Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, after being represented by several law firms over multiple years in a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service, was awarded attorneys’ fees by the district court under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The total fee award was almost $789,000. The various law firms that had represented the nonprofit at different times—specifically, a set of former attorneys and the Bopp Law Firm—disputed how much each was entitled to from the award. Both the former attorneys and Bopp asserted they had an equitable charging lien entitling them to direct payment from the fee award, rather than requiring payment first be made to the client.After the resolution of the underlying claims, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the former attorneys had a valid charging lien but denied Bopp’s motion to enforce its own lien. The district court reasoned, based on Indiana law (per a choice-of-law provision in Bopp's fee agreement), that Bopp had to show an agreement with the client that its compensation would come from the fund itself. The court concluded Bopp failed to establish such an agreement and thus did not have a valid lien.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard under Indiana law. Indiana law recognizes two independent ways an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien: either by securing the fund for the client or by an agreement with the client to be paid from the fund. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Bopp satisfied either prong and for potential resolution of lien priority and the calculation of amounts owed. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

A Canadian investment company provided loans to Mexican companies owned by a businessman, securing these loans with mortgages and promissory notes. When the Mexican companies defaulted, the investor attempted to recover its funds through negotiations and litigation in Mexico. The investor alleged that a fraudulent scheme, orchestrated by the businessman, led to a forged settlement used in Mexican court to void the loans. After Mexican courts did not provide relief, the investor initiated arbitration against Mexico under NAFTA, claiming Mexico failed to provide the protections required for foreign investments.The arbitral tribunal, seated in Washington, D.C., found that only the mortgages—not the promissory notes—qualified as protected “investments” under NAFTA. The tribunal concluded that Mexico had breached its obligations under Article 1105(1) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s qualifying investments, awarding $47 million in compensation to the investor. Mexico then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrators exceeded their authority and disregarded the law. The district court rejected these arguments, confirming the award. Separately, the businessman sought to intervene in the proceedings, claiming his interests were harmed, but the district court denied intervention.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the arbitral tribunal did not exceed its powers, as it at least arguably interpreted the relevant treaty provisions, and did not act in manifest disregard of the law. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the businessman’s motion to intervene, finding Mexico adequately represented his interests. The court affirmed the district court’s order in full. View "United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment.After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment.The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies.The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses.She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law