Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A minister sought to hold a small prayer event on the lower section of the Eastern Steps of the United States Capitol, advocating for various causes including opposition to federal funding of abortion. Under federal regulations, public demonstrations on these Steps are generally prohibited unless sponsored by a member of Congress, with violations carrying criminal penalties. The minister, unable to secure sponsorship, faced the threat of arrest and had previously been arrested for similar conduct.After protracted litigation and partial settlement, the parties stipulated to key facts and proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ruled in favor of the minister on his First Amendment claim, holding that the lower section of the Eastern Steps was a traditional public forum and that the regulations at issue suppressed more speech than necessary. The district court entered a permanent universal injunction, barring enforcement of the regulations against anyone wishing to demonstrate on the lower Steps. The Capitol Police Board appealed, and the district court later limited the injunction to the minister and up to 14 others pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo regarding summary judgment and for abuse of discretion as to the injunction. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s forum classification, holding that the Eastern Steps constitute a nonpublic forum because of their specialized function and physical integration with the Capitol. Nevertheless, the court held that the regulation’s requirement of congressional sponsorship for demonstrations was unreasonable, as it granted unbridled discretion to members of Congress, violating First Amendment protections. The court affirmed summary judgment for the minister but vacated the universal injunction, remanding for the district court to determine the proper scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance limiting universal injunctions. View "Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Board" on Justia Law

The case involves the allocation of statutory royalties collected from cable television systems for the distant retransmission of broadcast programming between 2014 and 2017. Under Section 111 of the Copyright Act, cable providers pay fees into a pooled fund, which the Copyright Royalty Board (the Board) is tasked with distributing among copyright claimants based on the relative marketplace value of their programming. Six claimant groups participated, including the Joint Sports Claimants (JSC) and Public Television (PTV), both of whom challenged the Board’s methodology and the resulting allocation.The Copyright Royalty Board conducted adversarial proceedings, admitting evidence and expert testimony focused on two principal valuation methods: regression analysis and constant-sum surveys (specifically the Bortz Survey). After accounting for adjustments to correct for market changes and methodological limitations—such as the conversion of WGNA from broadcast to cable and the impact of must-carry rules—the Board issued a final determination in June 2024, allocating royalty shares among the groups. Both JSC and PTV appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, while other claimant groups intervened.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected nearly all challenges to the Board’s use of regression and survey methodologies, finding them reasonable. However, the court found the Board failed to sufficiently explain how it merged the results of the two methodologies to arrive at the final allocation percentages. Because the decisive step in the allocation process lacked a clear and reasoned explanation, the court vacated the Board’s final determination and remanded for further proceedings and clarification. View "Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. LOC" on Justia Law

A former high-ranking Navy Admiral served for nearly forty years before retiring. During his last assignment, he interacted with Next Jump, Inc., a company providing leadership training. Despite staff recommendations against further contracts, the Admiral privately negotiated with Next Jump’s executives. They discussed post-retirement employment for him, with substantial compensation and equity, contingent on facilitating a Navy contract. The Admiral pushed through the contract, deviating from usual procedures, and began working for Next Jump after retirement. Subsequent feedback on the training was negative. He later admitted to investigators he had been improperly influenced.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after the Admiral was indicted for conspiracy to accept a bribe, bribery, conflict of interest, and concealment of a material fact. At trial, the government presented evidence of a “contract for a job” arrangement and concealment of the agreement. The jury convicted him on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. Next Jump’s co-CEOs were tried separately; their first trial ended in a hung jury and they were acquitted upon retrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Admiral’s appeal, which challenged evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the fairness of the trial. The Circuit Court held that the evidentiary rulings were either proper or harmless given the overwhelming evidence. Although it identified a legally erroneous jury instruction regarding mens rea for bribery, the error was invited by defense counsel and thus not grounds for reversal. The Court affirmed the convictions, concluding no cumulative error deprived the Admiral of a fair trial. View "USA v. Burke" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company, a private utility in Michigan, planned to retire the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant, a decades-old coal facility, and replace it with newer, cleaner, and more reliable energy sources. The proposed closure and replacement plan underwent extensive review by the Michigan Public Service Commission and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), both of which ultimately approved it after finding that the substitute resources would meet reliability standards and improve affordability and environmental outcomes. As the retirement date neared, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, compelling Consumers Energy to keep the Campbell plant operational, citing an energy emergency in the region.The Michigan Public Service Commission approved the integrated resource plan after a contested case proceeding, finding that it would enhance resource adequacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s approval. MISO also determined that Campbell’s retirement, as planned, would not threaten reliability. Consumers Energy documented sufficient capacity to meet projected demand, and MISO’s resource auction confirmed adequate supply and reserve margins for the relevant period. No state or regional entity requested FERC intervention, nor did the Michigan governor declare an energy emergency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the DOE’s order. The court held that section 202(c) grants DOE limited, emergency authority to intervene only when an electricity shortage creates an acute risk that cannot be timely addressed by state or regional planning, and immediate federal action is necessary. The court found that DOE’s asserted circumstances did not constitute such an emergency, as reasonable alternatives existed and the state had adequately planned for resource adequacy. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated DOE’s order. View "People of the State of Michigan v. DOE" on Justia Law

