Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

The Bank and a group of States challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. The district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe. The court concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the Bureau. The court also concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge Director Cordray’s recess appointment, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the recess appointment. The court further concluded that the Bank lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and affirmed the judgment as to that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the State plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Government’s orderly liquidation authority, and that claim is not ripe. Therefore, the court affirmed as to that claim. View "State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew" on Justia Law

The Bank and a group of States challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. The district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe. The court concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the Bureau. The court also concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge Director Cordray’s recess appointment, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the recess appointment. The court further concluded that the Bank lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and affirmed the judgment as to that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the State plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Government’s orderly liquidation authority, and that claim is not ripe. Therefore, the court affirmed as to that claim. View "State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the mother of Karl Grimes, a juvenile who was allegedly beaten to death at a detention facility. Plaintiff claimed that the District showed deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for, her son’s safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the summary judgment motion and to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia based on an asserted conflict of interest. The court concluded that the district court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of any dispositive motion because a claim of counsel’s conflict of interest calls into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in the sequence in which it rendered its decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of the motion to disqualify, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Medicaid recipients who unsuccessfully sought coverage for prescription drugs, filed suit contending that the District and its officials unlawfully failed to afford them notice of their entitlement to a hearing before denying their prescription drug claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Title XIX’s notice regulations are triggered whenever there has been a denial of a claim for prescription drug coverage at the point-of-sale. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the due process claims because the prescription drug coverage sought by plaintiffs qualifies as a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment; plaintiffs adequately alleged that Xerox, a private company, determined their eligibility for benefits while acting as an agent of the District; and the court remanded the case to permit the district court to conduct an inquiry in the first instance into what process is due. The court also remanded to the district court to reconsider its jurisdiction over the D.C. -law claims in light of the court's partial reversal. View "NB v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that a police officer violated her Fourth Amendment right when, during her husband’s traffic stop and arrest, the officer ordered her to get out of the car and put her hands on the hood. Given the circumstances of plaintiff’s alleged seizure, nothing in her brief shows that existing precedent has placed her Fourth Amendment right beyond debate. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the officer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the factual allegations in the complaint do not plausibly suggest that the officer violated plaintiff's clearly established Fourth Amendment right. View "Fox v. Government of DC" on Justia Law

After the court held, in 2005, that a Postal Service regulation was unconstitutional based on the regulation's ban on signature collection on perimeter sidewalks, the Postal Service amended its regulation to correct the constitutional defects. The plaintiff nonprofit organizations subsequently applied for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The district court denied the fee application on the ground that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties under the Act. However, the court concluded that its 2005 decision effectuated a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties. The court agreed with plaintiffs that they obtained a favorable, court-ordered change and plaintiffs easily satisfy the remaining two prongs of the “prevailing party” test: They achieved a judgment “in favor of the party seeking the fees” and a judicial pronouncement “accompanied by judicial relief.” Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. USPS" on Justia Law