Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several defendants were charged by indictment in separate cases with various offenses arising from their alleged participation in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021. Among other charges, the government also charged each Defendant with one count of Obstruction of an Official Proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The district court granted each Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. At issue on consolidated appeal is whether individuals who allegedly assaulted law enforcement officers while participating in the Capitol riot can be charged with corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The court wrote that Defendants’ alleged conduct falls comfortably within the plain meaning of “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] [an] official proceeding, or attempt[ing] to do so.” The alternative interpretations of Section 1512(c)(2) proffered by the district court and Defendants failed to convince the court to depart from the natural reading of the statute’s unambiguous text. View "USA v. Joseph Fischer" on Justia Law

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) is an agency within the Department of Labor whose mission is to administer the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”). The Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through MSHA, to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards, inspect mines, issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or mandatory standards, and propose penalties for those violations. An inspector for MSHA discovered a crane at Westfall operating on-site with no working service brakes. Eight years after the sentence was deemed a final order, and only after MSHA had begun enforcement proceedings against the operator for failing to pay its delinquent penalties, Westfall filed a motion to reopen the matter. A two-member majority of the Commission granted the motion. The DC Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review, reversed the Commission’s decision dismissing Westfall’s motion to reopen as moot, and remanded the case for a prompt disposition. The court explained that the Commission’s decision relies on a ground not raised or addressed by the parties, lacks substantial evidence to support its principal findings, and ignores the potential applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) covering motions to reopen. View "Secretary of Labor v. Westfall Aggregate & Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought class certification to pursue various claims against the Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan (“Hilton Plan”) for what they say are unlawfully denied vested retirement benefits. The district court ultimately denied certification on the ground that Plaintiffs had proposed an “impermissibly ‘fail-safe’” class—that is, a class definition for which membership can only be ascertained through “a determination of the merits of the case.”   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s decision, finding that the district court, in this case, bypassed Rule 23’s requirements and based its denial of class certification entirely on the class’s “fail-safe” character. The court explained that the textual requirements of Rule 23 are fully capable of guarding against unwise uses of the class action mechanism. So the court rejected a rule against “fail-safe” classes as a freestanding bar to class certification ungrounded in Rule 23’s prescribed criteria. Instead, district courts should rely on the carefully calibrated requirements in Rule 23 to guide their class certification decisions and the authority the Rule gives them to deal with curable misarticulations of a proposed class definition. View "In re: Valerie White" on Justia Law

On November 22, 2021—the day federal employees were required to be vaccinated—Appellant filed suit in District Court, challenging the mandate’s constitutionality. Characterizing Appellant’s suit as a “workplace dispute involving a covered federal employee,” the District Court found Appellant’s claims were precluded under the CSRA and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellant insisted that he challenges the vaccine mandate’s constitutionality, as opposed to contesting a workplace dispute under the CSRA. According to his complaint, however, he alleged that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional—at least in part—because it requires that he obtain the vaccine to avoid adverse employment action.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that all attempts to characterize his argument as anything but a challenge to adverse employment action fail for jurisdictional purposes because Appellant himself admitted that his standing to challenge the vaccine mandate is rooted in the looming disciplinary action he now faces as a result of his continued noncompliance. In other words, Appellant challenges the vaccine mandate to maintain his employment while continuing to defy the mandate that he views as unlawful. And while his constitutional arguments are relevant to the merits, they do not change the fact that one of Appellant’s interests in this suit is to avoid the impending adverse employment action. Appellant’s claims are not wholly collateral because challenges to adverse employment actions are the type of claims that the MSPB regularly adjudicates. Thus, the court found that should Appellant choose to continue challenging the vaccine mandate, he must do so through the CSRA’s scheme. View "Jason Payne v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Metropolitan Washington Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (“Metro Washington”), a corporate trade organization representing construction companies, brought this pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia First Source Employment Agreement Act of 1984. The statute requires contractors on D.C. government-assisted projects to grant hiring preferences to D.C. residents. Metro Washington appealed the district court’s Rule 12 dismissals of the claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia on the substantive due process claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Metro Washington’s dormant Commerce Clause claim and Rule 12(c) dismissal of the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia on the inapplicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a corporation. Further, although Metro Washington has Article III standing as an association, it lacks third-party standing to raise its alternative Privileges and Immunities claim based on incorporation through the Fifth Amendment, and therefore the court dismissed this alternative contention. View "Metropolitan Washington Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. DC" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense has detained Petitioner at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over two decades. In 2008, a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit various war crimes. He now seeks judicial review of his ensuing life sentence. Petitioner moved to disqualify Judge Katsas based on my involvement in other Guantanamo Bay detainee litigation while serving in the Department of Justice between 2001 and 2009.   Judge Katsas denied the motion to disqualify. The court explained that Section 455 of Title 28 establishes disqualification standards for federal judges. Section 455(b) lists five specific circumstances requiring disqualification. Petitioner cites these provisions and a handful of cases applying them for the general proposition that a judge “may not hear a case in which he previously played any role.” The court wrote that Section 455(a) is a more general “catch-all” provision, and the court should not lightly use it to shift the lines specifically drawn in section 455(b). At most, that should occur only in “rare and extraordinary circumstances,” which are not present here. Judge Katsas wrote that in short, his work at DOJ does not disqualify him under the specific rules set forth in section 455(b), and no other consideration tips the balance in favor of disqualification under section 455(a). View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law