A former employee, after suspecting his previous employer of facilitating a foreign bribery scheme, provided his suspicions and supporting documents to a journalist. The journalist informed the Department of Justice (DOJ) and published articles exposing the alleged misconduct. Following a tip from a DOJ attorney, the employee was advised to submit his information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to potentially qualify for a whistleblower award. However, the employee waited over a year before submitting his information directly to the SEC, by which time the SEC had already begun its investigation and independently developed its case using information from the DOJ and public sources.The SEC’s Claims Review Staff (CRS) issued a preliminary determination denying the whistleblower award, reasoning that the employee’s submission neither led the SEC to open its investigation nor significantly contributed to the enforcement action, as the information was already known. The CRS also found that the employee did not meet the regulatory timing requirements for information submitted to other agencies. The employee contested this, relying on a prior SEC order that had granted an award in a similar situation, but the Commission had since disavowed that reasoning and clarified that both original source status and causation are required for an award.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order. The court held that, under the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act and implementing regulations, a whistleblower must submit original information directly to the SEC, and that information must lead to a successful enforcement action. Because the employee’s belated submission did not assist the SEC’s investigation or enforcement efforts, he was not entitled to an award. The court denied the petition for review. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

Federal tax privacy law prohibits the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from sharing taxpayer return information with other federal agencies unless strict statutory requirements are met. In 2025, after a request from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the IRS developed and implemented a new protocol, known as the Data-Exchange Procedure, for responding to ICE’s mass requests for the addresses of over a million undocumented individuals. This streamlined process did not ensure that ICE’s requests satisfied the statutory prerequisites, such as providing a taxpayer’s actual address or identifying an appropriate point of contact personally involved in a criminal investigation. Using this flawed procedure, the IRS disclosed over 47,000 taxpayer records to ICE.The Center for Taxpayer Rights, joined by other organizations, sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the IRS’s actions violated federal law and harmed their missions by eroding trust in the tax system, deterring immigrant engagement, and diverting resources. The district court found that the IRS had, in fact, adopted a new policy, concluded plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, and issued a preliminary injunction halting further disclosures under the new procedure unless statutory requirements were strictly followed and the court was notified of any future requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the IRS’s Data-Exchange Procedure constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), did not comply with statutory requirements, and that the relief available under the Internal Revenue Code did not preclude APA review. The court found plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS" on Justia Law

Gina Latture, a Black woman, was hired in January 2021 as Director of Sales and Marketing by Priority Life Care, LLC (PLC) to prepare a new assisted living facility in Washington, D.C. for its opening. She reported directly to the Executive Director and worked alongside other staff, most of whom were white. Latture alleged that during her tenure, she was subjected to racially derogatory comments by coworkers and supervisors. Despite objections to at least one comment, she did not formally report most incidents, fearing retaliation. After the facility opened with low occupancy, Latture’s job performance was scrutinized, and she was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Following an altercation with supervisors regarding her duties, she was terminated for insubordination and unprofessionalism in August 2021. Afterward, an offer of employment from another facility was rescinded, which Latture attributed to negative comments from PLC representatives.Latture filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, bringing common law claims for wrongful termination and tortious interference with business relations, as well as Title VII claims for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. PLC removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the common law claims and granted summary judgment to PLC on the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that Latture failed to plead sufficient facts to support her common law claims, specifically lacking the required specificity for the wrongful termination and tortious interference claims. The appellate court also determined that PLC was entitled to summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims, as Latture did not provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent. The hostile work environment claim was affirmed as untimely. View "Latture v. Priority Life Care, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities.The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

A biotechnology company developed a gene therapy for two hereditary blood disorders, which may negatively affect patients’ fertility. To address potential deterrence due to fertility concerns, the company created a program offering up to $70,000 for fertility services to patients receiving the therapy. The program was initially limited to privately insured patients, as the company was concerned it might violate federal healthcare statutes if extended to federally insured patients. To clarify the legality, the company requested an advisory opinion from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the program did not violate relevant statutes and, alternatively, qualified for statutory exceptions.After significant delays and exchanges, HHS issued an unfavorable advisory opinion, concluding the program violated both the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Beneficiary Inducement Statute (BIS), and denied immunity from enforcement. The company sued HHS and its officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the advisory opinion and the regulations governing timing for advisory opinions. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the program violated the AKS and deferring to HHS’s reasoning regarding the BIS exception, while dismissing the challenge to the timing regulations as moot after the opinion was issued.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment for HHS regarding the AKS, holding that the program constituted prohibited remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the therapy. However, it reversed as to the BIS, finding HHS’s determination arbitrary and capricious due to its failure to explain why the statutory exception did not apply. The court also held that the company had standing to challenge HHS’s timing regulations and that those regulations unlawfully evaded the statutory deadline. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

Eric Flannery owns and operates The Big Board, a bar and restaurant in Washington, D.C. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the District imposed masking and proof-of-vaccination requirements for restaurants and bars. Flannery publicly criticized these policies, and The Big Board refused to comply. After the mandates were lifted, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 6C (ANC 6C) formally opposed renewal of The Big Board’s liquor license, citing concerns such as impact on property values and public safety. Flannery and The Big Board attempted to resolve the protest but received little cooperation. Investigators found no evidence supporting ANC 6C’s stated concerns. Ultimately, ANC 6C withdrew its protest after an unproductive mediation session.Flannery and The Big Board sued ANC 6C commissioners in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for Flannery's public criticism and the restaurant's noncompliance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that The Big Board’s refusal to comply with the mandates was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a causal link between Flannery’s protected speech and ANC 6C’s protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. The court agreed with the district court that The Big Board’s noncompliance was not inherently expressive conduct under the First Amendment. However, it found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Flannery’s public criticism—protected speech—was a but-for cause of ANC 6C’s protest, based on statements by a commissioner and lack of evidence supporting the protest’s grounds. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flannery v. Eckenwiler" on Justia Law