Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Government, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Administrative Procedure Act, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' action stemmed from extensive and intrusive security screenings at domestic and international airports, and their belief that they were on a terrorist watchlist maintained by the U.S. Government. The district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss with prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.The DC Circuit concluded that because plaintiffs plausibly allege that they will travel again soon and that they will again endure the alleged illegalities, they have established an imminent threat of future injury and have standing to pursue most of their claims for prospective relief. The court could easily infer from the family's travel history that they will soon fly again, particularly if they secure the relief they now seek. Furthermore, plaintiffs' uncontested factual allegations, combined with the reasonable inferences the court drew from them, plausibly indicate that the family likely appeared on a terrorist watchlist in 2018. The court also concluded that plaintiffs plausibly allege that the treatment they endured went well beyond what typical travelers reasonably expect during airport screenings. Finally, plaintiffs' factual allegations lead to the reasonable inference that the family's watchlist status remains the same today.However, the court held that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue prospective relief relating to certain actions taken by Government agents who detained them during their travel in 2018. In this case, plaintiffs claim that these actions violated established federal policies, but they lack standing because they have not plausibly alleged any impending or substantial risk of future harm. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jibril v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Twentieth Century geopolitical events — World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Civil War, and World War II — forced leaders of Chabad Chasidism, a religious movement, to flee Russia, first to Latvia, then to Poland, and ultimately to the United States. In 1940, Chabad of the United States was incorporated under New York law and began attempting to recover 17th Century religious materials taken from its religious community.In 2004, Chabad sued Russia. In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered a partial judgment for Russia, which eventually withdrew from the case. The district court entered a default judgment against Russia in 2010, ordering it to return the materials. When Russia failed to comply, Chabad served subpoenas seeking to identify assets that could be attached for the fines imposed by the district court. Both appellants moved to quash the subpoenas. Neither, however, appealed the district court denials of their motions. Each then attempted to appeal the district court denials of their efforts to present immunity defenses. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The court denied mandamus review because there was an alternative avenue for review (the collateral order appeal that was filed too late). View "Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and numerous intervenors filed suit challenging the Forest Service's issuance of the Roadless Rule, which prohibits (with some exceptions) all road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System lands. After the district court dismissed the case on statute-of-limitations grounds, the DC Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted the summary-judgment motions of the Agriculture Department and its intervenor supporters. After briefing but before oral argument, the Agriculture Department granted Alaska's request to conduct a rulemaking to redetermine whether to exempt the Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Rule. The DC Circuit ordered the appeals stayed pending completion of the rulemaking, and on October 29, 2020, the Agriculture Department issued a final rule exempting the Tongass from the Roadless Rule.The DC Circuit concluded that Alaska's claims regarding application of the Roadless Rule to the Tongass National Forest are moot, and dismissed these claims and vacated those portions of the district court's decision regarding the Tongass. The court dismissed the remaining claims on appeal for lack of standing. View "Alaska v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, to sue an agency of the United States, a plaintiff must serve the agency and the United States. Service to the United States is delivered to the U.S. Attorney for the district where the action is brought and the U.S. Attorney General . Rule 4 provides 90 days to complete service, and instructs that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court ... must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” In these consolidated cases, federal employees seeking to sue federal agencies for discrimination, failed to properly serve the United States. Each district court declined to grant an extension of time to effectuate service. The cases were dismissed without prejudice, but the limitations period had expired.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. When a plaintiff has otherwise not demonstrated good cause for failing to effectuate service, the running of the statute of limitations does not require a district court to extend the time for service of process, nor does it require appellate review under a heightened standard. Neither plaintiff demonstrated good cause, and dismissal of these complaints under Rule 4(m) was within the broad discretion of the district court. View "Stephenson v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Schindler filed suit alleging that WMATA arbitrarily eliminated it from consideration of a bid to replace escalators throughout WMATA's Metrol Rail System stations even though it complied with the Request for Proposal's (RFP) requirements and offered a better value than that proposed by the awardee.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal sua sponte of Schindler's complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that WMATA, an interstate compact entity, had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court explained that neither the interstate compact creating WMATA, the Authority's procurement documents nor the Administrative Procedure Act waives WMATA's sovereign immunity for challenges to procurement decisions like Schindler's. View "Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Broidy, an activist businessman, urged the government to oppose Qatar’s alleged funding and harboring of terrorists and to support the efforts of Qatar’s neighbors to isolate it economically. Broidy alleges that Qatar engaged in “a multi-million dollar dark money effort to recruit lobbyists and influencers to polish Qatar’s public image.” Qatar allegedly paid the defendants, U.S.-citizen public relations contractors, millions in hopes of rehabilitating its image with “the Republican, American Jewish community and other conservative supporters of Israel.” They allegedly retained a cybersecurity firm “to coordinate an offensive cyber and information operation against” Broidy and his company.Broidy sued, alleging violations of RICO, Stored Communications Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Defend Trade Secrets Act, and California law. Without acknowledging involvement in the alleged scheme, the defendants claimed immunity based on Broidy’s allegations regarding their relationship to Qatar, a foreign sovereign. The court dismissed certain claims as legally inadequate and rejected the immunity defense.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by its terms does not apply. Qatar has not said that the challenged conduct was at its behest nor has it urged the United States to recognize the defendants’ immunity. The State Department has never suggested that the defendants are immune as agents of Qatar. Without any such acknowledgment or suggestion, a private party claiming foreign sovereign immunity bears a heavy burden. The defendants here are U.S. citizens sued in their private capacities by U.S. plaintiffs for violations of U.S. and California law within the U.S. View "Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Muzin" on Justia Law

