Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A technology company developed an artificial intelligence system and imposed contractual and technical restrictions to prevent its use for fully autonomous lethal military operations and mass domestic surveillance. The company had previously adapted its product to meet some government needs but refused to remove these two key restrictions when the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) sought contractual terms allowing all lawful uses of the AI system. This disagreement coincided with a dispute over the product’s use in a sensitive military operation and previous incidents where the AI’s restrictions prevented it from fulfilling government requests. As a result, the Secretary of War determined that continued use of the AI posed a national security risk and ordered its removal from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.The Department promptly notified the company, offered an opportunity for reconsideration, and began implementing the exclusion. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and raised statutory and constitutional challenges, arguing that the exclusion was arbitrary, beyond statutory authority, and violated due process and First Amendment rights. The company also sought a stay, which was denied, and later requested rescission, which was also denied by the Secretary.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the statute to review the procurement action. The court found the Department’s determination reasonable, concluding that the company’s ability and willingness to restrict the AI’s use posed a covered “supply chain risk” under the statute, even without evidence of malicious intent. The court also held that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that any procedural deficiencies in notice did not prejudice the company. The court further held that the exclusion did not violate the Fifth or First Amendments. The petitions for review were denied. View "Anthropic PBC v. United States Department of War" on Justia Law

A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S.After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

A dual Swedish-Russian national was accused of creating and operating a bitcoin “mixer” service called Bitcoin Fog, which the government alleged was designed to facilitate money laundering and conceal illegal activity. The platform enabled users to deposit and withdraw bitcoin anonymously, making it difficult to trace transactions. Evidence presented at trial included IP address analyses allegedly connecting the defendant to Bitcoin Fog, records of his interest in similar services, and his promotion of illicit darknet marketplaces. Undercover law enforcement also conducted sting operations, sending and withdrawing funds through Bitcoin Fog and communicating intentions to launder proceeds from illegal drug sales. The defendant was arrested in 2021, after which Bitcoin Fog ceased operations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial at which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and conducting a money transmission business without a license. The District Court sentenced him to 150 months in prison and rejected his pre-trial and post-trial motions, including challenges to venue, expert testimony admissibility, evidence sufficiency, and access to proprietary software used in the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that venue was proper in the District of Columbia for all counts, based largely on evidence that Bitcoin Fog served customers there, including undercover agents. The court found no errors in the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony and “Welcome to Video” evidence, and rejected arguments regarding statute of limitations, due process, and Confrontation Clause violations. The appellate court affirmed all convictions and the sentence, finding no merit in any of the defendant’s arguments. View "USA v. Sterlingov" on Justia Law

A minister sought to hold a small prayer event on the lower section of the Eastern Steps of the United States Capitol, advocating for various causes including opposition to federal funding of abortion. Under federal regulations, public demonstrations on these Steps are generally prohibited unless sponsored by a member of Congress, with violations carrying criminal penalties. The minister, unable to secure sponsorship, faced the threat of arrest and had previously been arrested for similar conduct.After protracted litigation and partial settlement, the parties stipulated to key facts and proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ruled in favor of the minister on his First Amendment claim, holding that the lower section of the Eastern Steps was a traditional public forum and that the regulations at issue suppressed more speech than necessary. The district court entered a permanent universal injunction, barring enforcement of the regulations against anyone wishing to demonstrate on the lower Steps. The Capitol Police Board appealed, and the district court later limited the injunction to the minister and up to 14 others pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo regarding summary judgment and for abuse of discretion as to the injunction. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s forum classification, holding that the Eastern Steps constitute a nonpublic forum because of their specialized function and physical integration with the Capitol. Nevertheless, the court held that the regulation’s requirement of congressional sponsorship for demonstrations was unreasonable, as it granted unbridled discretion to members of Congress, violating First Amendment protections. The court affirmed summary judgment for the minister but vacated the universal injunction, remanding for the district court to determine the proper scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance limiting universal injunctions. View "Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Board" on Justia Law

The case involves the allocation of statutory royalties collected from cable television systems for the distant retransmission of broadcast programming between 2014 and 2017. Under Section 111 of the Copyright Act, cable providers pay fees into a pooled fund, which the Copyright Royalty Board (the Board) is tasked with distributing among copyright claimants based on the relative marketplace value of their programming. Six claimant groups participated, including the Joint Sports Claimants (JSC) and Public Television (PTV), both of whom challenged the Board’s methodology and the resulting allocation.The Copyright Royalty Board conducted adversarial proceedings, admitting evidence and expert testimony focused on two principal valuation methods: regression analysis and constant-sum surveys (specifically the Bortz Survey). After accounting for adjustments to correct for market changes and methodological limitations—such as the conversion of WGNA from broadcast to cable and the impact of must-carry rules—the Board issued a final determination in June 2024, allocating royalty shares among the groups. Both JSC and PTV appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, while other claimant groups intervened.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected nearly all challenges to the Board’s use of regression and survey methodologies, finding them reasonable. However, the court found the Board failed to sufficiently explain how it merged the results of the two methodologies to arrive at the final allocation percentages. Because the decisive step in the allocation process lacked a clear and reasoned explanation, the court vacated the Board’s final determination and remanded for further proceedings and clarification. View "Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. LOC" on Justia Law

