Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases concern the constitutionality of statutory limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Both agencies are composed of members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and statutes prohibit the President from removing members except for cause. The NLRB oversees labor relations and union elections, with powers including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of affirmative remedies. The MSPB administers federal employment disputes and can issue final orders, award a range of remedies, and promulgate certain regulations.After the President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB and Cathy Harris from the MSPB—without alleging the statutory grounds for removal—Wilcox and Harris challenged their removals in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that the statutory protections against removal were constitutional under the precedent of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, declared Wilcox and Harris remained in office, and enjoined the government from interfering with their roles. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s orders pending appeal, signaling skepticism about the constitutionality of the removal restrictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments. The court held that, under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The court found that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise powers that are executive in nature and go beyond the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions contemplated in Humphrey’s Executor. Consequently, statutory restrictions on the President’s removal authority for members of these boards are unconstitutional. The court ordered that the removal protections for NLRB and MSPB members be disregarded. View "Harris v. Bessent" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses.She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., approached a car that was illegally parked and had windows tinted beyond legal limits. When the officers tapped on the window, the driver, Ronnard Williams, lowered it only slightly, making it difficult for the officers to see inside. The officers then ordered Williams to lower the windows further. After he complied, the officers saw a firearm at the feet of a backseat passenger. The officers opened the door, seized the gun, and arrested Williams and the passenger. A subsequent search revealed another gun, marijuana, and cash. Williams, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order to lower the windows constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams. He was sentenced to three years and five months in prison, with credit for time served.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the police order to lower the windows during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, police may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful stop due to officer safety concerns, and that the same reasoning applies to ordering a driver to lower tinted windows. The court found that the minimal intrusion of lowering a window is outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Williams’s conviction. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Judge Pauline Newman, a sitting judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was investigated by a Special Committee of her circuit under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. The investigation was initiated after the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit raised concerns about Judge Newman’s ability to manage her workload due to alleged health and age-related impairments. The Special Committee requested that Judge Newman undergo medical examinations and provide medical records, which she refused, arguing the requests and investigation were unlawful. As a result, the Federal Circuit’s Judicial Council suspended Judge Newman from receiving new case assignments for one year, with the suspension subsequently renewed.Judge Newman filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging her suspension on statutory and constitutional grounds. She argued that the Judicial Council exceeded its statutory authority, violated her due process rights by not transferring the matter to another circuit, and that the Act’s case-suspension provision was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court dismissed her statutory and as-applied constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction, relying on circuit precedent, and rejected her facial constitutional challenge on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, under binding precedent from McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, it lacked jurisdiction to review Judge Newman’s statutory and as-applied constitutional claims. The court further held that Judge Newman’s facial constitutional challenge to the Act’s case-suspension provision failed because the provision has many constitutional applications. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Newman v. Moore" on Justia Law