Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved cost-saving tools that Congress had devised for Medicare payments to cancer hospitals and specifically concerned Medicare reimbursements paid to one cancer hospital, appellant, in 2000 and 2001. The first issue on appeal related to the cancer hospitals' inpatient costs where appellant requested an increase to its target amount in 2000 and 2001 due to the high cost of certain new cancer drugs and where the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") denied that request. Appellant argued that it did not receive proper notice of the new net financial impact requirement and thus did not have a fair opportunity to satisfy the requirement at the administrative hearing. The court agreed and held that appellant did not receive timely notice of the requirement and, on remand to HHS, must be given an opportunity to satisfy it. The second issued on appeal concerned cancer hospitals' outpatient costs where appellant contended that HHS misapplied the statutory formula that provided hospitals a fraction of their reasonable costs and undercompensated appellant. The court rejected appellant's arguments and affirmed summary judgment in favor of HHS.

NMSA, a trade association representing marine terminal operators, petitioned for review of OSHA's vertical tandem lifts ("VTLs") Standard. At issue was whether OSHA failed to demonstrate that VTLs posed a significant risk of worker safety; whether two of the Standard's requirements were not technologically feasible; whether the Standard was not reasonably necessary or appropriate in light of the "safe work zone" requirement; whether OSHA's authority was limited to requiring, not prohibiting, workplace practices; and if the Standard was otherwise valid, whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 651-678, had made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to OSHA. The court denied NMSA's petition for review in large part, granted the petition in part, vacating and remanding only that portion of the VTL Standard providing for the inspection requirement for ship-to-shore VTLs and the total ban on platform container VTLs.

Two businesses with nearly identical names, John C. Flood, Inc. ("1996 Flood") and John C. Flood of Virginia, Inc. ("Virginia Flood"), brought suit against each other over which company had the right to use two trademarks: JOHN C. FLOOD and its abridged form FLOOD. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 1996 Flood was the proper owner of the two trademarks and that Virginia Flood, as the licensee of the marks, was estopped from challenging 1996 Flood's ownership. The court affirmed the district court's order granting 1996 Flood's motion for partial summary judgment and held that 1996 Flood was the proper successor-in-interest to John C. Flood, Inc. ("1984 Flood"), and that Virginia Flood was barred by the doctrine of licensee estoppel from challenging 1996 Flood's ownership of those marks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment but remanded the case back to the district court for clarification regarding whether Virginia Flood's use of the mark JOHN C. FLOOD OF VIRGINIA was prohibited by the court's decision.

New York Presbyterian Hospital ("Hospital") petitioned for review of a decision and order by the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") finding the Hospital in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), for failing to produce information requested by the labor union with which the Hospital had a collective bargaining agreement, the New York State Nurses Association ("NYSNA" or "Union"). The Hospital asserted that NYSNA failed to demonstrate the relevance of its request for information, attacked the evidentiary foundation of the Board's decision and order, and raised a number of additional arguments. The court held that NYSNA adequately demonstrated the relevance of its request for information where the nub of NYSNA's request for information was the Union's concern that non-Union NPs, licensed nurses, were performing bargaining unit work in the Hospital. The court also held that the Board's order that the Hospital be required to furnish information about shifts worked by bargaining unit NPs was supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected or declined to reach the Hospital's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied and the court granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

Plaintiffs, two national trade associations representing the private charter bus industry, challenged Senator Patty Murray's amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 172, related to charter bus services, alleging that the amendment ensured that the Federal Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. 5323(d)(1) ("Charter Rule"), could not spend appropriated funds to enforce the Charter Rule to bar King County Metro ("KCM") from providing bus service to Seattle Mariners games in Fiscal Year 2010. At issue was whether Congress could constitutionally permit a federally-subsidized transit system to take the residents of Seattle out to the ball game. The court held that Congress could and that the amendment was not unconstitutional where it did not violate plaintiffs' First Amendment right to petition, Fifth Amendment right to equal protection, procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, or separation of powers principles. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed.

Appellant, a primary care physician who served Medicaid patients in the District of Columbia, appealed his convictions for health care fraud and for making false statements relating to health care matters, as well as his 53 month prison sentence. At issue was whether the district court committed evidentiary errors and improperly refused to give the good faith instruction appellant requested. Also at issue was whether appellant's sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The court found no merit in appellant's assertions of trial errors and affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court held, however, that because the district gave an inadequate explanation for its above-Guidelines sentence and because this procedural defect amounted to plain error, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant and his wife filed an action against the Palestinian Authority ("PA") and the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") seeking to recover damages under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, where appellant was arrested by PA security officers and confined and tortured for several months. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court where the complaint did not raise a claim cognizable within the jurisdictional grant of the ATS and further concluded that the district court did not err in declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction under the alleged negligence claim under Israeli law.

Petitioner sought review of an adverse decision of the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") where an ALJ found that petitioner violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., when it placed a registered nurse on "investigatory suspension" because of her protected union activities. At issue was whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the Board's general counsel offered insubstantial evidence, if any, to establish that the nurse's protected union activity was a motivating factor in her suspension and therefore, the general counsel failed to carry his burden under the first prong of the NLRB v. Wright Line test so as to make out a prima facie case and shift the burden of proof to petitioner. Therefore, the Board had no basis to conclude that petitioner violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

Petitioner, Performance Coal Company, petitioned the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission") for temporary relief from restrictions imposed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") after a coal mine disaster occurred on April 5, 2010. The Commission denied relief and petitioners appealed. At issue was whether section 105(b)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 20 U.S.C. 815(b)(2), authorized temporary relief from section 103(k) orders. The court held that the plain language of section 105(b)(2) unambiguously provided that petitioner was entitled to seek temporary relief from modification or termination of any order, including a section 103 order. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and set aside the Commission's order denying relief.

The United States appealed from the district court's decision granting defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court improperly concluded that the government failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was "part of" al Qaeda. The court held that the government had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant could be detained where the district court clearly erred in regarding another detainee's statements as unreliable, improperly excluded it from consideration, and failed to give it sufficient weight to the reliable evidence it did consider. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.