Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees.After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

A company sought to introduce a generic version of a prescription drug by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The first applicant for the generic version had previously entered into a settlement with the brand-name drug manufacturer following patent litigation, obtaining a license to market the drug at a future date but still needed FDA approval. While the first applicant’s ANDA remained pending, another company (the appellant) submitted its own ANDA for the same drug, including certifications that its product would not infringe certain patents or would not be marketed for patented uses. The FDA determined that the first applicant was eligible for a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which prevented final approval of the subsequent applicant’s ANDA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the subsequent applicant’s request for an injunction and granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA and parties supporting the FDA’s position. The court found that the first applicant’s exclusivity remained intact, as not all statutory forfeiture conditions had been met. Specifically, it concluded that the first applicant had not forfeited exclusivity by failing to market or by failing to obtain tentative approval, interpreting the relevant statutory provisions in the FDA’s favor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the FDA correctly determined the first applicant had not forfeited exclusivity under the “failure to market” provision, as forfeiture requires triggering events for each qualifying patent certification in the first applicant’s ANDA. However, the appellate court found the FDA applied an incorrect causation standard in assessing whether the first applicant forfeited exclusivity for failure to obtain tentative approval. The court ruled that a but-for causation standard applies and remanded the case for the FDA to apply this correct standard. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

A group of commercial fishers and buyers of South Atlantic red snapper challenged a regulation issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service. This regulation, under the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper Fishery Management Plan, established an annual catch limit for red snapper based solely on “landings” (fish brought ashore), without including “dead discards” (fish that die after being caught and thrown back). The fishers argued that this approach failed to prevent overfishing as required by federal law, since dead discards represent a significant and increasing portion of total red snapper mortality.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the Service. The district court concluded that the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in A.P. Bell Fish Co. v. Raimondo largely resolved the main legal issues. That precedent had determined that federal law does not require the annual catch limit to directly restrict bycatch, such as dead discards, so long as the regulatory mechanism is designed to prevent overfishing. The district court also found no basis to conclude that excluding dead discards from the enforceable limit made it impossible to address overfishing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It first rejected the Service’s argument that the case was moot due to a superseding rule (Amendment 59), finding that the fundamental regulatory approach remained unchanged. On the merits, the court concluded that its prior decision in A.P. Bell Fish Co. controlled: the Service’s landings-only annual catch limit does not violate the statutory requirement to specify catch limits at a level that prevents overfishing. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Slash Creek Waterworks, Inc. v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a periodic review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter, as required by the Clean Air Act. After an extensive eleven-year process, EPA decided to retain the existing standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, while lowering the secondary standard for sulfur oxides. EPA also issued a memorandum explaining its view that the new rule would not change air quality or emissions and thus would have no effect on endangered species or their habitats.Previously, EPA published its proposed rule in April 2024, followed by the final rule in December 2024. The agency’s no-effect determination stated that the revisions would not trigger additional emissions reductions or affect listed species. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged EPA’s rule, arguing that the agency violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with federal wildlife agencies before issuing the rule. CBD asserted that ongoing and cumulative pollutant effects could harm species, and that EPA’s effects determination was both arbitrary and untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that CBD had standing to bring the challenge, but ultimately determined that EPA’s no-effect finding was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the rule would not cause any changes to air quality or emissions, and thus would not trigger consultation obligations under the ESA. The court also held that EPA’s timing of the effects determination was appropriate under regulatory requirements. The main holding is that EPA reasonably determined the rule would have no effect on protected species or critical habitat, and the petition for review was denied. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant.Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

Kevin Welch underwent emergency surgery for an ascending aortic dissection and was subsequently treated in the intensive care unit of a hospital. After the operation, he exhibited confusion and, later, weakness in his lower extremities. Neurological consultation and imaging were recommended, but an MRI was delayed for safety and stability reasons. When eventually performed, the MRI indicated that Welch had suffered a stroke. He later reported ongoing cognitive and physical impairments, while the hospital maintained that his physical function had largely recovered and that any permanent disability was cognitive rather than physical.Following these events, Welch’s power of attorney, Shana Hargrove, filed a medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the hospital and several physicians, alleging that delays and omissions in post-surgical care worsened Welch’s outcome. After discovery, the hospital moved to exclude the causation testimony of Welch’s experts, Dr. Elakil and Dr. Schulman, and for summary judgment. The District Court excluded Dr. Elakil’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 due to insufficient basis for his causation opinions and excluded Dr. Schulman’s testimony because he was not properly disclosed as a causation expert under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. With no admissible expert testimony on causation, the court granted summary judgment for the hospital.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the exclusions for abuse of discretion and the summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that both expert testimonies were properly excluded and summary judgment was warranted, as expert testimony on causation is required under District of Columbia law for medical malpractice claims of this nature. View "Hargrove v. MedStar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

