Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III began investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, during which Giorgi Rtskhiladze testified before a grand jury. When the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a redacted version of Mueller’s report, it included information that Rtskhiladze claimed was inaccurate and damaging to his reputation. Rtskhiladze sued for both equitable and monetary relief and sought a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Rtskhiladze lacked standing for his equitable claims, failed to state a claim for damages, and was not entitled to obtain a copy of the transcript. The court found that Rtskhiladze had abandoned his separate damages claim against DOJ and Mueller personally and forfeited arguments about this claim on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rtskhiladze has standing to bring all his claims and remanded the equitable claims for further consideration. The court agreed with the district court that Rtskhiladze failed to state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, as he did not allege "intentional or willful" conduct by DOJ. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript, emphasizing the government’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy and preventing witness intimidation.In summary, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Rtskhiladze’s equitable claims for lack of standing, affirmed the dismissal of his damages claim for failure to state a claim, and upheld the denial of his request to obtain a copy of his grand jury transcript. View "Rtskhiladze v. Mueller" on Justia Law

Eva Mae Givens applied for Medicaid assistance in Washington, D.C., but the District miscalculated her copay, requiring her to pay an extra $2,000 per month. Givens requested an administrative hearing to contest the miscalculation, but D.C. did not provide a timely hearing as required by federal law. Givens then filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for a fair hearing and monetary damages for the overpayments. While the case was pending, D.C. held a hearing, corrected the miscalculation, and sent back-payments to the nursing homes, but not to Givens. Givens passed away shortly after the hearing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case with prejudice, ruling that the claims were moot because D.C. had provided the hearing and corrected the miscalculation. The court also held that Givens failed to state a claim for relief. Givens' children, who sought to be substituted as plaintiffs, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the fair-hearing claims as moot but noted that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The court found that the calculation claim was not moot because Givens had not received compensation for the overpayments she made. However, the court held that the calculation claim failed to plausibly allege a violation of federal rights under § 1983, as Givens did not identify a specific municipal policy or custom that caused the miscalculation.The appellate court vacated the district court's order dismissing the case with prejudice and remanded the case. The district court was instructed to dismiss the moot fair-hearing claims without prejudice and to either dismiss the calculation claim without prejudice or provide a detailed explanation for a dismissal with prejudice. View "Givens v. Bowser" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report mentioning the CIA’s “operational control” over fourteen detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006. Based on this, a lawyer representing one of the detainees requested records from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about the CIA’s “operational control” at Guantanamo from September 2006 to January 2007. The CIA identified three documents but stated it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of other records, citing the need to protect classified intelligence sources and methods.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA. The court concluded that the CIA had adequately justified its Glomar response, which allows an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records if doing so would reveal classified information. The court found that the CIA had not waived its right to issue a Glomar response despite the release of some documents and references in the Senate report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the CIA did not waive its Glomar response through official acknowledgment, as the Senate report and the released documents did not constitute an official acknowledgment by the CIA. The court also found that the CIA’s justification for its Glomar response was logical and plausible, as confirming or denying the existence of additional records could reveal protected intelligence sources and methods. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the CIA. View "Connell v. CIA" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a rule allowing certain H-4 visa holders, who are dependent spouses of H-1B visa holders, to work in the United States. Save Jobs USA challenged this rule, arguing that DHS exceeded its authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA includes provisions that grant the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to set conditions for nonimmigrants' stay in the U.S. and to establish necessary regulations. DHS relied on these provisions to justify the rule.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of DHS, citing the precedent set by the D.C. Circuit in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS (Washtech). In Washtech, the court upheld a DHS rule allowing certain foreign students to work in the U.S. based on similar INA provisions. The district court found that Save Jobs USA did not meaningfully distinguish its case from Washtech and thus ruled in favor of DHS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the INA provisions cited by DHS indeed grant the agency the authority to issue employment-related rules for nonimmigrants. The court noted that Save Jobs USA did not effectively challenge the applicability of the Washtech precedent. Additionally, the court rejected Save Jobs USA's argument that the major questions doctrine should apply, stating that Washtech had already interpreted the relevant statutory provisions post-West Virginia v. EPA. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of DHS. View "Save Jobs USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

