Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Representative Charles Rangel filed suit challenging his 2010 censure by the United States House of Representatives as a violation of the House Rules and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Rangel sued the former Chair, Ranking Member and Republican Members of the House Ethics Committee; the former Chief Counsel and two Committee staffers; and the current Speaker and Clerk of the House. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Rangel lacked Article III standing, the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question, and defendants were immune from suit under the Speech and Debate Clause. The court concluded that defendants' actions fall comfortably within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause and they enjoyed legislative immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision on this ground and did not consider Rangel's remaining arguments. View "Rangel v. Boehner" on Justia Law

Teton, a nonprofit that maintains historic military aircraft, filed suit challenging the DOD's decisions that make it effectively impossible to buy surplus aircraft parts from the Department. The district court concluded that Teton lacked standing to sue because its injury was not redressable. The court concluded, however, that Teton has shown redressability where Teton has adequately demonstrated, based on the Department's past willingness to sell property of this kind and its interest in the financial benefits of such sales, that the Department will likely sell aircraft parts in the future if Teton wins the suit. Likewise, although GL is an independent party, its relationship with the Department, its incentives, and its past expressions of intent together make clear that GL would likely sell any property the Department made available for sale. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5481 et seq., as a violation of the separation of powers. The district court dismissed the complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief without reaching the merits of the complaint, ruling that Morgan Drexen Inc. had an adequate remedy at law in an enforcement action filed by the Bureau in the Central District of California, where Morgan Drexen could raise the constitutional challenge as a defense. The district court also ruled that the other plaintiff, an attorney who contracts with Morgan Drexen for paralegal services, lacked standing under Article III. The court affirmed, concluding that the attorney failed to proffer evidence of an injury in fact at the time she filed the complaint and that Morgan Drexen failed to show the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint. View "Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

Gun Recovery Unit officers were in an unmarked car, wearing vests that said “police.” Gross was walking the sidewalk. Officer Bagshaw slowed the car and shined a flashlight, saying “[H]ey, it is the police, how are you doing? Do you have a gun?” Gross stopped, but did not answer. Bagshaw stopped the car and asked, “Can I see your waistband?” Not speaking, Gross lifted his jacket to show his left side. Bagshaw began to move the car. Officer Katz asked Bagshaw to stop, opened his door and asked, while stepping out, “[H]ey man, can I check you out for a gun?” Gross ran. Katz gave chase, saw Gross patting his right side, and smelled PCP. Katz apprehended Gross, performed a frisk, and recovered a handgun from Gross’s waistband. Denying a motion to suppress, the court reasoned that no seizure occurred until after Gross fled because nothing would have indicated to a reasonable person that he lacked freedom to disregard the questions and walk away; Gross’s flight and other behavior, provided reasonable grounds to detain him and conduct a pat-down frisk. Gross was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Given the totality of the circumstances and precedents involving comparable interactions, Bagshaw’s questioning did not effect a Fourth Amendment seizure. Once he attempted to flee, officers had authority to stop him and conduct the frisk. View "United States v. Gross" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the GPO, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the GPO. Plaintiff's claims on appeal involve the GPO's alleged discrimination in not promoting him to Second Offset Pressperson and the GPO's alleged retaliation in excluding him from a Georgia training program. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the GPO's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him - he was not qualified for the position he was seeking - was pretextual. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's exclusion from the training program was sufficiently adverse, he failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the GPO's proffered reason for denying him training - that the decisionmaker thought he did not want it - was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hairston v. Vance-Cooks" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated cases is whether a regulatory accommodation for religious nonprofit organizations that permit them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), itself imposes an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The court concluded that the challenged regulations do not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise under RFRA. All plaintiffs must do to opt out is express what they believe and seek what they want via a letter or two-page form. Religious nonprofits that opt out are excused from playing any role in the provision of contraceptive services, and they remain free to condemn contraception in the clearest terms. The ACA shifts to health insurers and administrators the obligation to pay for and provide contraceptive coverage for insured persons who would otherwise lose it as a result of the religious accommodation. Because the regulatory opt-out mechanism is the least restrictive means to serve compelling governmental interests, it is fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. The court also found no merit in plaintiffs' additional claims. The court rejected all of plaintiffs' challenges to the regulations and affirmed the district court's opinion in Priests for Life in its entirety. As for the RCAW decision, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for Thomas Aquinas and its holding as to the unconstitutionality of the non-interference provision and affirmed the remainder of the decision. View "Priests For Life v. HHS" on Justia Law

USAID entered a contract with a private consulting firm, DAI, to provide humanitarian support to groups within Cuba pursuant to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq. DAI contracted with Alan Gross to train the Jewish community in Cuba to use and maintain information and communication technologies. Gross was subsequently convicted in Cuba of participating in a subversive project of the U.S. government and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Gross and his wife subsequently field suit against DAI and the United States, alleging, among other things, negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium in connection with Gross's work in Cuba. Gross settled with DAI and the district court granted the United States's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the foreign country exception deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address Gross's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(k), claims, all of which are based on or derivative of injuries suffered in Cuba. Further, the court rejected Gross's Equal Protection Clause argument under rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Gross v. United States" on Justia Law

Mathew filed suit challenging the Board's order in this case, raising a Recess Appointments Clause challenge. A panel of three Board members decided Mathew's case and Mathew argues that one of those three members, Craig Becker, was appointed by the President without either Senate consent or compliance with the Clause. President Obama appointed Member Becker by recess appointment during an intra-session Senate recess of 17 days. Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the court concluded that the President's appointment of Member Becker was constitutionally valid. The court lifted a prior order withholding issuance of the mandate rejecting Mathew's other challenges and ordered issuance of the mandate. View "Mathew Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law