Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The case revolves around Matthew Couch, a self-described investigative journalist and political commentator, who operates a news and opinion website and maintains active profiles on various social media platforms. Couch had been involved in spreading conspiracy theories about the unsolved murder of Seth Rich, a worker for the Democratic National Committee. In 2019, a podcast called Conspiracyland discussed the murder and the conspiracy theories surrounding it, including those propagated by Couch. Following this, Couch sued the journalist and his publishers for defamation and other related torts.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court granted judgment to all defendants, finding that Couch failed to plausibly allege actual malice or verifiable facts that were defamatory. It also denied Couch's request to file an amended complaint, concluding that the proposed amendments would not fix the deficient pleadings.The case was then brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Couch failed to plausibly state any claims against the defendants. Eight of the supposedly defamatory statements lacked any evidence that could prove actual malice, and the other six lacked verifiable facts that could be proven or disproven to a jury. The court also noted that each of Couch's other claims relied on the success of the defamation claim, and thus, they failed as well. The court concluded that Couch's proposed amended complaint did not fix these problems, and therefore, affirmed the dismissal of the case with prejudice. View "Couch v. Verizon Communications Inc." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the use of forecasts in the electric energy industry, specifically in proposing rates for electricity-generating entities. The New York Independent System Operator, Inc., a non-profit entity that operates New York’s electric grid and oversees the state’s wholesale electricity markets, proposed rates for the 2021–2025 period. It shortened the amortization period from twenty years to seventeen years, justifying the change by pointing to the recently enacted New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, 2019. The Act proclaims that by the year 2040, the statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initially rejected the System Operator’s submission, deeming the justification for a seventeen-year commercial lifespan “speculative”. Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc., a trade association of electricity generators, sought judicial review of FERC’s rejection. The court granted their petition, holding that FERC failed to sufficiently explain its reasons for rejecting the System Operator’s proposal. On remand, FERC again rejected the System Operator’s analysis as “speculative”. Independent Power Producers sought rehearing before FERC, which granted its request. This time, FERC approved the System Operator’s submission. The Public Service Commission sought (re-)rehearing before FERC, which was denied. The Public Service Commission now petitions for judicial review in this court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Public Service Commission’s petitions for review. The court found that FERC’s ultimate decision to approve the shortened amortization period satisfied the directives of the court's prior judgment. The court also found that FERC’s decision to not address the cost impact of the change was in line with the court’s precedents. The court concluded that the Public Service Commission can file a separate complaint to argue that the existing rate design is producing rates that are not just and reasonable. View "New York State Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves attorney Larry Klayman, who has been subject to multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In response, Klayman filed a series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar officials, alleging torts and constitutional claims. In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to practice law. Employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that suspension to other jurisdictions where Klayman is admitted to practice law. Klayman then brought three lawsuits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any forum, state or federal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the pre-filing injunction. The court affirmed on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages, but it affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court held that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees were entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages claims. However, the court found that there was no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger abstention at the time of the dismissal, and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims. View "Klayman v. Porter" on Justia Law

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An investigative reporter, Jason Leopold, sought access to the written directives of the United States Capitol Police and audits and reports prepared by the Inspector General of the Capitol Police. He invoked the District Court’s mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, claiming a common law right to access public documents and a statutory right under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The District Court dismissed these claims, holding that sovereign immunity barred the suit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, but for different reasons. The court found that Leopold failed to establish that the Capitol Police had a clear, indisputable, and ministerial duty to provide access to the records. The court also rejected Leopold's argument that the Inspector General of the Capitol Police breached his duty to publish all audits and reports that recommend corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 404(e)(1)(C), as applied to the Inspector General of the Capitol Police under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The court concluded that even if this duty existed, the Inspector General was forbidden from publishing the audits and reports due to their designation as "security information" under 2 U.S.C. § 1979. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, allowing Leopold to refile his complaint with the requisite allegations to satisfy the mandamus standard if he so desires and if he plausibly believes that he can prove those allegations. View "Leopold v. Manger" on Justia Law

