Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hawaiian Dredging Construction Company and a Hawaiian chapter of the Boilermakers union failed to renew a collective bargaining agreement. Hawaiian Dredging then discharged Boilermakers welders who were covered by the now-expired agreement. The Boilermakers thought those discharges were an “unfair labor practice” under the National Labor Relations Act and asked the National Labor Relations Board to weigh in. Originally, the Board sided with the Boilermakers. But Hawaiian Dredging asked the DC Circuit to review that decision, and the court remanded it to the Board to reconsider. The Board then changed its view and concluded that no unfair practice occurred. Then the Union petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit denied the petition finding that the Board’s new decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied established law. The court agreed with the Board that Hawaiian Dredging demonstrated “a legitimate and substantial business justification for” discharging the welders. The court explained when a prehire agreement expires, a construction employer has no continuing obligation to maintain a bargaining relationship with a union. So, absent other evidence, there is nothing discriminatory about a policy that suspends work and discharges all employees when an agreement expires. If anything, Hawaiian Dredging’s policy promotes collective bargaining by ensuring that all of its welding work is done pursuant to a pre-hire agreement. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual finding that Hawaiian Dredging discharged the welders because of its policy and not for some discriminatory reason. View "International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia Department of Behavioral Health had a policy of restraining civilly committed hospital patients during transport to court hearings. It applied that policy to Plaintiff. He says the policy violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from unjustified bodily restraint. After the superior court granted Plaintiff conditional release, he filed a Section 1983 suit against an assortment of D.C. officials — including the directors of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Behavioral Health. He sought damages for “pain and suffering, degradation, and humiliation” caused by the restraints. The district court granted summary judgment for the D.C. officials.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that Bell and Youngberg each show that the D.C. officials did not violate Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that to show that the restraint policy violated the Constitution under Youngberg, Plaintiff must prove that it was not an exercise of “professional judgment.” The court found that Plaintiff failed to prove either. First, the policy was “made by a professional.” Second, the policy was not a “substantial departure” from the “practices or standards” for transporting civilly-committed patients. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim fails because he offered no evidence to show that the policy was a substantial departure from accepted standards for transporting civilly-committed patients. View "Warren Harris v. Muriel Bowser" on Justia Law

Appellant, an intelligence analyst at the FBI, wants his employer to use available software that is accessible to blind employees like himself. Both parties agree that Section 794d of the Rehabilitation Act generally requires federal agencies, including the FBI, to use technology that is accessible to employees with disabilities. But the district court dismissed Appellant’s action on the ground that the Rehabilitation Act does not give him any right to bring a lawsuit against the FBI to enforce that obligation.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the plain text of Section 794d extends a private right of action to all persons with disabilities who file administrative complaints requesting accessible technology and who seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. The court explained that Congress amended 29 U.S.C. Section 794d to make sure that agencies would fulfill their responsibility to procure technology that allows employees with disabilities to participate fully in the workplace. To enforce that duty, Congress expressly provided a private right of action to any individual with a disability, including a federal employee, who first files an administrative complaint about inaccessible technology—a group of which Appellant is undoubtedly a member. View "Jahinnslerth Orozco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Black student at George Washington University, claimed that the university discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court, applying the one-year statute of limitations contained in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, granted summary judgment to the university. Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment, finding that the lower court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act; the proper statute of limitations was the three-year limit that applies to personal injury actions. The court also refused to affirm on alternate grounds, as requested by the university. View "Jabari Stafford v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Sikh men, intended to join the Marines. However, existing Marines pre-enlistment requirements pertaining to hair length, beards, and a prohibition on wearing certain non-uniform items, conflicted with their faith. The Marines allowed an accommodation, but only after the men completed basic training.Appellants sought a preliminary injunction, and the district court refused. After considering the competing interests in the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision as it related to two men, finding that they showed a likelihood for success on the merits and proved irreparable harm. The court remanded the third man's case for further proceedings. View "Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a secretary for the Navy. In 2017, Plaintiff filed a charge alleging that a Navy contractor, had subjected her to a hostile work environment. In 2018, the Navy issued a final decision concluding that Plaintiff failed to prove that the contractor harassed her. On appeal, the EEOC agreed with the Navy’s conclusion, but it raised two distinct claims that Plaintiff had not charged. A motions panel denied Plaintiff’s motion in full and granted the Navy’s motion as to the first three claims.   On appeal, the relevant question was whether the employee may pursue a retaliation claim in court without first exhausting it before the Navy. The DC Circuit affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, holding that an employee may not pursue the relevant claim without first exhausting it before the Navy. Here, Plaintiff failed to present her retaliation-by-disclosure claim to the Navy before filing a lawsuit. The court explained that the fact that the EEOC told Plaintiff she had a right to sue does not change this analysis. The EEOC itself recognizes that an employee must describe in her charge “the action(s) or practice(s) that form the basis of the complaint.” View "Katrina Webster v. Carlos Del Toro" on Justia Law

