Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two consolidated cases arise out of the Hungarian government’s confiscation of property owned by Jews during the Holocaust. The questions raised by these appeals bear on whether survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust may hale the Hungarian government and its instrumentalities into United States courts to answer for a subset of the wrongs they committed. The plaintiffs invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception as a means to pierce the Hungarian state’s sovereign immunity and assert jurisdiction in federal district court. Defendants object that the exception is inapplicable. The district court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs asserting statelessness but concluded that most of the plaintiffs asserting Czechoslovakian nationality could proceed.   The DC Circuit largely affirmed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs claiming statelessness—have not made out a recognized claim within a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception. Assuming without deciding that those plaintiffs were de facto stateless at the time of the alleged takings, as they claim, the plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to identify adequate affirmative support in sources of international law for their contention that a state’s taking of a stateless person’s property amounts to a taking “in violation of international law” within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.   The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims of some of the plaintiffs asserting Czechoslovakian nationality, with a few exceptions. The district court correctly determined that four of those plaintiffs had plausibly alleged they were Czechoslovakian nationals at the time of the takings. The court concluded that as for the five Lebovics sisters, the district court should have dismissed their claims. View "Rosalie Simon v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Appellant brought an action against the Army in district court, challenging the Secretary’s assignment of a 20% disability rating. According to Appellant the Secretary should have given him a 30% rating, consistent with the rating he had received from the Department of Veterans Affairs in a separate assessment conducted by the VA to determine his eligibility for veterans’ disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army.   The DC Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment to the Army and remanded. The court concluded that the Secretary’s approach when determining Appellant’s disability rating was inconsistent with the applicable statute and regulations. The court explained that to the extent the Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR) concluded that Appellant’s leg condition rendered him collectively unfit when considered together with his back condition, it was obligated to assign a rating to the leg condition. By extension, the Secretary, in accepting the PDBR’s recommendation to give no rating to Appellant’s leg condition, acted contrary to law insofar as the PDBR concluded that his leg condition was collectively unfitting together with his back condition. The court further explained that the fact that a condition contributes to a soldier’s unfitness is enough, and the Secretary’s apparent addition of a “significantly” criterion naturally raises questions about what degree and manner of contribution is thought to suffice, questions that the terms of the statute and regulations do not make salient. Any assumption that a medical condition, to receive a rating, must contribute “significantly” to unfitness thus is contrary to law. View "Jason Sissel v. Christine Wormuth" on Justia Law

Appellees worked as non-emergency medical transportation drivers. In July 2017, they brought a putative class action and Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Medical Transportation Management, Inc. (“MTM”). Their complaint alleged that MTM is their employer and had failed to pay them and its other drivers their full wages as required by both federal and District of Columbia law. MTM appealed the district court’s certification of an “issue class” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) and its denial of MTM’s motion to decertify plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act collective action.   The DC Circuit remanded the district court’s certification of the issue class because the court failed to ensure that it satisfies the class-action criteria specified in Rules 23(a) and (b). The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s separate decision on the Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. The court explained that because the resolution of the action will bind absent class members, basic principles of due process require that they be notified that their individual claims are being resolved and that they may opt out of the action if they so choose. So if the district court certifies the issue class under Rule 23(b)(3) on remand, it must direct “the best notice that is practicable” as part of any certification order. View "Isaac Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2018, Congress enacted the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (commonly referred to as “FOSTA”). FOSTA adds a new definitional provision to the Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(e)(4), and authorizes parens patriae suits by States against persons who violate that same Act’s prohibition of sex trafficking. The Woodhull Freedom Foundation and four other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of FOSTA on numerous grounds, but the district court upheld FOSTA in full.The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither Section 2421A of FOSTA nor FOSTA’s amendments to the Trafficking Act are overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. FOSTA’s clarification that Section 230 withholds immunity for violations of federal sex trafficking laws comports with the First Amendment. And the district court correctly dismissed the challenge to Section 230(e)(5)’s retroactive application. View "Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. USA" on Justia Law