Eight years ago, several hospitals challenged the Department of Health and Human Services’ methodology for calculating certain Medicare payments. The hospitals had sought expedited judicial review (EJR) from the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, which is available if a hospital’s claim involves a question that the Board “is without authority to decide,” 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(f)(1). While the Board granted most of the EJR requests, it dismissed the claims of certain hospitals (appellants) for failing to comply with agency filing procedures. The Board declined to grant EJR to those hospitals. In 2018, the D.C. Circuit ruled against the hospitals on the merits.The appellants filed suit, arguing that the Board’s dismissal of their claims was a “final decision” subject to judicial review, and urged the court not to remand their cases but to resolve the merits of their challenge to the rules for Medicare outlier payments. The district court held that the Board had lacked authority to resolve their challenges—the triggering condition for the Board’s granting of EJR—and that the court could proceed to consider the merits. The other hospitals (who had been granted EJR) joined with appellants in seeking vacatur of the challenged Medicare outlier rules. The district court rejected that suit on summary judgment.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. For the hospitals to establish that the now-final judgment against them was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction, they would need to show that there was not even an arguable basis for that court’s conclusion—at the urging of the hospitals themselves—that jurisdiction existed. The hospitals fail to make that showing. View "Lee Memorial Hospital v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act (RSA) gives licensed blind individuals priority to operate vending facilities on federal property, 20 U.S.C. 107(b). The Secretary of Education promulgates implementing regulations and designates state agencies to administer the program. The RSA includes a grievance scheme for vendors to challenge a state’s operation of its Randolph-Sheppard program through the state licensing agency. A licensee dissatisfied with the results of the state’s hearing may seek further review before the Secretary, who must “convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute.” In the District of Columbia, the designated licensing agency is the Rehabilitation Services Administration.The plaintiffs, current and former vendors in the District’s Randolph-Sheppard program, claim that the District discriminated against them, based on their blindness, specifically by discriminatory inspections of vending facilities and failing to provide aids such as human or electronic readers. The plaintiffs did not pursue the Randolph-Sheppard grievance procedure but filed a lawsuit, claiming disability-based discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs had to proceed through the RSA grievance procedure before pursuing their discrimination claims in court; no futility exception could apply here. View "Patten v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in districts across the country filed class action complaints against four airlines, alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 3, by colluding to decrease capacity and raise prices. These lawsuits were consolidated and transferred to the District of Columbia for multidistrict litigation proceedings. The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with Southwest and American. The district court preliminarily approved both settlements. Settlement class members include anyone who purchased flights from the defendant airlines for a period after July 2011. Litigation against Delta and United continued. Under the proposed settlements, Southwest would pay $15 million and American would pay $45 million. The amount ultimately received by each settlement class member may increase at the close of litigation against Delta and United. To avoid piecemeal payments, the proposed settlements left open the question of how the funds should be allocated and distributed until the entire lawsuit concluded.Bednarz and Frank objected, arguing the settlement notice should have detailed how the funds would be distributed and opposing the possibility of a cy pres distribution of funds to undisclosed recipients. After a hearing, the district court approved the settlements, rejecting the objections. The court dismissed Southwest and American from the consolidated action but declined to make the dismissal a final judgment. The D.C. Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, an appeal by Bednarz and Frank. The court’s order is not an appealable final judgment or interlocutory order. View "In re: Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2719, allows a federally recognized Indian tribe to conduct gaming on lands taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior as of October 17, 1988 and permits gaming on lands that are thereafter taken into trust for an Indian tribe that is restored to federal recognition where the tribe establishes a significant historical connection to the particular land. Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians regained its federal recognition in 1991 and requested an opinion on whether a Vallejo parcel would be eligible for tribal gaming. Yocha Dehe, a federally recognized tribe, objected. The Interior Department concluded that Scotts Valley failed to demonstrate the requisite “significant historical connection to the land.” Scotts Valley challenged the decision.Yocha Dehe moved to intervene to defend the decision alongside the government, explaining its interest in preventing Scotts Valley from developing a casino in the Bay Area, which would compete with Yocha Dehe’s gaming facility, and that the site Scotts Valley seeks to develop "holds cultural resources affiliated with [Yocha Dehe’s] Patwin ancestors.”The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Yocha Dehe’s motion, citing lack of standing. Injuries from a potential future competitor are neither “imminent” nor “certainly impending.” There was an insufficient causal link between the alleged threatened injuries and the challenged agency action, given other steps required before Scotts Valley could operate a casino. Resolution of the case would not “as a practical matter impair or impede” the Tribe’s ability to protect its interests. View "Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law