Appellant was working as a bus ticketing agent in Washington, D.C. when a person attempted to sneak onto a bus headed to New York without a ticket. After Appellant ordered the person off the bus the two women got into a scuffle. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police officers arrived in response to the unticketed person’s call reporting Appellant for assault.   Officers grabbed Appellant, pressed her against the wall, and then forced her to the floor and handcuffed her. The police charged her with simple assault on the person attempting to get on the bus and with assaulting a police officer while resisting arrest. Appellant subsequently sued the District of Columbia and the police officers, alleging civil rights violations during this arrest and a second arrest that occurred in April 2016. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and its officers.   The DC Circuit agreed in part and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the District and its officers on Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 wrongful arrest, common law false arrest, and respondeat superior claims. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Appellant’s other claims. The court explained that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the District on Appellant’s wrongful arrest and common law false arrest claims because there is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether probable cause for the simple assault arrest had dissipated and required the police officers to release Appellant. View "Xingru Lin v. DC (PUBLIC)" on Justia Law

After Appellant, a ticketing agent ordered a non-ticketed individual off of the bus, the two women got into a physical altercation. When DC Metropolitan Police officers arrived, they grabbed Appellant, pressed her against the wall, and then forced her to the floor. The police charged her with simple assault on the non-ticketed individual and with assaulting a police officer while resisting arrest.   Appellant sued the District of Columbia and the police officers, alleging civil rights violations during this arrest and a second arrest that occurred two months after the first. Appellant appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and its officers.   The DC Circuit agreed in part and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the District and its officers on Appellant’s Section 1983 wrongful arrest, common law false arrest, and respondeat superior claims. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Appellant’s other claims. The court explained that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether probable cause for the simple assault charge dissipated before Appellant was handcuffed a second time and taken involuntarily to the police station. Second, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of probable cause to arrest Appellant for assaulting a police officer. View "Xingru Lin v. DC (REDACTED)" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Department of Housing and Urban Development promulgated a rule prohibiting the use of lit tobacco products in HUD-subsidized public housing units and their immediate surroundings. Appellants, led by New York City Citizens Lobbying Against Smoker Harassment (C.L.A.S.H.), brought an action raising a number of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Rule. The district court rejected all of C.L.A.S.H.’s claims.The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the Department did not exceed its authority in passing the rule and was not arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The Court similarly rejected C.L.A.S.H.’s constitutional claims under the Spending Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. View "NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. Marcia L. Fudge" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) governs collective bargaining by employees of the District of Columbia government. It allows officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, like other D.C. government employees, to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. They have done so and are represented by the plaintiff in this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union (FOP). The police union contends that the statute violates equal protection principles, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit rejected all the challenges concluding that the district court correctly concluded that the FOP’s constitutional claims lack merit. The FOP disputes that police accountability motivated the Council. The court explained that the legislature’s actual motive is “entirely irrelevant”; all that matters is whether there are “plausible reasons” to conclude that the statutory classification furthers a legitimate government interest.   The FOP next contends that section 116 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, the court found that the union makes no serious effort to show that the Council acted beyond its discretion. And the court could discern no express or hidden intent to punish. Further, FOP contends that section 116 violates the Contract Clause. The court explained that retrospective laws violate the Contract Clause only if they “substantially” impair existing contract rights. Here, the union could not have reasonably expected to insulate itself from legal changes after the 2017 Agreement had expired by its terms. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union v. DC" on Justia Law