The Sunshine Act’s “agency” definition only encompasses those with a majority of Board members whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms to such position. Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act). For years, the Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Earth, and the Center for International Environmental Law (collectively, CBD) enjoyed the benefits from the Sunshine Act’s application to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). By statute, it reorganized OPIC into the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).  Congress shrunk DFC’s Board of Directors (the Board) from fifteen members to nine. DFC’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) serves by virtue of their appointment to DFC instead of to the Board itself. Thus, DFC thought its Board majority was composed only of ex officio members. Accordingly, it promulgated a rule exempting itself from the Sunshine Act without notice-and-comment. CBD sued. The district court granted DFC’s motion to dismiss.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that CBD clearly had informational standing because the information it statutorily sought is from the agency itself. Next, the court held that the Sunshine Act does not apply to DFC because a majority of its Board members serves ex officio by virtue of their appointments to other positions. Finally, the court held that CBD’s claim that DFC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking fails because CBD did not demonstrate any prejudice arising from the asserted APA violation distinct from the legal question of Sunshine Act compliance. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Intl. Dev. Finance Corp" on Justia Law

GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise. View "GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Methane is considered the most dangerous gas in underground mining; in sufficient concentrations, methane can ignite and cause a potentially catastrophic explosion. To protect worker safety, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations thus require miners to deenergize equipment and cease work when they detect certain methane concentrations. But during the methane inundation at the Francisco mine the miners did not stop work. They instead continued operating an energized drill, trying to stop the flow of methane. MSHA issued two orders citing the mine operator, Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, for violating the applicable safety regulations and designated those violations as unwarrantable failures. It also individually cited the mine’s manager as Peabody’s agent. An administrative law judge and then the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with MSHA that Peabody violated MSHA safety regulations, that those violations constituted unwarrantable failures, that mine manager was individually liable, and that civil penalties were appropriate. Peabody and the manager petitioned for review in this court.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that MSHA safety regulations unambiguously prohibited Peabody’s operation of an energized drill in a high-methane environment, and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s unwarrantable failure and individual liability determinations. Further, as the Commission recognized, by permitting miners to work with energized equipment, the manager risked incurring the very hazard section 75.323(c)(2) is intended to address, i.e., potential ignition [in a] high-methane environment. View "Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (MSPB) final decision affirming his removal from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but filed his complaint in the district court one day after the statutory deadline prescribed in 5 U.S.C. Section 7703(b)(2). The district court dismissed his complaint as untimely. The district court held in the alternative that Plaintiff had not presented facts to warrant equitable tolling.   The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that Robinson failed to show that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The court explained that in light of the combined weight of intervening United States Supreme Court authority and the decisions of the other circuits interpreting section 7703(b)(2) as a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule since King, the court now holds that section 7703(b)(2)’s thirty-day filing deadline is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, the record shows that Plaintiff chose to mail his complaint by standard mail four days before the statutory filing deadline and assumed the risk his complaint would arrive late. On these facts, Plaintiff’s decision to use standard mail is a 14 “garden variety claim of excusable neglect” insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. View "Adam Robinson v. DHS Office of Inspector General" on Justia Law

Longmont United Hospital (Longmont) petitioned for a review of the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), concluding that Longmont violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, AFL-CIO (Union). Longmont does not dispute that it refused to bargain with the Union. Instead, it challenges the representation election whereby a group of registered nurses at Longmont elected the Union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative.   The DC Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court reasoned that Longmont has not shown a basis to disturb the Hearing Officer’s credibility findings. Further, the court held that the Board correctly declined to relitigate issues in the enforcement proceeding that had been decided in the representation proceeding. The Board did not adjudicate the General Counsel’s request for compensatory relief, and, as a result, any challenge to the fact or measure of compensatory damages is premature. View "Longmont United Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant complaint, filed in 2021, repeated the claims she had made against the defendants in her 2018 complaint. The district court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the D.C. statutory limitations period had run. In both of her complaints Appellant alleged that in 2004, when she was 14 years old and a student at a KIPP charter school in the District of Columbia, one of her teachers began having sexual relations with her. She further alleged that this man continued to abuse her after she enrolled in another school and that they began living together in Maryland. She claimed that she ended her relationship with him in 2009. At issue is whether, as the district court ruled, res judicata barred Appellant’s second action.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act went into effect on May 3, 2019. The new and expanded limitations period extends to “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” Here, the court held that the district court did not decide whether the old or the new D.C. statute of limitations applied to several of Appellant’s claims. The court wrote that the district court also concluded that its interpretation of the new Act depended on constitutional avoidance, which the DC Circuit determined to be inapplicable. View "Shanique Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corporation" on Justia Law