Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations.The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases concern the constitutionality of statutory limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Both agencies are composed of members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and statutes prohibit the President from removing members except for cause. The NLRB oversees labor relations and union elections, with powers including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of affirmative remedies. The MSPB administers federal employment disputes and can issue final orders, award a range of remedies, and promulgate certain regulations.After the President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB and Cathy Harris from the MSPB—without alleging the statutory grounds for removal—Wilcox and Harris challenged their removals in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that the statutory protections against removal were constitutional under the precedent of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, declared Wilcox and Harris remained in office, and enjoined the government from interfering with their roles. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s orders pending appeal, signaling skepticism about the constitutionality of the removal restrictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments. The court held that, under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The court found that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise powers that are executive in nature and go beyond the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions contemplated in Humphrey’s Executor. Consequently, statutory restrictions on the President’s removal authority for members of these boards are unconstitutional. The court ordered that the removal protections for NLRB and MSPB members be disregarded. View "Harris v. Bessent" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses.She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law