More than a decade ago, Medicaid recipients filed this suit alleging that in violation of the Due Process Clause, the District of Columbia is failing to provide them notice and an opportunity to be heard when denying them prescription coverage. The case is now before the DC Circuit for the third time. In the first two appeals, the DC Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissals for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim, respectively. On remand, the district court once more dismissed the case, this time for mootness.   The DC Circuit again reversed and remanded with instructions to proceed expeditiously with discovery and allow Plaintiffs to make their case. The court explained that Plaintiffs challenged the District’s failure to give Medicaid recipients reasons for denying their prescriptions and an explanation of how to appeal, and uncontested evidence demonstrates that, notwithstanding the transmittal memorandum, some number of Plaintiffs are still not receiving the information they claim they are entitled to under the Due Process Clause. Because it is not “impossible for [the district] court to grant any effectual relief,” the case is not moot. View "Elsa Maldonado v. DC" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns a discovery dispute over certain documents in an ongoing case before the district court. Defendants are non-mission third parties hired by Qatar as “contractors to support its foreign policy objective of maintaining U.S. Government support.” Plaintiffs brought this case against Defendants for allegedly helping Qatar hack Plaintiffs’ computer systems and disseminate the hacked materials. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to produce documents related to their work on Qatar’s behalf. On appeal, Qatar contends that the disputed documents are inviolable under the Vienna Conventions and protected from disclosure.   The DC Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Qatar is not a party to the suit, having chosen to only file statements of interest in the underlying district court proceedings as amicus curiae. The court explained that an appellant not named in the underlying suit must be bound by an underlying order and avail itself of applicable procedural rules in the related trial court proceedings to be recognized as a party that can properly bring an appeal. Otherwise, the appeal must be dismissed under the well-established rule that only parties can appeal an adverse judgment.   However, the court wrote that it recognizes that both the parties and the District Court were operating in uncharted territory regarding how a foreign sovereign may invoke its treaty rights under the Vienna Conventions. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to the District Court to afford Qatar the opportunity to intervene or take some other action to become a party in accordance with this opinion before enforcing the underlying discovery order. View "Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Nicolas Muzin" on Justia Law

Ascension Borgess Hospital and forty-four other hospitals appeal the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) dismissing challenges of certain reimbursements for uncompensated care. The Hospitals challenged the “disproportionate share hospital” (“DSH”) payments. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board (“PRRB”) dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory bar on administrative and judicial review of challenges to the methodology for calculating those payments. The Hospitals contend that HHS was required to promulgate its audit instructions by notice and comment rulemaking before using audited data from each hospital’s Worksheet S-10 to estimate the Hospitals’ proportionate shares of the national total of uncompensated care. They maintain that they do not challenge the Secretary’s estimate but seek only an order directing fulfillment of HHS’s notice and comment obligations.   The DC Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary. The court held that t the Hospitals’ framing of their challenge as purely procedural under the Medicare Act’s notice and comment requirement does not save their appeal, notwithstanding the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of final agency action.” Even if, as the Hospitals contend, the alleged procedural violation is reviewable, the Hospitals have failed to identify any standard required to be set by rule that was not. Although neither DCH nor Florida Health addresses whether notice and comment rulemaking is required for protocols or procedures used to modify providers’ raw uncompensated care data before calculating DSH payment estimates, routine audit instructions to Medicare contractors ordinarily fall outside of section 1395hh’s rulemaking requirement. View "Ascension Borgess Hospital v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the Foreign Service Grievance Board to review the Foreign Service’s decision to deny her tenure. While the Board was considering her grievances, Plaintiff asked the Board to grant “interim relief.” That relief would have let Plaintiff keep working for the Foreign Service until her case was decided. But the Board refused to grant it. So Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the Board should have given her relief. After Plainitff in lost in the district court and appealed to this court, the Board reached final decisions on her grievances. 
 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s backpay claim, and the court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of her interim-relief claims as moot. The court explained backpay is not an available remedy on judicial review of the Board’s orders. Nothing in the Foreign Service Act authorizes a court to issue backpay. Plus, under the Act, judicial review is adjudicated “in accordance with the standards set forth in [the Administrative Procedure Act].” Here, the Board found no merit to four of Plaintiff’s grievances. As for the fifth grievance, the Board held that Plaintiff’s claim had merit, but it still denied her backpay. And because Plaintiff has not petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision to deny backpay in that grievance, the court wrote it cannot direct the Board to reconsider it. View "Julie Beberman v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law