Carol Lewis and Douglas Sargent, both diabetics and Medicare beneficiaries, sought reimbursement for continuous glucose monitors and related supplies from 2015 to 2017. After the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) denied their claims, they pursued judicial review and sought to represent a class of individuals with similar claims. The district court denied their motion for class certification, noting that most putative class members had unexhausted or untimely claims. The court concluded that neither waiver of the exhaustion requirement nor equitable tolling of the limitations period was appropriate, reducing the putative class to seventeen individuals, which was too small to meet the numerosity requirement for class certification. After the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued new guidance in 2022, the district court granted partial judgment in favor of Lewis and Sargent, setting aside the denials of their claims and declaring that continuous glucose monitors are durable medical equipment.Lewis and Sargent appealed the denial of class certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They did not challenge the favorable merits judgment but focused solely on the class certification issue. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed their appeal for lack of constitutional standing. The court held that their desire to serve as class representatives did not create a cognizable Article III interest, as they did not allege any concrete individual injury resulting from the denial of class certification. The court emphasized that an abstract interest in representing a class is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lewis v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law

Andres Cabezas was arrested in an FBI sting operation in 2017 and later pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. While his appeal was pending, he submitted FOIA requests to the FBI for records related to his case. After six months without a response, Cabezas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking the release of the requested records. The FBI eventually released some records but withheld others, citing various FOIA exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FBI, finding that it had conducted a reasonable search and properly withheld documents under FOIA and the Privacy Act.Cabezas appealed the district court's decision, challenging the adequacy of the FBI's search and the justification for withholding records. He also contested the denial of his motions for limited discovery and in camera review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the FBI had made a good faith effort to conduct a reasonable search, using appropriate methods and search terms. The court also found that the FBI's affidavits provided a detailed account of the search process and the reasons for withholding certain records.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the FBI had conducted a reasonable search and properly invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold certain records. The court also upheld the denial of Cabezas's motions for limited discovery and in camera review, finding no abuse of discretion. The court concluded that Cabezas had not provided sufficient evidence to challenge the adequacy of the FBI's search or the validity of the exemptions claimed. View "Cabezas v. FBI" on Justia Law

Jo Spence, a licensed attorney, was terminated from her position at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) after eleven years. She claimed her termination was retaliatory, following her filing of internal discrimination complaints and whistleblower disclosures. Spence alleged discrimination based on race, sex, and age, and also claimed the VA engaged in illegal preferential hiring practices. She filed a complaint in the district court after the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) upheld her termination, citing her poor performance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed most of Spence’s claims for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment on her remaining claim. The court found that Spence, despite being pro se, was not entitled to the leniency typically afforded to pro se litigants due to her legal training and experience. The court dismissed her initial lengthy complaints and allowed her to amend them multiple times, but ultimately dismissed her claims with prejudice for failing to comply with the court’s page limits and pleading requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not apply to licensed attorneys. It found that Spence failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims of retaliation and discrimination, and that her termination was supported by substantial evidence of poor performance. The court also upheld the district court’s dismissal of her claims with prejudice, noting Spence’s repeated failure to comply with court rules and orders. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Spence v. DVA" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Saad Aljabri, a former Saudi Arabian government official, who alleges that a group led by the current Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, plotted to kill him after he relocated to Canada. The district court dismissed Aljabri's claims, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the defendants, and that Aljabri had failed to state a claim against two others.The district court found that due to the burden on bin Salman to litigate in the United States and Saudi Arabia’s greater procedural and substantive interest, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over bin Salman would not meet “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The court also determined that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute did not provide “specific” personal jurisdiction over other defendants because Aljabri failed to sufficiently align their alleged business activities in D.C. with the plot against his life. The court denied Aljabri's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that any information revealed in the discovery would not change the court’s conclusion that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Saudi Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, albeit for a different reason: his immunity from suit. However, the court held that the district court did abuse its discretion in denying Aljabri’s motion for jurisdictional discovery outright. The court therefore reversed the district court’s order denying jurisdictional discovery, vacated the judgment of dismissal with respect to two defendants, and remanded for jurisdictional discovery. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against two other defendants for the reasons given by the district court. View "Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. and its affiliates, who were charged by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for imposing "unjust and unreasonable" detention charges on TCW, Inc., a trucking company. The charges were for the late return of a shipping container. The FMC argued that the charges were unreasonable as they were levied for days when the port was closed and could not have accepted a returned container. Evergreen contested this decision, arguing that the FMC's application of the interpretive rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The FMC had previously ruled in favor of TCW, Inc. in a small claims program. The Commission then reviewed the decision, focusing on the application of the interpretive rule on demurrage and detention. The FMC upheld the initial decision, stating that no amount of detention can incentivize the return of a container when the terminal cannot accept the container. The Commission dismissed Evergreen's arguments that failing to impose detention charges during the port closure would have disincentivized the return of the container before the closure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found the FMC's decision to be arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the FMC failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide a reasoned explanation for several aspects of its decision. The court also found that the FMC's application of the incentive principle was illogical. The court concluded that a detention charge does not necessarily lack any incentivizing effect because it is levied for a day on which a container cannot be returned to a marine terminal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Commission’s order, and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law