A former high-ranking Navy Admiral served for nearly forty years before retiring. During his last assignment, he interacted with Next Jump, Inc., a company providing leadership training. Despite staff recommendations against further contracts, the Admiral privately negotiated with Next Jump’s executives. They discussed post-retirement employment for him, with substantial compensation and equity, contingent on facilitating a Navy contract. The Admiral pushed through the contract, deviating from usual procedures, and began working for Next Jump after retirement. Subsequent feedback on the training was negative. He later admitted to investigators he had been improperly influenced.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after the Admiral was indicted for conspiracy to accept a bribe, bribery, conflict of interest, and concealment of a material fact. At trial, the government presented evidence of a “contract for a job” arrangement and concealment of the agreement. The jury convicted him on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. Next Jump’s co-CEOs were tried separately; their first trial ended in a hung jury and they were acquitted upon retrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Admiral’s appeal, which challenged evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the fairness of the trial. The Circuit Court held that the evidentiary rulings were either proper or harmless given the overwhelming evidence. Although it identified a legally erroneous jury instruction regarding mens rea for bribery, the error was invited by defense counsel and thus not grounds for reversal. The Court affirmed the convictions, concluding no cumulative error deprived the Admiral of a fair trial. View "USA v. Burke" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company, a private utility in Michigan, planned to retire the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant, a decades-old coal facility, and replace it with newer, cleaner, and more reliable energy sources. The proposed closure and replacement plan underwent extensive review by the Michigan Public Service Commission and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), both of which ultimately approved it after finding that the substitute resources would meet reliability standards and improve affordability and environmental outcomes. As the retirement date neared, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, compelling Consumers Energy to keep the Campbell plant operational, citing an energy emergency in the region.The Michigan Public Service Commission approved the integrated resource plan after a contested case proceeding, finding that it would enhance resource adequacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s approval. MISO also determined that Campbell’s retirement, as planned, would not threaten reliability. Consumers Energy documented sufficient capacity to meet projected demand, and MISO’s resource auction confirmed adequate supply and reserve margins for the relevant period. No state or regional entity requested FERC intervention, nor did the Michigan governor declare an energy emergency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the DOE’s order. The court held that section 202(c) grants DOE limited, emergency authority to intervene only when an electricity shortage creates an acute risk that cannot be timely addressed by state or regional planning, and immediate federal action is necessary. The court found that DOE’s asserted circumstances did not constitute such an emergency, as reasonable alternatives existed and the state had adequately planned for resource adequacy. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated DOE’s order. View "People of the State of Michigan v. DOE" on Justia Law

A former employee, after suspecting his previous employer of facilitating a foreign bribery scheme, provided his suspicions and supporting documents to a journalist. The journalist informed the Department of Justice (DOJ) and published articles exposing the alleged misconduct. Following a tip from a DOJ attorney, the employee was advised to submit his information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to potentially qualify for a whistleblower award. However, the employee waited over a year before submitting his information directly to the SEC, by which time the SEC had already begun its investigation and independently developed its case using information from the DOJ and public sources.The SEC’s Claims Review Staff (CRS) issued a preliminary determination denying the whistleblower award, reasoning that the employee’s submission neither led the SEC to open its investigation nor significantly contributed to the enforcement action, as the information was already known. The CRS also found that the employee did not meet the regulatory timing requirements for information submitted to other agencies. The employee contested this, relying on a prior SEC order that had granted an award in a similar situation, but the Commission had since disavowed that reasoning and clarified that both original source status and causation are required for an award.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order. The court held that, under the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act and implementing regulations, a whistleblower must submit original information directly to the SEC, and that information must lead to a successful enforcement action. Because the employee’s belated submission did not assist the SEC’s investigation or enforcement efforts, he was not entitled to an award. The court denied the petition for review. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

Federal tax privacy law prohibits the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from sharing taxpayer return information with other federal agencies unless strict statutory requirements are met. In 2025, after a request from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the IRS developed and implemented a new protocol, known as the Data-Exchange Procedure, for responding to ICE’s mass requests for the addresses of over a million undocumented individuals. This streamlined process did not ensure that ICE’s requests satisfied the statutory prerequisites, such as providing a taxpayer’s actual address or identifying an appropriate point of contact personally involved in a criminal investigation. Using this flawed procedure, the IRS disclosed over 47,000 taxpayer records to ICE.The Center for Taxpayer Rights, joined by other organizations, sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the IRS’s actions violated federal law and harmed their missions by eroding trust in the tax system, deterring immigrant engagement, and diverting resources. The district court found that the IRS had, in fact, adopted a new policy, concluded plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, and issued a preliminary injunction halting further disclosures under the new procedure unless statutory requirements were strictly followed and the court was notified of any future requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the IRS’s Data-Exchange Procedure constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), did not comply with statutory requirements, and that the relief available under the Internal Revenue Code did not preclude APA review. The court found plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS" on Justia Law

Gina Latture, a Black woman, was hired in January 2021 as Director of Sales and Marketing by Priority Life Care, LLC (PLC) to prepare a new assisted living facility in Washington, D.C. for its opening. She reported directly to the Executive Director and worked alongside other staff, most of whom were white. Latture alleged that during her tenure, she was subjected to racially derogatory comments by coworkers and supervisors. Despite objections to at least one comment, she did not formally report most incidents, fearing retaliation. After the facility opened with low occupancy, Latture’s job performance was scrutinized, and she was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Following an altercation with supervisors regarding her duties, she was terminated for insubordination and unprofessionalism in August 2021. Afterward, an offer of employment from another facility was rescinded, which Latture attributed to negative comments from PLC representatives.Latture filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, bringing common law claims for wrongful termination and tortious interference with business relations, as well as Title VII claims for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. PLC removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the common law claims and granted summary judgment to PLC on the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that Latture failed to plead sufficient facts to support her common law claims, specifically lacking the required specificity for the wrongful termination and tortious interference claims. The appellate court also determined that PLC was entitled to summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims, as Latture did not provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent. The hostile work environment claim was affirmed as untimely. View "Latture v. Priority Life Care, LLC" on Justia Law