Two investigative journalists, on assignment for a nonprofit media organization known for undercover reporting, infiltrated Democratic political consulting operations in 2016 using false identities. One reporter, posing as a philanthropist, met with a political consultant who then arranged for his colleague to hire the second reporter, also undercover, as an unpaid intern at the consultant's firm. The intern secretly recorded conversations and internal meetings over eight days, gaining access to nonpublic information. The media organization later published a video series alleging a conspiracy to incite violence at political events, using footage from both public interactions and the intern’s covert recordings.After the video’s release, major clients of the consulting firm terminated their contracts, citing concerns about scandal and the security breach. The consulting firm and its principals sued the journalists and their organizations in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violations of federal and D.C. wiretapping laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on some claims but allowed others to proceed to trial. A jury found for the plaintiffs on the remaining claims and awarded damages for lost contracts and statutory damages for wiretapping.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the verdict. It held that the First Amendment barred damages based on losses caused by the publication’s protected speech, as the plaintiffs failed to prove that the unprotected conduct (the infiltration and covert recording) was the predominant cause of their damages. The court also held that the intern did not owe a fiduciary duty to the consulting firm under D.C. law, and therefore the wiretapping claims could not stand. The court reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and vacated the damages awards. View "Democracy Partners, LLC v. O'Keefe" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both representing themselves, sought to appeal adverse decisions in separate civil cases. In the first case, a plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against a federal official. The district court denied this plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiff subsequently submitted a document titled as both a “Notice of Appeal” and a “Motion to Transfer Appeal.” This document was filed 69 days after the district court’s order and included statements indicating the plaintiff had not received notice of the order and was requesting more time to appeal. In the second case, another plaintiff alleged mistreatment by a hospital and physician, but the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. This plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 37 days after judgment, including various grievances but without clearly acknowledging the late filing or explicitly requesting relief for the delay.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia transmitted both notices to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court reviewed whether the notices of appeal could be construed as including motions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6), which allow late appeals in certain circumstances if specific requirements are met.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a pro se notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include a motion for extension or to reopen the time to appeal if it reasonably recognizes the filing is late, provides reasons for the lateness, and seeks relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). Applying this standard, the court found that the first plaintiff’s filing met these criteria and remanded that case to the district court for further proceedings. The second plaintiff’s notice did not meet the standard, and the court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine" on Justia Law

Several nonprofit organizations and associations that receive federal funding challenged a memorandum issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shortly after President Trump’s return to office in 2025. The memorandum, M-25-13, directed federal agencies to temporarily pause the obligation and disbursement of all federal financial assistance to analyze compliance with recent executive orders. Plaintiffs argued that the memorandum called for a sweeping freeze on virtually all federal funding, which they alleged would have catastrophic consequences for federally funded programs.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially responded to plaintiffs’ request for emergency relief by issuing a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, barring OMB from implementing the memorandum. The district court found that the memorandum was likely to be arbitrary and capricious and possibly beyond OMB’s statutory authority. The court rejected the government’s argument that the case was moot after OMB rescinded the memorandum, relying in part on statements from the White House Press Secretary and ongoing funding disruptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction. It did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ legal arguments or the district court’s interpretation of the memorandum. Instead, it concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge was likely moot because OMB had rescinded the memorandum before the government knew of the lawsuit and had clarified, in guidance issued the day after the memorandum, that a global funding freeze was not intended. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation the government would reissue the challenged action. As a result, the court vacated the preliminary injunction. View "National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB" on Justia Law

A man with two prior felony convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in the District of Columbia was sentenced in 2022 to a period of supervised probation in lieu of imprisonment for his second offense. While still under this court-ordered supervision, he knowingly possessed a firearm, which was reportedly stolen and modified for automatic firing, and was alleged to have brandished it during a shootout. He was indicted by a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which emphasized historical tradition over means-end scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. The district court rejected his arguments, holding that earlier circuit precedent (Medina v. Whitaker) upholding § 922(g)(1) remained good law, and denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, even assuming prior precedent did not control and that § 922(g)(1) implicated conduct covered by the Second Amendment, there exists a widespread historical tradition of temporarily disarming felons while they are serving their criminal sentences, including during periods of noncustodial supervision such as probation or supervised release. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals still serving their sentences, and is not facially unconstitutional. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law