Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

President Trump, without congressional approval or proper consultation, demolished the White House East Wing over three days in October 2025 to build a privately funded 90,000 square-foot ballroom. The National Park Service’s environmental assessment acknowledged that the project would cause permanent and adverse impacts on President’s Park’s historical landscape, disrupting architectural integrity and historical continuity. The National Trust for Historic Preservation, a congressionally chartered organization with longstanding ties to President’s Park, challenged the construction, citing irreparable harm to the historic, aesthetic, and cultural interests of its members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia first denied a temporary restraining order, relying on government assurances about the timing and separability of underground and above-ground work. Later, after the National Trust amended its complaint and renewed its request, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against above-ground ballroom construction, but exempted below-ground work and measures necessary for safety and security. The court found both statutory (APA) and ultra vires claims likely to succeed, concluding that neither the President nor the National Park Service had congressional authority for such dramatic alterations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s modified preliminary injunction. The court held that Congress exercises exclusive control over federal property, including the White House, under the Property and District Clauses. Statutory language and appropriations history did not authorize unilateral demolition and replacement of the East Wing with a privately funded ballroom. The court ruled that the National Trust had associational standing, that the Trust was likely to succeed on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court vacated its prior administrative stay and stayed its ruling for fourteen days to permit further review. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. NPS" on Justia Law

A Slovenian businessman, who had served as a consultant to the government of Brunei, entered into an agreement to investigate corruption within the Bruneian government. He alleges that after delivering his findings—which implicated high-level officials in theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing—his contractual partners refused to pay him and conspired, along with three corporate entities, to ruin his reputation and business. The suit claims violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various common law contract and tort theories. The corporate defendants are Audley Property Management Company Limited, Seven Properties AG, and The Dorchester Group, LLC.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the corporate defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding neither general nor specific jurisdiction was established. It also denied the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that his allegations were speculative and that the proposed discovery would not show purposeful direction of activities toward the United States. Partial final judgment was entered in favor of the corporate defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. The appellate court assumed, based on the parties’ agreement and post-Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, that personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment required reasonableness and a meaningful nexus to the United States. The court found the plaintiff had not established any concrete interest in litigating in the U.S., nor had he identified any meaningful U.S. interest in the dispute. The burden on the foreign corporate defendants would be unjustified. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei" on Justia Law

Two individuals who were victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran obtained judgments against Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s terrorism exception and were deemed eligible for compensation from the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. The Fund is financed by criminal penalties and forfeitures related to certain offenses involving state sponsors of terrorism. After British American Tobacco and its subsidiary agreed to pay over $629 million in criminal penalties and forfeitures for conspiracies involving illicit business with North Korean entities, the Department of Justice allocated only a small fraction of those proceeds to the Fund. The Department’s allocation was based on its interpretation that only proceeds from offenses with a direct nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Department of Justice, upholding its interpretation of the relevant statutory funding provision. The district court reasoned that only proceeds from transactions or conduct occurring while North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited into the Fund, and that the Department’s allocation was consistent with statutory requirements.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Justice erred in its allocation. The statutory language requires all proceeds from violations of IEEPA and TWEA, including conspiracy offenses charged under IEEPA, to be deposited into the Fund regardless of any nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism. Additionally, for related criminal conspiracies such as BAT’s bank fraud conspiracy, if the offense originated from doing business with a state sponsor of terrorism, all proceeds must be deposited into the Fund. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. View "Englehardt v. Blanche" on Justia Law

After a major healthcare system filed for bankruptcy in 2024, a Senate committee initiated an investigation to understand the causes. The committee subpoenaed the system’s former CEO, who had overseen its operations, to testify at a hearing about the bankruptcy. The CEO objected, arguing that the committee’s actions—including the subpoena and subsequent contempt proceedings—violated his Fifth Amendment rights, particularly after he formally invoked those rights and refused to appear. The committee nevertheless proceeded, holding hearings and passing both civil and criminal contempt resolutions, with the full Senate adopting the criminal contempt resolution unanimously.The CEO then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the committee and most of its members, seeking to declare their actions unlawful and to quash the subpoena. He also asked the court to enjoin further punishment for his refusal to testify. The committee moved to dismiss the case, relying on the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, which protects legislative acts from judicial inquiry. The district court agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and denying the CEO’s request for jurisdictional discovery, finding the challenged actions fell squarely within the protected legislative sphere.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause absolutely barred the suit because the conduct challenged—issuing the subpoena, conducting the hearing, and voting on contempt resolutions—were core legislative acts. The court further determined that the CEO’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment did not deprive these acts of their legislative character, nor did allegations about the senators’ motives create an exception. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and its denial of discovery. View "De la Torre v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims.Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute over whether the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is entitled, under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), to restoration of approximately 1.5 million acres of unallotted land within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. The Tribe argued that it was entitled to reclaim these lands, asserting that historical treaties, statutes, and executive orders granted it compensable title—meaning a right to proceeds from any sale of these lands. The federal government and the State of Utah, on the other hand, contended that the Tribe never acquired such compensable title for the Utah reservation lands; rather, any compensable title extended only to lands within the Tribe’s original reservation in Colorado.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Tribe’s challenge to the Department of the Interior’s denial of restoration. In that court, all parties agreed that only lands to which the Tribe had compensable title could be restored under the IRA. The district court found that none of the relevant treaties, statutes, or executive orders gave the Tribe compensable title to the disputed lands in Utah, and thus granted summary judgment to the federal defendants and Utah, while denying the Tribe’s cross-motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that, under the text and structure of the 1880 Act and subsequent legal developments, the Tribe’s compensable title did not extend to unallotted lands within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. Therefore, those lands are not eligible for restoration under the IRA. The court rejected the Tribe’s various historical and statutory arguments to the contrary and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA" on Justia Law

