Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102 et seq., discrimination suit in which a jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff, a diabetic, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that there was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff could control his diabetes by eating three meals a day, plus snacks, and taking his medication. The court concluded that there is no good reason to assume that the jury was misled by the Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc. instruction given by the district court where the jury had before it sufficient evidence to determine that plaintiff was allowed to eat his regular meals and snacks, and thus conclude that he did not have a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lee v. Government of D.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint for failure to effect service of process as required under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(3). In view of the resulting prejudice to plaintiff and the absence of any relevant prejudice to the Embassy of Zambia of allowing a further effort at service, the court concluded that that dismissal was too extreme a remedy because plaintiff's attempts at service came so close to strict compliance with the FSIA as to demonstrate a good faith effort at timely compliance amidst the sometimes confusing directions from the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Barot v. Embassy of Zambia" on Justia Law

After Venezuela forcibly seized oil rigs belonging to the Venezuelan subsidiary of an American corporation, both the parent and subsidiary filed suit in the United States asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, 1605-1607, expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court granted Venezuela's motion to dismiss as to the subsidiary's expropriation claim, but denied the motion in all other respects. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the parent corporation had sufficient rights in its subsidiary's property to support its expropriation claim; but the district court should have allowed the claim to proceed because the subsidiary's expropriation claim is neither "wholly substantial" nor "frivolous" under this Circuit's standard for surviving a motion to dismiss in an FSIA case; and the district court should have granted the motion to dismiss with respect the commercial activity exception where the subsidiary's commercial activity had no "direct effect" in the United States, which is required by the FSIA to defeat sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Standley went to a D.C. public library to complete her homework and study for upcoming college exams. She sat in an area of the library reserved for children. Officer Edmonds-Leach asked Standley to move. Finding no seats in the adult area, Standley relocated to the young-adult area, although she was too old to sit there. The officer again asked Standley to move. Aan altercation ensued. The officer arrested Standley. Standley sued Officer Leach and the District of Columbia for the unconstitutional use of excessive force and common law torts. At trial, Standley and Officer Leach disputed the specifics of their encounter. Other than an inconclusive video, the only evidence was provided by Kellar, a librarian. The court allowed the defense to call Kellar for impeachment, although Kellar had not been identified before trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the defense had agreed not to call undisclosed witnesses. The D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that Kellar’s testimony was not confined to impeachment; that the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Standley and Officer Edmonds-Leach; and that the testimony of the relatively disinterested witness likely influenced that outcome. View "Standley v. Edmonds-Leach" on Justia Law

The 2008 contract for the design and construction of nuclear electrical generating units at a Georgia power plant specifies that it is to be governed by Georgia law. The contractor sought payment after Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements delayed the project and imposed additional costs. The contract calls for mediation. After 60 days, either party may proceed to litigation “in a court of competent jurisdiction,” the parties “agree to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for any legal proceedings.” After mediation the contractor filed its District of Columbia complaint, seeking more than $900 million. The court’s electronic filing log reported “11/01/2012 20:00:01” as the filing time. Georgia Power filed in the Southern District of Georgia, seeking to recover more than $100 million paid under protest and a declaratory judgment. The hard copy of the complaint notes November 1, 2012, 8:00 p.m. as the time of the filing. The district court did not decide who filed first, but determined that the controversy should be adjudicated in Georgia, regardless of which party filed first. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. A clause permitting first-to-file challenges (comparing one lawsuit to another) contemplated that the venue clause was permissive. View "Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was awarded monetary sanctions for attorney's fees and expenses he accrued in defending a defamation action brought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant, publisher of a website called Iranianlobby.com, defamed plaintiffs in a series of articles and blog posts claiming that they had secretly lobbied on behalf of the Iranian regime in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's award of sanctions. The court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where plaintiffs failed to obey two direct court orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in light of their failure to explain their withholding of so many relevant documents, some of which they misrepresented to the district court that they could not locate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's award of sanctions. The court reversed the award related to defendant's expenses in preparing the portions of his motion related to NIAC's alteration of a document and Trita Parsi's interrogatory responses, as well as the award of post-judgment interest to run from September 13, 2010. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Parsi v. Daioleslam" on Justia Law

WMATC filed suit against Paul Rodberg and his company, seeking an injunction to shut down Rodberg's illegal limousine operation. After the district court entered a default judgment, Rodberg ignored the default judgment and continued operating his limousine business under a different name. The district court issued another order enjoining all of Rodberg's companies from transporting passengers without a license. Rodberg appealed the default judgment and order. The court affirmed the default judgment where the district court did not abuse its discretion when it entered default judgment against Rodberg as a sanction for his total discovery lapse. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the subsequent order where the order did not modify the previous injunction because Rodberg's company was already bound by the earlier order as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in Case No. 13-7072 and dismissed in Case No. 13-7161. View "Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Reliable Limousine Serv." on Justia Law

John Tyler and his wife filed suit seeking damages from various companies that manufacture products containing asbestos that he had been exposed. After Tyler died from a form of lung cancer caused by asbestos, Stephen Wannall became the personal representative of Tyler's estate. Honeywell was named in the suit as the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, which manufactured brake shoes that Tyler used in helping friends, family, and neighbors perform automobile repairs for over 50 years. Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish the causal link required under Virginia law between Tyler's exposure to Bendix brakes and his disease. The district court denied the motion. While the parties were preparing for trial, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued Ford Motor Company v. Boomer, which rejected the "substantial" cause standard that the parties had previously understood as controlling, and ruled instead that plaintiffs must demonstrate that "exposure to the defendant's product alone must have been sufficient to have caused the harm." Honeywell moved for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment in light of Boomer. Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not seek leave to file a new declaration of their expert under Rule 26(e). Nor did plaintiff move under Rule 56(d) for permission to take additional discovery in response to Honeywell's motion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Honeywell's motion to strike the new expert declaration and its renewed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Boomer. View "Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in state court, challenging the foreclosure proceedings that ultimately resulted in the sale of his property. Defendants removed to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying leave to amend plaintiff's complaint to add additional federal claims; vacated the district court's orders relating to the state-law claims against Chase and Shapiro & Burson because the D.C. statutory and common law claims against the bank and its foreclosing agent should have been decided by the local courts; and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to Superior Court for determination of plaintiff's state-law claims against those parties. View "Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law