Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the GPO, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the GPO. Plaintiff's claims on appeal involve the GPO's alleged discrimination in not promoting him to Second Offset Pressperson and the GPO's alleged retaliation in excluding him from a Georgia training program. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the GPO's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him - he was not qualified for the position he was seeking - was pretextual. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's exclusion from the training program was sufficiently adverse, he failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the GPO's proffered reason for denying him training - that the decisionmaker thought he did not want it - was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hairston v. Vance-Cooks" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated cases is whether a regulatory accommodation for religious nonprofit organizations that permit them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), itself imposes an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The court concluded that the challenged regulations do not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise under RFRA. All plaintiffs must do to opt out is express what they believe and seek what they want via a letter or two-page form. Religious nonprofits that opt out are excused from playing any role in the provision of contraceptive services, and they remain free to condemn contraception in the clearest terms. The ACA shifts to health insurers and administrators the obligation to pay for and provide contraceptive coverage for insured persons who would otherwise lose it as a result of the religious accommodation. Because the regulatory opt-out mechanism is the least restrictive means to serve compelling governmental interests, it is fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. The court also found no merit in plaintiffs' additional claims. The court rejected all of plaintiffs' challenges to the regulations and affirmed the district court's opinion in Priests for Life in its entirety. As for the RCAW decision, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for Thomas Aquinas and its holding as to the unconstitutionality of the non-interference provision and affirmed the remainder of the decision. View "Priests For Life v. HHS" on Justia Law

USAID entered a contract with a private consulting firm, DAI, to provide humanitarian support to groups within Cuba pursuant to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq. DAI contracted with Alan Gross to train the Jewish community in Cuba to use and maintain information and communication technologies. Gross was subsequently convicted in Cuba of participating in a subversive project of the U.S. government and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Gross and his wife subsequently field suit against DAI and the United States, alleging, among other things, negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium in connection with Gross's work in Cuba. Gross settled with DAI and the district court granted the United States's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the foreign country exception deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address Gross's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(k), claims, all of which are based on or derivative of injuries suffered in Cuba. Further, the court rejected Gross's Equal Protection Clause argument under rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Gross v. United States" on Justia Law

Mathew filed suit challenging the Board's order in this case, raising a Recess Appointments Clause challenge. A panel of three Board members decided Mathew's case and Mathew argues that one of those three members, Craig Becker, was appointed by the President without either Senate consent or compliance with the Clause. President Obama appointed Member Becker by recess appointment during an intra-session Senate recess of 17 days. Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the court concluded that the President's appointment of Member Becker was constitutionally valid. The court lifted a prior order withholding issuance of the mandate rejecting Mathew's other challenges and ordered issuance of the mandate. View "Mathew Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In 2011, SecurityPoint filed suit against TSA for infringement of a patent covering some equipment and methods used in the Bin Advertising Program. In 2012, TSA modified the Program, amending the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) template to require participating airports to indemnify TSA from all liability for intellectual property claims related to the checkpoint equipment. TSA also changed the template to provide that, on cancellation of an agreement between an airport and a private company, TSA would retain the right to use the checkpoint equipment as well as a license to all intellectual property necessary for such use. SecurityPoint opposed the changes and wrote a cease and desist letter to TSA's Chief Counsel. SecurityPoint then petitioned for review of TSA's changes. The court held that TSA's chief counsel's letter rejecting SecurityPoint's request is a reviewable order and the court has jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a); on the merits, the court concluded that the letter failed to provide any basis upon which the court could conclude that it was the product of reasoned decisionmaking; nor is there anything in the record beyond counsel's letter that would support TSA's decision; and because TSA failed to consider an important aspect of the problem before it, its decision must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Security Point Holdings, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit challenging the District's tour-guide licensing scheme as an unconstitutional, content-based restriction of their First Amendment rights. The court concluded that it need not determine whether strict scrutiny applied in this instance because, assuming the regulations are content-neutral, they failed even under the more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny. The District failed to present any evidence the problems it sought to thwart actually exist; even assuming those harms are real, there is no evidence the exam requirement is an appropriately tailored antidote; the district court provided no explanation for abjuring the less restrictive but more effective means of accomplishing its objectives; because this lack of narrow tailoring is hardly unique to appellants, and the court sustained both their facial and as-applied challenges to the offending regulations. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and remanded with instructions to grant appellants' motion for summary judgment.View "Edwards, et al. v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against the District, the DOC, and several jail officials, seeking relief under federal law and D.C. common law for conspiracy, false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), deprivation of due process, aiding and abetting, and loss of consortium. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff, a Correctional Officer, was the victim of an unprovoked attack by a prison inmate. Plaintiff was arrested, criminally prosecuted, and fired from his employment. After being acquitted at his subsequent trial, where the inmate admitted to initiating the confrontation and assaulting plaintiff, and after prevailing in a contested administrative hearing, plaintiff was not reinstated until a D.C. Superior Court judge intervened. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the false arrest, malicious prosecution, and IIED claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.View "Amobi, et al. v. D.C. Dept. of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Sorenson is a purveyor of telephones for the hearing-impaired that have words scrolling on a screen during a call. Sorenson's technology uses the Internet to transmit and receive both the call itself and the derived captions (IP CTS). Sorenson gives its phones out for free, with the captioning feature turned on. On appeal, Sorenson challenged the FCC's promulgation of rules regarding IP CTS under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court concluded that the FCC's rule requiring all new users to register and self-certify their hearing loss, but only if the provider sold the IP CTS equipment for $75 or more, was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Further, the FCC's requirement that IP CTS phones "have a default setting of captions off, so that all IP CTS users must affirmatively turn on captioning," was unsupported by the evidence and, rather, contradicted by it. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review.View "Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law