Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Chief of Police sanctioned plaintiff, pursuant to MPD General Order 204.01, Part VI-C-1, for releasing to the media a recording of Emergency Response Team (ERT) radio communications that occurred during an incident in which a suspect exchanged gunfire with the police and barricaded himself inside a private home, plaintiff filed suit against the District and MPD officials, alleging that he was being punished for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA), D.C. Code 1-615.52(a)(6). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the First Amendment and DCWPA claims, and dismissed the DCWPA claims against the individual defendants. The court held that Part VI-C-1 as applied to plaintiff is sufficiently tailored temporally and in scope to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal activity and police operations implicating police safety, and that the MPD’s interests in non-disclosure outweigh plaintiff’s and the public’s interests in releasing the recording at the time he did; Part VI-C-1 bars disclosure of confidential information only during ongoing investigations and does not otherwise bar speech about police activity, including the barricade incident; and releasing the confidential ERT recording could have harmed pending criminal investigations because it contained potentially critical information about the barricade and, only if kept confidential, could it provide a means to gauge other evidence offered by witnesses and persons involved in the incident. Finally, plaintiff's statutory challenge under the pre-2010 DCWPA is unavailing for failure to identify a “protected disclosure.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baumann v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

The Bank and a group of States challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. The district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe. The court concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the Bureau. The court also concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge Director Cordray’s recess appointment, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the recess appointment. The court further concluded that the Bank lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and affirmed the judgment as to that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the State plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Government’s orderly liquidation authority, and that claim is not ripe. Therefore, the court affirmed as to that claim. View "State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew" on Justia Law

The Bank and a group of States challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. The district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe. The court concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the Bureau. The court also concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge Director Cordray’s recess appointment, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the recess appointment. The court further concluded that the Bank lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and affirmed the judgment as to that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the State plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Government’s orderly liquidation authority, and that claim is not ripe. Therefore, the court affirmed as to that claim. View "State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the mother of Karl Grimes, a juvenile who was allegedly beaten to death at a detention facility. Plaintiff claimed that the District showed deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for, her son’s safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the summary judgment motion and to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia based on an asserted conflict of interest. The court concluded that the district court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of any dispositive motion because a claim of counsel’s conflict of interest calls into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in the sequence in which it rendered its decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of the motion to disqualify, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law