Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit contending that USPS's custom postage program violated the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. While the parties were completing discovery and nearing summary judgment, the Postal Service adopted the 2018 Rule, which deems custom postage designs acceptable only if they are commercial or social and exclude any content that is political. After plaintiff filed a Supplemental Complaint, the district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss the viewpoint discrimination claim as moot and plaintiff's challenge to the 2018 Rule for failure to state a claim.The DC Circuit held that it had jurisdiction on appeal, because plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint raises two challenges to the Postal Service's current policies covering custom postage and neither claim is moot. First, the Supplemental Complaint incorporates the allegation that plaintiff suffers ongoing viewpoint discrimination. Second, the Postal Service has not met its heavy burden of making it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Accordingly, the court reversed the viewpoint discrimination claim and remanded for further proceedings on the merits.The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's facial challenge to the 2018 Rule, because the rule's blanket ban on political content fails the objective, workable standards test articulated by the Supreme Court in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018). Therefore, the contested rule is unconstitutional. View "Zukerman v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

Following an incident at President Trump's 2019 Social Media Summit involving Appellee Brian Karem, a journalist with a hard pass, and Sebastian Gorka, a Summit attendee, the Press Secretary suspended Karem's pass for thirty days on the ground that his conduct violated "professional journalistic norms."The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the suspension of Karem's hard pass credentials based on Fifth Amendment due process grounds. The court held that Karem is likely to succeed on his due process claim because, on this record, he lacked fair notice that the White House might punish his purportedly unprofessional conduct by suspending his hard pass for a month. The court also held that the remaining preliminary injunction factors counsel in favor of affirmance where Karem stands to suffer immediate irreparable harm absent an injunction, and the balance of the equities and the public interest factors also favor an injunction. The court limited the scope of the injunction to run only to the Press Secretary, rather than the Press Secretary and the President. View "Karem v. Trump" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the validity of District of Columbia regulations that impose minimum education requirements for certain childcare providers. The district court held that the case was non-justiciable on grounds of standing, ripeness, and mootness.The DC Circuit held that the case is justiciable and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of the complaint. The court held that Plaintiff Sorcher's due process and equal protection claims are ripe for review, because she has demonstrated cognizable hardship where, in the absence of a decision in her favor, she will have to begin expending time and money in order to obtain the necessary credentials. The court also held that Plaintiff Sanchez's claims are not moot where there is no dispute that the regulations' education requirements continue to apply to her and her experience waiver is not permanent. Therefore, Sanchez retains a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation and her case is also ripe. Likewise, Plaintiff Homan's claims are similar to Sorcher and Sanchez. View "Sanchez v. Office of the State Superintendent of Education" on Justia Law

Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the direct appeal of his murder conviction in D.C. Superior Court. Appellant alleged that his appellate counsel labored under two conflicts of interest and failed to argue that the government withheld exculpatory evidence. The court rejected appellant's claims that a conflict arose from counsel's prior representation of another individual present at the time of the murder where counsel had forgotten his prior representation of the individual and thus lacked an actual conflict. Consequently, appellant's second claim of conflict also failed.The court further held that counsel was not ineffective by declining to pursue a losing Brady claim. Moreover, appellant's final argument that counsel was ineffective on appeal in failing to argue that he had been ineffective at trial simply repackaged the losing Brady argument. Therefore, appellant was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. View "Johnson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Attorney General of the United States in his official capacity as head of the Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging that the DOJ had denied her a promotion to a Division Director position because of her gender, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and her age, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 633a. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOJ.The DC Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that the DOJ's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff the promotion that she sought was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason. In this case, a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor based on her superior qualifications, the accumulated evidence of gender discrimination, and pretext. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stoe v. Barr" on Justia Law

