Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) approved a shipping company’s request to replace two vessels operating in the Pacific trade within the Maritime Security Program. Matson Navigation Co., a competitor in the Pacific, petitions for review of the replacements. As a source of jurisdiction, Matson points to the Hobbs Act, under which the DC Circuit had original jurisdiction over some acts of MARAD.   The DC Circuit reversed two orders of the district court, consolidated with these petitions, that held jurisdiction over Matson’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and was exclusive in the court of appeals. The court wrote that Matson was not a “party” to the replacement proceedings for either vessel, therefore, the court denied the petitions for direct review. The court explained that whether a case begins in district court or is eligible for direct review in the court is a policy decision that is for “Congress rather than us to determine.” The court wrote that as Matson’s counsel stated at oral argument, the company is just “trying to get review.” Because sending limited comments based on limited information to an informal agency proceeding does not confer “party” status under the Hobbs Act, that review starts in the district court. View "Matson Navigation Company, Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law

Commercial-fishing associations challenged the creation of the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument, which was established by President Obama to protect distinct geological features and unique ecological resources in the northern Atlantic Ocean. The district court concluded that the President acted within his statutory authority in creating the Monument, dismissing the Fishermen's claims.The DC Circuit first drew a distinction between two types of claims: those justiciable on the face of the proclamation and those requiring factual development. The court determined that the Fishermens' first three claims could be judged on the face of the proclamation and resolved as a matter of law, and the last claim required factual allegations.As to the first three claims, the court held that Supreme Court precedent foreclosed the Fishermens' contention that the Antiquities Act does not reach submerged lands; ocean-based monuments are compatible with the Sanctuaries Act; and the federal government's unrivaled authority under both international and domestic law established that it controls the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. Finally, the court held that the Fishermens' smallest-area claim failed, because the complaint contained no factual allegations identifying a portion of the Monument that lacks the natural resources and ecosystems the President sought to protect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association v. Ross" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an action brought under 33 U.S.C. 1904(h). In section 1904(h), Congress gave a ship unreasonably detained or delayed, on suspicion of intentionally discharging oil and other contaminants into the sea, a cause of action to recover any loss or damage suffered thereby.The court held that the Coast Guard acted reasonably in detaining a vessel for nearly six months pending a criminal trial after its owner and operator failed to meet the government's security bond demands. The court measured the reasonableness of the Coast Guard's actions by an objective standard and found that the Coast Guard set a reasonable monetary bond, and that the nonmonetary components of the bond demand contributed nothing to the owner's losses. View "Angelex, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit dismissed Matson's petition for review of three of the Maritime Administration's orders approving APL's requested replacement vessels in the Maritime Security Fleet. At issue was whether the three orders were issued pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 50501 or any other statute listed in the Hobbs Act vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals. The court held that Matson failed to file a timely petition for review; even if MARAD forfeited a timeliness defense, Matson had no vessels in the fleet and was therefore not a contractor for whom MARAD's regulation provided an administrative appeal; and the 2016 and 2017 Approval Orders did not trigger Hobbs Act jurisdiction. View "Matson Navigation Company, Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a pilot, seeks review of the final order of the NTSB that permanently revoked his certificates based on his criminal conviction, contending that the FAA’s earlier administrative action bars the FAA’s permanent revocation order by operation of various preclusion doctrines, double jeopardy, and due process. In this case, petitioner fraudulently sold helicopter rotor blades with maintenance records he had altered to hide the fact that another mechanic had deemed the blades to be unrepairable scrap. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 44726(b)(1)(A) plainly authorizes revocation of any airman certificate after a qualifying conviction, even if the FAA unsuccessfully pursued a prior subsection (B) administrative action based on the events underlying the conviction. The court further concluded that revocation of airman certificates in those circumstances is a civil, remedial measure aimed at protecting public safety that does not offend principles of preclusion, double jeopardy, or due process. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lauterbach v. Huerta" on Justia Law

Maher, a marine terminal operator, challenges a decision of the Commission authorizing preferential lease terms to a competitor, APM-Maersk. The court concluded that, assuming arguendo that the Commission adequately responded to Maher’s contention that the same rates should be extended to it, the Commission’s explanation as to why APM-Maersk’s preference was based on a “transportation factor” was hopelessly convoluted, particularly in light of its precedent. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a more adequate explanation of its decision and policy. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Maher Terminals, LLC v. FMC" on Justia Law

The Coast Guard, after receiving whistleblower complaints, initiated an investigation against two foreign-flagged vessels. The Coast Guard subsequently ordered Customs to withhold departure clearance and the vessels were held for investigation for differing lengths of time, ranging from a couple of days to over a month. The vessels were released after appellants, the ship owners and operators, posted a bond and executed a security agreement. At issue in this appeal is whether the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security – acting through the Coast Guard – may impose certain conditions (nonfinancial in nature) upon the release of ships suspected of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. 1901(a)(4). Determining that the case is justiciable, the court concluded on the merits that the first sentence of section 1908(e) gives the Coast Guard the requisite authority. Section 1908(e) states that “[i]f any ship subject to the [Convention]…is liable for a fine or civil penalty...or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the ship...may be subject to a fine or civil penalty [Customs]...upon request of the Secretary [the Coast Guard]...shall refuse...clearance,” and as such it clearly provides authority in the Coast Guard to simply hold the ship in port until legal proceedings are completed. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watervale Marine Co. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law