Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the FEC’s rule requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only those donations “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.” At issue in this appeal is whether the rule survives Step Two of the Chevron framework and State Farm's arbitrary and capricious test, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. The court held that the FEC’s purpose requirement satisfies both Chevron Step Two and State Farm review has the benefit both of being a correct application of black letter administrative law and of forestalling to some other time an answer to the important constitutional questions bubbling beneath the surface of this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title IX, and various D.C. tort laws, seeking damages from the District. Plaintiff alleged that, while attending a District school for emotionally disturbed students, she and a teacher had a consensual sexual relationship that led to the birth of a child. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that in order for the district court to assess whether plaintiff stated a facially plausible complaint, plaintiff needed to assert the elements of the type of municipal policy that caused her injury. Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education standard where she has not alleged that anyone - much less an appropriate official - knew of any acts of sexual harassment while the harassment was ongoing. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet the statutory notice requirement for her tort claim and that her alternative claim seeking to discover a police report about the incident is forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., alleging that the District: (1) unlawfully refused to accommodate her disability, and (2) retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation by terminating her employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the District. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's refusal-to-accommodate claim because she was not a qualified individual. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's retaliation claim because she did not proffer any evidence proving that the actual reason for her termination was retaliatory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minter v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics action against the FBI, alleging that the FBI violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they detained, interrogated, and tortured him over the course of four months in three African countries. The district court dismissed the suit. The court held that in this case, where the agents' actions took place during a terrorism investigation and those actions occurred overseas, special factors counsel hesitation in recognizing a Bivens action for money damages.Two special factors are present in this case. First, special factors counseling hesitation have foreclosed Bivens remedies in cases “involving the military, national security, or intelligence.” Second, the Supreme Court has never “created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside the borders of the United States.” The court further concluded that the weight of authority against expanding Bivens combined with the court's recognition that tort remedies in cases involving matters of national security and foreign policy are generally left to the political branches, counsels serious hesitation before recognizing a common law remedy in these circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal because plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action. View "Meshal v. Higgenbotham" on Justia Law

The district court determined as a matter of law that the District’s efforts “to combat gun violence and promote public safety” by means of its registration laws were “constitutionally permissible.” Plaintiffs challenged the district court's admission of, and its reliance upon, certain expert reports proffered by the District and the final order denying plaintiffs' and granting the District’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the admission of the challenged expert reports was not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed with respect to the basic registration requirement as applied to long guns, D.C. Code 7- 2502.01(a); the requirement that a registrant be fingerprinted and photographed and make a personal appearance to register a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.04; the requirement that an individual pay certain fees associated with the registration of a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.05; and the requirement that registrants complete a firearms safety and training course, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(13). The court reversed with respect to the requirement that a person bring with him the firearm to be registered, D.C. Code 7- 2502.04(c); the requirement that a gun owner re-register his firearm every three years, D.C. Code 7-2502.07a; the requirement that conditions registration of a firearm upon passing a test of knowledge of the District’s firearms laws, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(10); and the prohibition on registration of “more than one pistol per registrant during any 30-day period,” D.C. Code 7-2502.03(e). View "Heller v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Amtrak, alleging that it discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and District of Columbia law. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak. After the engine plaintiff was driving passed a stop signal at the rail yard and was forced off the rails by a safety derailer, Amtrak fired him and suspended his engineer certificate. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that no jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence in the record that Amtrak was motivated by plaintiff's race to take the adverse actions of which he complains. View "Burley v. Nat'l Passenger Rail Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a freelance journalist, filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and subordinating officers in both the present appeal, reversal of the memorandum terminating his embed status and reinstatement of his credentials and accommodation status. Plaintiff's status was withdrawn and he was returned to the United States after he reported on a controversial shooting incident at an adjoining Afghan national army base over the military personnel's objections. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims, concluding that plaintiff failed to assert a cognizable claim where plaintiff failed to show constitutional entitlement to the status of embed journalist. Further, the court noted that, even if it erred in determining that plaintiff brought no justifiable claim in the first instance, any claim which he may have asserted is now moot. View "Anderson v. Carter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the government's "bulk data program" collection constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The program operates pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, where section 215 of the Act empowered the FBI to request, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to enter, orders “requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting plaintiffs’ call records, but stayed its order pending appeal. After the court determined that the case was not moot, Judge Brown and Judge Williams wrote separate opinions stating the reasons for reversal. Judge Brown wrote separately to emphasize that, while plaintiffs have demonstrated it is only possible - not substantially likely - that their own call records were collected as part of the bulk-telephony metadata program, plaintiffs have nonetheless met the bare requirements of standing. Having barely fulfilled the requirements for standing at this threshold stage, plaintiffs fall short of meeting the higher burden of proof required for a preliminary injunction. Judge Williams wrote that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. View "Klayman v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that 40 U.S.C. 6135's Assemblages and Display Clauses, by restricting his intended activities, violate his rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiff seeks to picket, leaflet, and make speeches in the Supreme Court plaza, with the aim of conveying to the Supreme Court and the public what he describes as “political messages” about the Supreme Court’s decisions. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional in all its applications to the Supreme Court's plaza. The court concluded, however, that the Supreme Court's plaza is a nonpublic forum and the government can impose reasonable restrictions on speech as long as it refrains from suppressing particular viewpoints. In this case, neither the Assemblages Clause nor the Display Clause targets specific viewpoints, and both clauses reasonably relate to the government’s long-recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure. The statute’s reasonableness is reinforced by the availability of an alternative site for expressive activity in the immediate vicinity: the sidewalk area directly in front of the Supreme Court’s plaza. Therefore, the court upheld the statute’s constitutionality. View "Hodge v. Talkin" on Justia Law