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Dr. Jennifer Seed, a former employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed a lawsuit against the EPA and the United States, alleging age discrimination. Seed claimed that she was involuntarily demoted to a junior position as older managers were replaced with younger employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA, concluding that Seed had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.The district court's decision was based on its finding that Seed had not provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent that would entitle her to a trial, nor had she provided indirect evidence that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court also found that Seed had not shown that she was treated less favorably than younger employees after her reassignment or that her treatment was based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed Seed's appeal, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of her reassignment claims because she lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. The court found that Seed had not demonstrated that a favorable court decision would likely redress her claimed injuries. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the grant of summary judgment and to dismiss the reassignment claim for lack of standing. View "Seed v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Johannes and Linda Lamprecht, Swiss citizens who lived in the United States in 2006 and 2007, underreported their taxable income by falsely claiming they had no foreign bank accounts. In reality, they had millions in a Swiss bank, UBS. The couple amended their tax returns for 2006 and 2007 in 2010, after the United States served a John Doe Summons on UBS in 2008, seeking information about unknown taxpayers who might have failed to report taxable income in UBS accounts. The amended returns reported taxable income in the previously undisclosed UBS accounts, increasing their tax liability by approximately $2.5 million. The couple paid these back taxes, but in 2014, the IRS informed them they would be penalized for their original inaccuracies, and in 2015, issued a formal “notice of deficiency” assessing about $500,000 in penalties.The Lamprechts challenged these penalties in the United States Tax Court, arguing that the IRS didn’t follow the tax code’s procedures when it first decided to penalize them, that they deserved protections for voluntarily fixing their own mistake before the IRS acted, and that the statute of limitations for assessing accuracy penalties had run on the two tax years. The tax court granted summary judgment to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The court found that the IRS had complied with the statutory requirement for a supervisor's written approval for the penalty assessment. The court also ruled that the Lamprechts' corrected returns did not protect them from penalties because they were filed after a John Doe Summons was issued. Lastly, the court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the assessment of penalties because the John Doe Summons extended the statute-of-limitations period. View "Lamprecht v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reinstate a waiver granted to California under the Clean Air Act. The waiver allows California to set its own standards for automobile emissions, which are stricter than federal standards. The petitioners, a group of states and fuel industry entities, argued that the EPA's decision was not authorized under the Clean Air Act and violated a constitutional requirement that the federal government treat states equally in terms of their sovereign authority.The lower courts had upheld the EPA's decision, finding that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the decision. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the fuel industry petitioners lacked standing to raise their statutory claim, and that the state petitioners lacked standing to raise their preemption claim, because neither group had demonstrated that their claimed injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision by the court. The court also rejected the state petitioners' constitutional claim on the merits, holding that the EPA's decision did not violate the constitutional requirement of equal sovereignty among the states. View "Ohio v. EPA" on Justia Law

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The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals examined a case against Iran and Syria brought by Rotem and Yoav Golan, an Israeli couple injured in a terrorist attack. The plaintiffs and their relatives who suffered emotional trauma from the attack, accused Iran and Syria of supporting the terrorist group Hamas, which orchestrated the attack. The district court denied a default judgment to several plaintiffs, leading to this appeal.The appellate court ultimately held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The court explained that although Congress has permitted federal courts to hear personal-injury claims arising from "extrajudicial killings" committed by state sponsors of terrorism, the attack in this case did not kill anyone, thus, it cannot be classified as an "extrajudicial killing". The plaintiffs could not identify any other basis for jurisdiction against the foreign-government defendants.The court pointed out that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 generally exempts foreign sovereigns from the reach of U.S. courts. This case falls within a statutory exception to that immunity, which was created by Congress in 1996 to withdraw foreign sovereign immunity for lawsuits that seek damages for personal injury or death caused by a state sponsor of terrorism. However, the court concluded that the exception did not apply because the attacker did not kill anyone.The court vacated the judgment of the district court with respect to the plaintiffs before the court and remanded for dismissal of their claims. View "Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

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The case involves Pablo Abreu, a student who was expelled from Howard University College of Medicine. Abreu appealed his expulsion, arguing that the university violated his rights under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1972 by refusing to grant him additional opportunities to retake a required examination, in light of his diagnosed test-taking-anxiety disability. The district court dismissed his complaint, applying a one-year statute of limitations and ruling that his claims were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application of a one-year statute of limitations to Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court pointed to its decision in another case, Stafford v. George Washington University, in which it concluded that a three-year statute of limitations should apply to civil rights claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since Abreu's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were also civil rights claims alleging discrimination, the court ruled that the three-year statute of limitations should apply. This made Abreu’s claims timely since he filed the suit less than three years after his expulsion.The court then remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. However, it affirmed the dismissal of Abreu's contractual claims, agreeing with the district court that Abreu failed to state a claim for breach of contract. View "Abreu v. Howard University" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in a case involving Regenative Labs ("Regenative"), a manufacturer of medical products containing human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products ("HCT/Ps"), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Following the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issuing two technical direction letters instructing Medicare contractors to deny reimbursement for claims for products manufactured by Regenative, the company filed suit challenging these letters without first exhausting administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction as Regenative had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in part on grounds of mootness. The Court concluded that the claims raised by Regenative arose under the Medicare Act and had to be pursued through the statutorily-prescribed administrative process. The Court also found that the company’s request for the court to vacate the contested policy was moot because the policy had already been rescinded by CMS. Finally, the court rejected Regenative's argument for mandamus jurisdiction, finding that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for this relief. View "Row 1 Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law