the soldier challenged his conviction, alleging unlawful command influence, citing public comments by Senator John McCain and President Donald Trump, and raised concerns about the presiding judge’s undisclosed application for a Department of Justice position. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also upheld the decision. Subsequent requests for reconsideration and review were denied, as was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.He then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking collateral review and expungement of his conviction and sentence. The District Court granted partial relief, vacating military court orders issued after the judge’s DOJ application and allowing for possible further proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Article III district courts lack jurisdiction on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments, as such authority resides with direct appellate tribunals. The Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bergdahl v. USA" on Justia Law

In 2011, Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired multiple rounds from an assault rifle at the White House, causing significant property damage. He believed then-President Obama was the anti-Christ and intended to harm him, but the President and First Lady were not present; two other members of the First Family were inside. No one was injured, but the shots struck areas near Secret Service officers and damaged the Truman Balcony. Ortega-Hernandez fled the scene and was arrested in Pennsylvania after a multi-state search.A federal grand jury indicted Ortega-Hernandez on nineteen counts, including attempting to assassinate the President. In 2013, he pled guilty to two counts: injuring a dwelling or placing lives in jeopardy within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 1363), and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The predicate crime for the § 924(c) charge was his § 1363 conviction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced him to 25 years in prison. After subsequent Supreme Court decisions invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, Ortega-Hernandez moved to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that § 1363 did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether Ortega-Hernandez’s § 1363 conviction categorically constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. The court held that willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling necessarily involves the use of physical force against the property of another and that § 1363 targets injury to another’s property, not one’s own. Therefore, Ortega-Hernandez’s conviction under § 924(c) stands, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Ortega-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Cheryl Walker used her Uber account to order a guest ride for her husband, Carroll Walker. Carroll had never downloaded the Uber app or created an account, and he consistently stated that he does not read or reply to text messages. On the relevant occasion, Cheryl ordered a ride for Carroll, and Uber sent Carroll a text message with ride details and a hyperlink to its Terms of Use, which included an arbitration provision. Carroll did not see the message. During the ride, an accident occurred, allegedly due to the driver’s distraction by Uber’s app, resulting in severe injuries to Carroll.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Cheryl Walker sued Uber on Carroll’s behalf, asserting negligence and products liability claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing Carroll was bound to arbitrate either because he had notice of the Terms via Uber’s text message or as a third-party beneficiary of Cheryl’s contract with Uber. The district court denied Uber’s motion, finding Uber failed to establish that Carroll was on inquiry notice of the Terms and concluding that Carroll was not bound as a third-party beneficiary or estopped from refusing arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration de novo, applying D.C. contract law. The Court held that Uber had not shown Carroll agreed to be bound by its Terms of Use, as Carroll lacked actual or inquiry notice of the Terms. The Court further determined that Carroll was not bound by Cheryl’s contract as a third-party beneficiary or by equitable estoppel, since Carroll was not seeking to enforce Cheryl’s contract and his claims were independent of it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A natural gas company operating in multiple states applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for permission to build new pipeline facilities and abandon some existing ones, requesting that the costs of these improvements be included in future customer rates. The company’s customers, a group of retail natural gas distributors, challenged the application, arguing that less costly alternatives existed, that the improvements were not justified by customer needs, and that FERC should not pre-determine the rate treatment for the project. The core dispute arose when the customers requested access to specific pipeline flow data, designated as sensitive Critical Energy Infrastructure Information, which was withheld from the public docket. FERC eventually released the requested data, but the customers claimed that the delay impaired their ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.FERC granted the company’s application, issuing a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and permitting facility abandonment. The Commission found that the evidence, including flow data, demonstrated the necessity of the project and justified the proposed rate treatment, noting that objections to rates could be addressed in future proceedings. The customers filed a rehearing request, alleging that FERC’s decision was premature and unsupported by substantial evidence due to delayed data access. FERC denied rehearing, later provided the requested data, and solicited comments, but the customers maintained that the timing was inadequate and refused to comment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court found the customers had standing, the case was not moot, and limited its review to arguments raised in the rehearing request. Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court held that FERC’s procedures and consideration of the record, including flow data, were sufficient and did not violate due process. The petitions for review were denied. View "East Tennessee Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case concerns Cesar Gomez Almonte, who was convicted for his role in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy. Beginning in 2016, conspirators based in the Dominican Republic transported large quantities of cocaine into the United States using boats with secret compartments. Almonte was responsible for procuring and outfitting these vessels. After U.S. officials became aware of the operation, Almonte was indicted under seal in Washington, D.C., and later arrested during a layover at Miami International Airport.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw Almonte’s trial, during which a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced him to 184 months in prison. Almonte raised several constitutional claims on appeal: he argued that the 18-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that venue in D.C. was improper under Article III and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and that the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial after certain jurors expressed concerns about his counsel denied him an impartial jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed these claims. The court held that the delay between indictment and arrest did not violate Almonte’s right to a speedy trial, given the government’s good-faith investigative reasons and his failure to show specific prejudice. On venue, the court found that Almonte waived his only meritorious venue argument regarding the Eastern District of Virginia by not raising it when invited, and his other arguments about venue in Florida were either without merit or forfeited. Regarding juror impartiality, the court concluded that the district court handled the matter appropriately through voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Almonte" on Justia Law