Appellant, an Algerian national detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, asks the court to hold that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause categorically applies in full to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and that his ongoing detention violates both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause.The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and held that appellant's arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court explained that the district court's decision that the Due Process Clause is categorically inapplicable to detainees at Guantanamo Bay was misplaced in light of Qassim v. Trump, 927 F.3d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Rather, the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), unequivocally held that Guantanamo Bay detainees must be afforded those procedures necessary to ensure "meaningful review" of the lawfulness of their detention. The court noted that whether and which particular aspects of the Due Process Clause apply to detainees at Guantanamo Bay largely remain open questions in this circuit, as well as what procedural protections the Suspension Clause requires. However, appellant has chosen not to ground any of his claims for procedural protections in the Suspension Clause. View "Ali v. Trump" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against George Washington University, alleging that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation and discriminating against her because of her illness. Plaintiff also alleged retaliation and interference claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Less than a year after plaintiff underwent treatment for cancer while working as a psychiatry resident at the George Washington University Hospital, she was terminated based on documented instances of unprofessionalism and deficient performance.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University on all claims. The court held that plaintiff failed to request an accommodation under the ADA, choosing to seek leave under the FMLA. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to identify evidence allowing a reasonable jury to conclude that her employer discriminated against her because of her disability. The court also held that plaintiff failed to rebut the University's legitimate justifications for its actions. Therefore, plaintiff's interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA likewise failed. View "Waggel v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the FAA, filed suit against the Secretary of Transportation for unlawful retaliation and discrimination, and the Secretary of Transportation and the Department of Labor for violation of her First Amendment right to run for office without penalty. In this case, after she ran for elective office, her full disability benefits were reduced.The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff alleged her FAA retaliation claim almost fifteen years after her protected activity and thus the lack of temporal proximity did not support an inference of causation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or Title VII, because she is neither an employee nor an applicant. Finally, OWCP's determination that plaintiff had demonstrated an ability to run for elective office, and thus disproving her doctor's contention that she was permanently disabled and would be unable to work again in any capacity, did not violate the First Amendment. View "Pueschel v. Chao" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining four plaintiffs from being executed. Plaintiffs claimed that the 2019 execution protocol and addendum violate the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. Each member of the panel had a different view of what the FDPA requires.Plaintiffs' primary claim under the FDPA, on which the district court found they were likely to succeed, involves the requirement to implement federal executions in the manner provided by state law. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao both rejected that claim on the merits; Judge Katsas concluded that the FDPA regulates only the top-line choice among execution methods, such as the choice to use lethal injection instead of hanging or electrocution; Judge Rao concluded that the FDPA also requires the federal government to follow execution procedures set forth in state statutes and regulations, but not execution procedures set forth in less formal state execution protocols; and Judge Rao further concluded that the federal protocol allows the federal government to depart from its procedures as necessary to conform to state statutes and regulations. On either of their views, plaintiffs' claim was without merit and the preliminary injunction must be vacated.Plaintiffs contend in the alternative that the federal protocol and addendum reflect an unlawful transfer of authority from the United States Marshals Service to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Judge Katsas would reject the claim on the merits, and Judge Rao would hold that it was forfeited. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao resolved the notice-and-comment claim because it involves purely legal questions intertwined with the merits of the FDPA issues at the center of this appeal. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao concluded, on the merits, that the 2019 protocol and addendum are rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice exempt from the APA's requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, judgment for the government must be entered on this claim. Finally, the court declined to reject plaintiffs' claims under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Federal Bureau of Prisons Execution Protocol Cases" on Justia Law

The Committee seeks to obtain the redacted grand jury materials referenced in the Special Counsel's Report in connection with its impeachment investigation of President Trump. The Committee requested three categories of grand jury materials: (1) all portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e); (2) any portions of grand jury transcripts or exhibits referenced in those redactions; and (3) any underlying grand jury testimony and exhibits that relate directly to certain individuals and events described in the Mueller Report. The district court authorized disclosure of the first two categories of requested information and stated that the Committee could file additional requests articulating its particularized need for the third category of information.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's decision authorizing disclosure of the grand jury materials under the "judicial proceeding" exception in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(i). The court held that a Senate impeachment trial qualifies as a "judicial proceeding" under the rule. The court also held that the Committee has established a "particularized need" for the grand jury materials. The court wrote that Counsel Mueller prepared his Report with the expectation that Congress would review it; the district court released only those materials that the Special Counsel found sufficiently relevant to discuss or cite in his Report; the Department has already released information in the Report that was redacted to avoid harm to peripheral third parties and to ongoing investigations, thereby reducing the need for continued secrecy; and the Committee's particularized need for the grand jury materials remains unchanged. In this case, the Committee has repeatedly stated that if the grand jury materials reveal new evidence of impeachable offenses, the Committee may recommend new articles of impeachment. View "Committee on the Judiciary v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law