Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

Cincinnati filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a duty to defendant or indemnify claims brought against its insured, All Plumbing, for sending unsolicited faxed advertisements alleged to be in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court ruled that Cincinnati could not assert any of its defenses to coverage under the primary liability provision of the policy because it had failed to reserve its rights, but could assert such defenses under the excess liability provision. However, the district court did not address the asserted defenses under that provision. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final decision as to all requested relief where the district court's decision did not resolve all of Cincinnati’s rights and liabilities under the excess liability provision of the policy. View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. All Plumbing, Inc." on Justia Law

Douglas B. Huron and the Society filed suit against OPM and its Director challenging the agency’s approval of health benefits plans for federal employees that exclude or limit insurance coverage of speech-generating devices. The court concluded that Huron and the Society never identified a procedural injury or raised procedural standing before the district court, and instead argued vigorously for “traditional” standing until their briefing on appeal. Huron’s and the Society’s appellate about-face on the nature of Huron’s claimed injury leaves them no viable basis on which to establish standing. Because Huron and the Society forfeited twice over the claims on which they predicate standing, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Huron v. Cobert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that new regulations promulgated by the USDA may result in an increase in foodborne illness from contaminated poultry. The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact and dismissed their claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that standing should have been evaluated under the motion to dismiss standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the district court erred by using the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment. On the merits, the court concluded that, because plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that the NPIS substantially increases the risk of producing unwholesome, adulterated poultry compared to the existing inspection systems, they do not have standing. Further, plaintiffs' self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the NPIS, and their subjective fear does not give rise to standing. The court also concluded that FWW has not alleged an injury to its interest to give rise to organizational standing. Because plaintiffs have failed to establish that they will likely suffer a substantive injury, their claimed procedural injury necessarily fails. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs failed to show any cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Dalton Trucking and ARTBA challenged the EPA's final decision authorizing California regulations intended to reduce emissions of particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen from in-use nonroad diesel engines. Dalton Truck sought review of the same EPA decision at the same time in the Ninth Circuit, where ARTBA intervened in Dalton Trucking's behalf. Before this court, Dalton Trucking and ARTBA argue that the Ninth Circuit is the proper venue for their challenges and seek dismissal or transfer of their petitions for review. The court agreed that, pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), venue is not proper in this court because EPA’s decision does not satisfy either of the statutory avenues for filing in the D.C. Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for review. View "Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The District and the Police Department appealed from the district court's grant of preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of a “good reason” standard in the D.C. Code provision governing the issuance of licenses for the carrying of concealed weapons, D.C. Law 20-279, 3(b). The court noted that the controlling fact in this case is the identity of the judge who decided it in the district court – The Honorable Senior United States District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., of the Northern District of New York. Although Judge Scullin served under a properly issued designation, that designation was limited to specific and enumerated cases. The court concluded that the present litigation is not one of those cases. The court concluded that, like the designated judge in Frad v. Kelly, Judge Scullin had a limited designation that did not extend beyond the specifications of that designation. Accordingly, the court vacated the order based on jurisdictional grounds. View "Wrenn v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Secretary issued regulations setting out reasonable cost limits (RCLs) for specified medical services and establishing certain exceptions to those limits. Canonsburg claimed that the Secretary has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., because her method of calculation is inconsistent with governing regulations and was promulgated without notice and comment. In light of Canonsburg I, the district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issue preclusion barred Canonsburg’s suit. The court concluded that the Secretary did not waive her issue preclusion affirmative defense by not raising it at the administrative stage. Moreover, the Secretary asserted it, expressly and properly, in district court and the court is free to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine to Canonsburg's complaint. In light of the Supreme Court's plain language in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I and II), the court's own construction of the Chenery doctrine and no persuasive case law to the contrary, the court concluded that the Chenery doctrine does not prohibit raising issue preclusion as an affirmative defense in district court even if the party raising the defense was not a party to the administrative proceeding or was otherwise unable to assert the defense at the administrative stage. Finally, the court rejected Canonsburg's claims of equitable considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Canonsburg General Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Texas appealed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to three intervenors in Texas’s lawsuit under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10304. Rejecting Texas’s cursory “Advisory” argument, the district court granted the motions and awarded fees. The district court held that Texas had conceded virtually all of the issues relevant to the motions for attorneys’ fees by deliberately choosing not to address them. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because "the discretion to enforce this rule lies wholly with the district court," and Texas forfeited any challenge to the district court’s exercise of that discretion by failing to even mention the issue in its opening brief in this court. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellees, medical records coders employed by appellants, filed suit against appellants for unlawfully failing to pay overtime pay. Appellees prevailed in a jury verdict and the district court denied appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment. The court concluded that the jury fulfilled its function by considering conflicting evidence, resolving factual disputes, and returning a verdict. In this case, there is no reason for the court to upset that verdict or order a new trial. Because the court found no merit in appellants' arguments, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Radtke v. Caschetta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the mother of Karl Grimes, a juvenile who was allegedly beaten to death at a detention facility. Plaintiff claimed that the District showed deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for, her son’s safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the summary judgment motion and to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia based on an asserted conflict of interest. The court concluded that the district court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of any dispositive motion because a claim of counsel’s conflict of interest calls into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in the sequence in which it rendered its decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of the motion to disqualify, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law