Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Department of Homeland Security, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her supervisor took adverse actions against her on account of her race or because she had previously filed a discrimination complaint against the Department. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the record in this case could not reasonably support a finding that the Department’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. View "Walker v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of Curtis Suggs, filed suit against the District, Symbral, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, federal law regulating community residential facilities, and the common law. Suggs died while residing in a group home operated by Symbral, a District contractor. The District appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the section 1983 claims and negligence claims, and against Symbral and Defendants Leon and Yvonne Mohammed, as well as appealed the district court's denial of the District's post-trial motion. After reviewing the record and considering the parties' arguments, the court concluded that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment against the District on plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, and the court affirmed that portion of the decision on review. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on his negligence and statutory claims, concluding that those claims are barred under D.C. Code 12-309. Because the district court abused its discretion by excluding causation evidence, the court vacated the damages and remand for reconsideration. View "Harvey v. Mohammed" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the religious exemption in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Plaintiff also argued that the Administration’s decision to temporarily suspend enforcement of some of the Act’s requirements for a transitional period deprived him of the equal protection of the laws. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss and held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring either claim. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff lacks standing to assert his equal protection claim because nothing in the transitional policy requires him to buy insurance. In this case, plaintiff's inability to maintain his old plan was the independent choice of his insurer. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff did have standing to bring his Establishment Clause challenge. On the merits, the court concluded that the claim fails because the qualifications for exemption are not drawn on sectarian lines. Rather, they simply sort out which faiths have a proven track record of adequately meeting the statutory goals. Moreover, the exemption promotes the Establishment Clause’s concerns by ensuring that those without religious objections do not bear the financial risk and price of care for those who exempt themselves from the tax. As configured by this specific statutory framework, that is an objective, non-sectarian basis for cabining the exemption’s reach. View "Cutler v. HHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking damages from the District, the Family Services Agency, and District employees after plaintiffs' children were removed from their home after they were sexually abused by plaintiffs' other children. The court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the District and remanded those claims to the district court to determine whether there is municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the First Amendment, tort, and post-adoption services claims. View "Doe v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate in Maryland, filed a mandamus petition seeking to compel the USCIS to grant him a hearing to review the denial of his application for naturalization. The court rejected appellant's claim that he qualifies for in forma pauperis (IFP) status under the imminent danger exception to the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In this case, appellant's allegations were insufficient to establish imminent danger where the beatings, which took place while appellant was in the general prison population, do not indicate that he continued to face imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint. Further, appellant makes no allegation that he suffered any beatings or received specific threats while in protective custody. The court also rejected appellant's claim that the three-strikes rule is unconstitutional as applied to his case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, denying appellant IFP status. View "Asemani v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white Foreign Service Officer, filed suit alleging that the State Department's hiring plan aimed to increase racial diversity among the officers corps in the Foreign Service violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court agreed with the district court's reliance on two Supreme Court decisions, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, to grant summary judgment in favor of the State Department. Johnson and Weber both upheld employers' affirmative action plans against Title VII challenges. In this case, the Department has introduced evidence that the plan worked to target manifest imbalances in senior-level positions in the Foreign Service and that those imbalances resulted from past discrimination. The Department has also introduced evidence that the plan refrained from unnecessarily trammeling the rights of non-minority candidates. Further, plaintiff failed to prove that the Department's justification is pretextual and that the plan is invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Shea v. Kerry" on Justia Law

After the Chief of Police sanctioned plaintiff, pursuant to MPD General Order 204.01, Part VI-C-1, for releasing to the media a recording of Emergency Response Team (ERT) radio communications that occurred during an incident in which a suspect exchanged gunfire with the police and barricaded himself inside a private home, plaintiff filed suit against the District and MPD officials, alleging that he was being punished for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA), D.C. Code 1-615.52(a)(6). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the First Amendment and DCWPA claims, and dismissed the DCWPA claims against the individual defendants. The court held that Part VI-C-1 as applied to plaintiff is sufficiently tailored temporally and in scope to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal activity and police operations implicating police safety, and that the MPD’s interests in non-disclosure outweigh plaintiff’s and the public’s interests in releasing the recording at the time he did; Part VI-C-1 bars disclosure of confidential information only during ongoing investigations and does not otherwise bar speech about police activity, including the barricade incident; and releasing the confidential ERT recording could have harmed pending criminal investigations because it contained potentially critical information about the barricade and, only if kept confidential, could it provide a means to gauge other evidence offered by witnesses and persons involved in the incident. Finally, plaintiff's statutory challenge under the pre-2010 DCWPA is unavailing for failure to identify a “protected disclosure.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baumann v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law