Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S.After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

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A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities.The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

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In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees.After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

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Two individuals, both representing themselves, sought to appeal adverse decisions in separate civil cases. In the first case, a plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against a federal official. The district court denied this plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiff subsequently submitted a document titled as both a “Notice of Appeal” and a “Motion to Transfer Appeal.” This document was filed 69 days after the district court’s order and included statements indicating the plaintiff had not received notice of the order and was requesting more time to appeal. In the second case, another plaintiff alleged mistreatment by a hospital and physician, but the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. This plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 37 days after judgment, including various grievances but without clearly acknowledging the late filing or explicitly requesting relief for the delay.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia transmitted both notices to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court reviewed whether the notices of appeal could be construed as including motions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6), which allow late appeals in certain circumstances if specific requirements are met.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a pro se notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include a motion for extension or to reopen the time to appeal if it reasonably recognizes the filing is late, provides reasons for the lateness, and seeks relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). Applying this standard, the court found that the first plaintiff’s filing met these criteria and remanded that case to the district court for further proceedings. The second plaintiff’s notice did not meet the standard, and the court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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A group of Cuban doctors alleged that they were coerced by the Cuban government to participate in Brazil’s Mais Médicos program, which placed healthcare professionals in underserved communities. The doctors claimed that the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) enabled the Cuban government’s actions by acting as a financial intermediary, moving funds from Brazil to Cuba, while retaining a 5% fee. They asserted that PAHO’s conduct facilitated a human trafficking scheme, and they brought claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act on behalf of themselves and similarly situated Cuban medical professionals.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied PAHO’s motion to dismiss, finding that the doctors’ allegations, if true, would bring the case within the “commercial activity” exception to immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this denial, allowing the case to proceed. PAHO then filed a second, “factual” motion to dismiss, contesting the factual basis of the doctors’ claims and submitting evidence to support its immunity argument. In response, the district court granted the doctors’ request for limited jurisdictional discovery to resolve the factual disputes relevant to the immunity question. PAHO appealed the discovery order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s discovery order at this stage. The court held that immediate appellate review under the collateral order doctrine does not extend to jurisdictional discovery orders issued after a judicial finding that the complaint adequately pleads an immunity exception, where discovery is directly related to those pleaded theories. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Pan American Health Organization" on Justia Law

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Several membership organizations representing immigrants challenged two actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security: a memorandum issued by the Acting Secretary and an email from Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Both directed officers to consider subjecting parolees—immigrants temporarily allowed to enter the U.S.—to expedited removal, a process that is faster and offers fewer protections than formal removal proceedings. The organizations argued these directives increased the likelihood that their members would face expedited removal, causing injury.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the challenge and partially granted the plaintiffs’ request to stay the memorandum and email, but not the underlying regulation (8 C.F.R. § 1.2) that independently authorized expedited removal for parolees. The District Court’s stay thus blocked the challenged executive actions to the extent they would subject individuals paroled into the United States to expedited removal, but left the regulation intact.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek the relief they requested. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to establish redressability, a necessary element of standing, because even if the memorandum and email were stayed, the government retained authority under the unchallenged regulation to subject parolees to expedited removal. Since the relief requested would not likely lessen the risk of expedited removal for the plaintiffs’ members, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s stay, finding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to grant it. The main holding is that organizational plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge government actions unless the relief sought would likely redress their members’ alleged injuries. View "Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin" on Justia Law

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Two individuals who were victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran obtained judgments against Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s terrorism exception and were deemed eligible for compensation from the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. The Fund is financed by criminal penalties and forfeitures related to certain offenses involving state sponsors of terrorism. After British American Tobacco and its subsidiary agreed to pay over $629 million in criminal penalties and forfeitures for conspiracies involving illicit business with North Korean entities, the Department of Justice allocated only a small fraction of those proceeds to the Fund. The Department’s allocation was based on its interpretation that only proceeds from offenses with a direct nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Department of Justice, upholding its interpretation of the relevant statutory funding provision. The district court reasoned that only proceeds from transactions or conduct occurring while North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited into the Fund, and that the Department’s allocation was consistent with statutory requirements.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Justice erred in its allocation. The statutory language requires all proceeds from violations of IEEPA and TWEA, including conspiracy offenses charged under IEEPA, to be deposited into the Fund regardless of any nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism. Additionally, for related criminal conspiracies such as BAT’s bank fraud conspiracy, if the offense originated from doing business with a state sponsor of terrorism, all proceeds must be deposited into the Fund. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. View "Englehardt v. Blanche" on Justia Law

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After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims.Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

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A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding.FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

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Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law