A Foreign Service officer who had worked for the State Department since 1993 alleged discrimination after being denied a promotion and experiencing difficult interactions with a supervisor, whom she accused of discriminatory conduct. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint and then sued the Department, raising five claims under Title VII, one under the Rehabilitation Act, and one under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), seeking over $10,000 in damages for the FLSA claim.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the State Department on all the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. Regarding the FLSA claim, even though both parties argued that the district court had jurisdiction, the court relied on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Waters v. Rumsfeld, which held that only the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over FLSA claims against the United States seeking more than $10,000. Based on that precedent, the district court transferred the FLSA claim to the Court of Federal Claims. The plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the State Department on the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. However, the appellate court held that the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA damages claims against the United States, overruling its previous decision in Waters in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bormes. The court vacated the transfer of the FLSA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim in the district court. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Ruppe v. Rubio" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case used an encrypted filesharing site to acquire hundreds of videos containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), which he then uploaded to his Google Drive account and stored on his computer. In October 2020, Google’s automated software identified some of these files as likely CSAM and, following federal law, sent so-called “CyberTip” reports to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC’s automated system, in turn, forwarded the reports and files to law enforcement, specifically a detective in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. The detective initially viewed some of the CSAM files without a warrant, then consulted a federal prosecutor and sought a warrant to review the files. A magistrate judge, however, advised that no warrant was needed, citing the “private search” doctrine, and the detective proceeded accordingly. Subsequent searches led to further evidence and ultimately to the defendant’s arrest and indictment for possession and transportation of CSAM.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation when the detective first viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was unwarranted under the good-faith exception and independent-source doctrine. The court also rejected the argument that the residential search warrant only permitted seizure, not search, of digital devices. After an eight-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on multiple counts related to possession and transportation of CSAM. The court further declined to reduce the sentencing offense level as requested by the defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detective viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was not warranted because the government later obtained lawful authority from a magistrate judge and the detective acted in good faith. The court also found the residential search warrant authorized both seizure and search of digital devices and upheld the sentencing determination. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a drive-by shooting targeted Antonio Payne’s home in Washington, D.C., police responded to the scene. Surveillance footage from neighbors captured Payne confronting an unidentified man, during which Payne was seen holding a gun, frisking the man, and making threatening statements. Payne was observed stepping off his driveway onto the alley while armed. Officers, invited into the home by Payne’s mother, saw ammunition in plain view. Detective interviews and a review of the footage led to a search warrant application for the home for evidence of carrying a pistol without a license. The warrant, which contained a typographical error in the cited statute but correctly described the offense, was granted. Upon execution, multiple firearms, drugs, and related materials were found. DNA testing linked Payne to several firearms.Before trial, Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Payne’s matching clothing, video evidence of him with a gun, and the shooting incident. At trial, Payne conceded he was filmed carrying a gun and stipulated he lacked a license. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including carrying a pistol without a license. Payne was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The appellate court held that, even assuming the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant triggered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court also found sufficient evidence supported Payne’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, as video footage and trial concessions established the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Payne’s new arguments regarding the statute’s typographical error and self-defense. View "USA v. Payne" on Justia Law

The case centers on reforms to the process by which new energy generators, particularly renewable energy sources, connect to the nation’s power grid. At the end of 2023, a significant backlog existed, with about 2,600 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity awaiting interconnection studies, mainly from solar, wind, and energy storage projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that delays and inefficiencies in the existing interconnection process were creating unjust and unreasonable conditions in wholesale energy markets, hindering timely development and competition.FERC responded by issuing Order 2023, acting under its remedial authority in Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Order 2023 mandated nationwide reforms for transmission providers, replacing the prior serial study model with a clustered study approach, requiring more substantial deposits, imposing withdrawal fines, establishing firm study deadlines, and implementing automatic late fees for missed deadlines. FERC also standardized affected-system study procedures and adopted energy-service modeling as the default. Following thirty-two rehearing and clarification requests, FERC issued Order 2023-A, reaffirming its findings and adjustments.Petitioners challenged three major aspects: the withdrawal fines, study deadlines backed by late fees, and the energy-service modeling requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC acted within its statutory authority, reasonably explained its reforms, and provided adequate process and safeguards. The court denied all petitions, holding that FERC’s nationwide interconnection regime and rulemaking under Order 2023 were lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not unduly discriminate or violate constitutional protections. The court also affirmed that FERC reasonably balanced competing interests and that its reforms were supported by substantial evidence. View "Advanced Energy United v. FERC" on Justia Law