Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking an order requiring DCPS to provide her son with compensatory education. The district court dismissed the suit as moot because the school system responded to the complaint by offering an individualized education plan that is adequate to keep the child on track going forward. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to address whether the child was entitled to compensatory education, which is a remedy that remains available. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boose v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102 et seq., discrimination suit in which a jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff, a diabetic, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that there was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff could control his diabetes by eating three meals a day, plus snacks, and taking his medication. The court concluded that there is no good reason to assume that the jury was misled by the Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc. instruction given by the district court where the jury had before it sufficient evidence to determine that plaintiff was allowed to eat his regular meals and snacks, and thus conclude that he did not have a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lee v. Government of D.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against law enforcement officers, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, after he was tased when resisting arrest at an Occupy D.C. encampment. The district court concluded that the officers were protected by qualified immunity against plaintiff's claims because the officer's use of the Taser did not violate the Constitution. The court agreed with the district court that qualified immunity shields the officers from plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, but on different grounds. The court held that a person actively resisting arrest does not have a clearly established right against a single use of a Taser to subdue him. The court also granted summary judgment to the officers on the First Amendment claim where plaintiff failed to meaningfully advance the argument on appeal. View "Lash v. Lemke" on Justia Law

Standley went to a D.C. public library to complete her homework and study for upcoming college exams. She sat in an area of the library reserved for children. Officer Edmonds-Leach asked Standley to move. Finding no seats in the adult area, Standley relocated to the young-adult area, although she was too old to sit there. The officer again asked Standley to move. Aan altercation ensued. The officer arrested Standley. Standley sued Officer Leach and the District of Columbia for the unconstitutional use of excessive force and common law torts. At trial, Standley and Officer Leach disputed the specifics of their encounter. Other than an inconclusive video, the only evidence was provided by Kellar, a librarian. The court allowed the defense to call Kellar for impeachment, although Kellar had not been identified before trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the defense had agreed not to call undisclosed witnesses. The D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that Kellar’s testimony was not confined to impeachment; that the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Standley and Officer Edmonds-Leach; and that the testimony of the relatively disinterested witness likely influenced that outcome. View "Standley v. Edmonds-Leach" on Justia Law

Gun Recovery Unit officers were in an unmarked car, wearing vests that said “police.” Gross was walking the sidewalk. Officer Bagshaw slowed the car and shined a flashlight, saying “[H]ey, it is the police, how are you doing? Do you have a gun?” Gross stopped, but did not answer. Bagshaw stopped the car and asked, “Can I see your waistband?” Not speaking, Gross lifted his jacket to show his left side. Bagshaw began to move the car. Officer Katz asked Bagshaw to stop, opened his door and asked, while stepping out, “[H]ey man, can I check you out for a gun?” Gross ran. Katz gave chase, saw Gross patting his right side, and smelled PCP. Katz apprehended Gross, performed a frisk, and recovered a handgun from Gross’s waistband. Denying a motion to suppress, the court reasoned that no seizure occurred until after Gross fled because nothing would have indicated to a reasonable person that he lacked freedom to disregard the questions and walk away; Gross’s flight and other behavior, provided reasonable grounds to detain him and conduct a pat-down frisk. Gross was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Given the totality of the circumstances and precedents involving comparable interactions, Bagshaw’s questioning did not effect a Fourth Amendment seizure. Once he attempted to flee, officers had authority to stop him and conduct the frisk. View "United States v. Gross" on Justia Law

Rattigan is a black male of Jamaican descent who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the FBI’s primary liaison to the Saudi intelligence service. In 2001, he accused supervisors in the FBI’s Office of International Operations, of discriminating against him on the basis of race and national origin and pursued charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office. One of those supervisors later sent Special Agent Leighton on a short assignment to Riyadh, where he evidently grew suspicious about Rattigan. The FBI Security Division conducted an investigation and concluded that the alleged security risks were “unfounded.” Rattigan filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the FBI because the memo on which Rattigan based his claim had been prepared not by one of the accused supervisors, but by Special Agent Donovan Leighton, who was not charged with discrimination and had no apparent reason to retaliate against him. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rattigan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Brown, a black female law professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law (DCSL), had worked for DCSL in various capacities for more than 20 years when she applied for tenure and promotion. The Faculty Evaluation Committee recommended tenure and transmitted her application to Dean Broderick, who initially recommended that the Committee withdraw its approval due to the sparseness and quality of Brown’s legal scholarship. Once Broderick learned that a law journal agreed to publish another of Brown’s articles, she endorsed the recommendation and forwarded her approval to then–Interim Provost Baxter, who rejected the application. President Sessoms agreed that Brown should not be awarded tenure and did not submit Brown’s application to the Board. Around the same time, the administration considered the tenure application of McLain, a white male. Brown alleges that McLain had “no legal publications” but that Broderick did not insist that he satisfy the three-publication requirement, as Broderick had with Brown’s application. The Board awarded him tenure and a promotion to full professor. Brown sued. The district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal of Brown’s D.C. Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 claims and affirmed dismissal of her other claims. View "Brown v. Sessoms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the GPO, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the GPO. Plaintiff's claims on appeal involve the GPO's alleged discrimination in not promoting him to Second Offset Pressperson and the GPO's alleged retaliation in excluding him from a Georgia training program. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the GPO's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him - he was not qualified for the position he was seeking - was pretextual. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's exclusion from the training program was sufficiently adverse, he failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the GPO's proffered reason for denying him training - that the decisionmaker thought he did not want it - was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hairston v. Vance-Cooks" on Justia Law