Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The SEC brought an administrative proceeding against George Jarkesy, Jr., for securities fraud. Meanwhile, Jarkesy filed this suit seeking the administrative proceeding's termination, arguing that the proceeding’s initiation and conduct infringe his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress, by establishing a detailed statutory scheme providing for an administrative proceeding before the Commission plus the prospect of judicial review in a court of appeals, implicitly precluded concurrent district-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy’s. In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review forecloses parallel district-court jurisdiction. Applying the considerations outlined in Thunder Basin and its progeny, the court found that Congress intended exclusivity when it established the statutory scheme. Consequently, instead of obtaining judicial review of his challenges to the Commission’s administrative proceeding now, Jarkesy can secure judicial review in a court of appeals when (and if) the proceeding culminates in a resolution against him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jarkesy, Jr. v. SEC" on Justia Law

The district court determined as a matter of law that the District’s efforts “to combat gun violence and promote public safety” by means of its registration laws were “constitutionally permissible.” Plaintiffs challenged the district court's admission of, and its reliance upon, certain expert reports proffered by the District and the final order denying plaintiffs' and granting the District’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the admission of the challenged expert reports was not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed with respect to the basic registration requirement as applied to long guns, D.C. Code 7- 2502.01(a); the requirement that a registrant be fingerprinted and photographed and make a personal appearance to register a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.04; the requirement that an individual pay certain fees associated with the registration of a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.05; and the requirement that registrants complete a firearms safety and training course, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(13). The court reversed with respect to the requirement that a person bring with him the firearm to be registered, D.C. Code 7- 2502.04(c); the requirement that a gun owner re-register his firearm every three years, D.C. Code 7-2502.07a; the requirement that conditions registration of a firearm upon passing a test of knowledge of the District’s firearms laws, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(10); and the prohibition on registration of “more than one pistol per registrant during any 30-day period,” D.C. Code 7-2502.03(e). View "Heller v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a freelance journalist, filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and subordinating officers in both the present appeal, reversal of the memorandum terminating his embed status and reinstatement of his credentials and accommodation status. Plaintiff's status was withdrawn and he was returned to the United States after he reported on a controversial shooting incident at an adjoining Afghan national army base over the military personnel's objections. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims, concluding that plaintiff failed to assert a cognizable claim where plaintiff failed to show constitutional entitlement to the status of embed journalist. Further, the court noted that, even if it erred in determining that plaintiff brought no justifiable claim in the first instance, any claim which he may have asserted is now moot. View "Anderson v. Carter" on Justia Law

The County seeks attorneys' fees from the Government under the Voting Rights Act of 1965's (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10310(e), fee-shifting provision after the County prevailed in a challenge to the constitutionality of the VRA. The court agreed with the district court that the County is not entitled to attorneys’ fees because its lawsuit did not advance any of the purposes that Congress meant to promote by making fees available. Even though the County has based its argument for fees entirely on Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., the district court considered whether the County might also be entitled to fees under the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC standard, which would allow a fee award only if the Government’s defense of the coverage formula’s constitutionality was frivolous or without foundation. But since the County has never maintained that it could even theoretically obtain fees under that standard, the court did not resolve whether Christiansburg Garment should sometimes apply in cases like this one. The court concluded that it is enough to resolve this fee dispute by holding that the County is not entitled to fees under the only standard it has urged the court to apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of attorneys' fees. View "Shelby County v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the government's "bulk data program" collection constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The program operates pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, where section 215 of the Act empowered the FBI to request, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to enter, orders “requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting plaintiffs’ call records, but stayed its order pending appeal. After the court determined that the case was not moot, Judge Brown and Judge Williams wrote separate opinions stating the reasons for reversal. Judge Brown wrote separately to emphasize that, while plaintiffs have demonstrated it is only possible - not substantially likely - that their own call records were collected as part of the bulk-telephony metadata program, plaintiffs have nonetheless met the bare requirements of standing. Having barely fulfilled the requirements for standing at this threshold stage, plaintiffs fall short of meeting the higher burden of proof required for a preliminary injunction. Judge Williams wrote that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. View "Klayman v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that 40 U.S.C. 6135's Assemblages and Display Clauses, by restricting his intended activities, violate his rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiff seeks to picket, leaflet, and make speeches in the Supreme Court plaza, with the aim of conveying to the Supreme Court and the public what he describes as “political messages” about the Supreme Court’s decisions. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional in all its applications to the Supreme Court's plaza. The court concluded, however, that the Supreme Court's plaza is a nonpublic forum and the government can impose reasonable restrictions on speech as long as it refrains from suppressing particular viewpoints. In this case, neither the Assemblages Clause nor the Display Clause targets specific viewpoints, and both clauses reasonably relate to the government’s long-recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure. The statute’s reasonableness is reinforced by the availability of an alternative site for expressive activity in the immediate vicinity: the sidewalk area directly in front of the Supreme Court’s plaza. Therefore, the court upheld the statute’s constitutionality. View "Hodge v. Talkin" on Justia Law

D.C. Code. Mun. Regs. Title 24, 121.1 is a municipal regulation that forbids any person from “set[ting] up, maintain[ing], or establish[ing] any camp or any temporary place of abode in any tent” on public property without the Mayor’s authorization. Members of the "Occupy Movement" filed suit alleging that their arrests for violating the regulation violated their rights under the Constitution and District law. The court held that the arresting officers had probable cause to conclude that plaintiffs had violated the temporary-abode regulation, and there is no dispute that plaintiffs “set up” a “tent” on public property, within the meaning of the District regulation. The court had no doubt that the officers’ judgment was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, plaintiffs' arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment or constitute a false arrest. Further, the court concluded that qualified immunity bars plaintiffs' claim that the officers arrested them in retaliation for their protest in violation of their First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that the district court’s decision to dismiss one count of the complaint without prejudice, as part of its final order dismissing the action in its entirety, did not deprive the court of appellate jurisdiction. View "Dukore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, the Department in which the Coast Guard is housed, under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., alleging that it had unlawfully denied her accommodations and terminated her in retaliation for requesting those accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment to the Coast Guard. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff was not a qualified individual able to perform her job duties even with reasonable accommodations and that she had produced no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the Coast Guard retaliated against her. View "Doak v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Department of Homeland Security, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her supervisor took adverse actions against her on account of her race or because she had previously filed a discrimination complaint against the Department. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the record in this case could not reasonably support a finding that the Department’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. View "Walker v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Secretary of DHS directed relevant agencies temporarily to defer low-priority removals of non-dangerous individuals so that the agencies can focus their resources on removing dangerous criminals and strengthening security at the border. In what became known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the Secretary outlined a policy to defer removal proceedings for two years. In addition, the Secretary outlined a second deferred action policy for the parents of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, which has become known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA). Joseph Arpaio, the Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, sued to enjoin the Secretary’s deferred action policies. Sheriff Arpaio’s standing arguments rest on the premise that more people causing more crimes harm him because, as Sheriff, he will be forced to spend more money policing the county and running its jails. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for want of Article III standing because Sheriff Arpaio’s allegations of causation and redressability rest on speculation beyond that permitted by the court's standing decisions. Any effects of the challenged policies on the county’s crime rate are unduly speculative. View "Arpaio v. Obama" on Justia Law