Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody.The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

On Christmas Eve, Bruce Bunting slipped and fell outside a CVS store in the District of Columbia on a walkway covered with a mix of water and salt or de-icing material, resulting in a serious ankle injury. Photographs taken soon after showed a wet but not icy surface. Bunting and his wife sued CVS in D.C. Superior Court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and loss of consortium under D.C. law. They argued CVS failed to maintain a safe walkway and did not adequately warn of the hazard. Both sides retained expert witnesses to address whether the walkway met the standard of care, focusing on its static coefficient of friction (COF); the parties agreed a COF below 0.50 indicated a dangerously slippery surface.After CVS removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, that court granted summary judgment to CVS. The district court concluded the plaintiffs were required to present expert testimony showing the walkway was below the COF standard, and found the plaintiffs’ expert testing insufficient because it did not replicate the precise mix of salt and water present at the time of the fall. The court also granted CVS summary judgment on the negligence per se claim, holding that the cited municipal safety regulation did not establish a duty different from the common law standard of care.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the parties’ expert evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the walkway was unreasonably slippery, making summary judgment inappropriate on the negligence claim. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for CVS on the negligence per se claim, finding that the municipal regulation at issue merely repeated the common law duty of reasonable care. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, after being represented by several law firms over multiple years in a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service, was awarded attorneys’ fees by the district court under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The total fee award was almost $789,000. The various law firms that had represented the nonprofit at different times—specifically, a set of former attorneys and the Bopp Law Firm—disputed how much each was entitled to from the award. Both the former attorneys and Bopp asserted they had an equitable charging lien entitling them to direct payment from the fee award, rather than requiring payment first be made to the client.After the resolution of the underlying claims, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the former attorneys had a valid charging lien but denied Bopp’s motion to enforce its own lien. The district court reasoned, based on Indiana law (per a choice-of-law provision in Bopp's fee agreement), that Bopp had to show an agreement with the client that its compensation would come from the fund itself. The court concluded Bopp failed to establish such an agreement and thus did not have a valid lien.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard under Indiana law. Indiana law recognizes two independent ways an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien: either by securing the fund for the client or by an agreement with the client to be paid from the fund. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Bopp satisfied either prong and for potential resolution of lien priority and the calculation of amounts owed. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

A visually impaired scientist was hired as a one-year fellow at the U.S. Department of State through a program administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, with the possibility of a second year if all parties agreed. The State Department provided her with several accommodations, including screen-reading software and noise-cancelling headphones. She experienced difficulties with the software and office environment, and alleged negative treatment by her supervisor. After initially being offered a renewal of her fellowship, negotiations regarding the renewal paperwork stalled, and the offer was rescinded. She filed a formal complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation based on her disability. Later, she was not selected to lead a project portfolio, a position for which she did not self-nominate. She continued to request accommodations, which were addressed with varying speed and effectiveness.After the end of her fellowship, the plaintiff sued the State Department in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Department, finding that the agency had provided reasonable accommodations, had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, and had not retaliated against her.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the State Department did not deny the plaintiff reasonable accommodations, did not discriminate against her on the basis of disability, and did not retaliate against her for requesting accommodations or filing complaints. The court found that the agency participated in good faith in the interactive process, provided reasonable accommodations, and had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for its employment decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State Department. View "Qashu v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput.After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

A Canadian investment company provided loans to Mexican companies owned by a businessman, securing these loans with mortgages and promissory notes. When the Mexican companies defaulted, the investor attempted to recover its funds through negotiations and litigation in Mexico. The investor alleged that a fraudulent scheme, orchestrated by the businessman, led to a forged settlement used in Mexican court to void the loans. After Mexican courts did not provide relief, the investor initiated arbitration against Mexico under NAFTA, claiming Mexico failed to provide the protections required for foreign investments.The arbitral tribunal, seated in Washington, D.C., found that only the mortgages—not the promissory notes—qualified as protected “investments” under NAFTA. The tribunal concluded that Mexico had breached its obligations under Article 1105(1) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s qualifying investments, awarding $47 million in compensation to the investor. Mexico then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrators exceeded their authority and disregarded the law. The district court rejected these arguments, confirming the award. Separately, the businessman sought to intervene in the proceedings, claiming his interests were harmed, but the district court denied intervention.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the arbitral tribunal did not exceed its powers, as it at least arguably interpreted the relevant treaty provisions, and did not act in manifest disregard of the law. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the businessman’s motion to intervene, finding Mexico adequately represented his interests. The court affirmed the district court’s order in full. View "United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P." on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States government suspended the processing of Diversity Immigrant Visa (DV) applications for the 2021 fiscal year. The State Department halted interviews and adjudication of diversity visa applications, and a presidential proclamation further restricted the entry of DV selectees. Processing resumed only after the proclamation was revoked, leaving many selectees unable to complete the process before the fiscal year ended. Some applicants in this group received visas and became lawful permanent residents, but others did not receive any meaningful response to their applications.Applicants who did not receive visas, as well as those who did, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They challenged the State Department’s handling of the 2021 DV Program and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the government to adjudicate their visa applications or preserve their eligibility beyond the fiscal year. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed the equitable claims as moot, finding that it could not grant relief after the fiscal year ended. The court also dismissed other claims—including requests for declaratory relief and nominal damages—for lack of standing, and denied the plaintiffs’ request to file supplemental briefing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that claims seeking preservation of visa eligibility were moot in light of prior circuit precedent, since courts cannot order visa processing beyond the relevant fiscal year. It also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their remaining claims because past injuries alone did not justify declaratory relief, nominal damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and equitable claims were foreclosed by precedent. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying supplemental briefing. View "Gjoci v. DOS" on Justia Law

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious.After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law