Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
USA v. Eleanor Milligan
Appellant was convicted of wire fraud and other offenses for embezzling over one million dollars from her former employer, Global Management Systems, Inc. On appeal, Appellant sought to set aside both her convictions and her sentence. Appellant contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of her embezzling from a different employer to prove her intent and lack of mistake concerning the offenses charged in this case. With respect to her sentence, Appellant challenged the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement for her use of sophisticated means to conceal her scheme, and she submits that her eight-year sentence of imprisonment is unreasonable.
The DC Circuit rejected Appellant’s arguments and affirmed her convictions and sentence. The court wrote that Appellant insists that a sophisticated means enhancement was inappropriate because the “most unsophisticated offender” could set up an email address or obtain a mailbox. The court explained that it does not assess the sophistication of a defendant’s concealment actions piecemeal.
Here, Appellant did not just set up an email address or a mailbox. Rather, she took those actions as part of an overall scheme to impersonate a former employee so as to enable concealing her offense from GMSI: she set up an email address in the employee’s name and used that account to author and send several emails to GMSI that purported to be from employee, and she obtained a mailbox in the name of a fictitious entity bearing the employee’s name so that she could then obtain checks listing that address for her use in writing checks that appeared to come from employee’s business. View "USA v. Eleanor Milligan" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA
Petitioner served as the personal assistant and public-relations secretary to Usama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Members of a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. The members sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for life, and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) affirmed. On Petitioner’s first appeal to the DC Circuit, the court upheld the conspiracy charge but vacated the other convictions as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The CMCR subsequently reaffirmed Petitioner’s remaining conspiracy conviction and life sentence twice. Petitioner asked the court to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military commission members.
The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner could have raised the change in law, or other similar objections, in his initial appeal to the CMCR or during the extensive proceedings since then. He did not. On the most recent remand to the CMCR, he questioned the admissibility of the statements in his opening brief but did not argue that Section 948r barred their admission until his reply. Accordingly, the court wrote that it declined to revisit its prior ruling that the convening authority is an inferior officer because the intervening Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner does not clearly dictate a departure from the circuit’s precedent. The court also upheld his sentence of life imprisonment. View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law
Jill Stein v. FEC
The federal government funds certain expenses incurred by presidential candidates at specific times during their primary campaigns. Jill Stein, who ran for President in 2016, contends that a temporal limit on this funding unconstitutionally discriminates against minor-party candidates. Stein also contests an administrative ruling that she forfeited the right to document certain costs of winding down her campaign, which could have offset a repayment obligation that she owed the government.
The DC Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that FEC regulations required her to reassert the issue in her written submission for administrative review. Further, Stein argued that the Commission should be estopped from claiming forfeiture because its audit report stated that the winding down costs “estimated” for the period between September 2018 and July 2019 “will be compared to actual winding down costs and will be adjusted accordingly.” The court wrote that it does not read this statement to relieve Stein of her duty to address winding down costs in her request for administrative review, which was filed near the end of that period. The court explained that it recognizes that Stein could not predict the exact amount of future winding down costs. But she could have done much more to alert the FEC that she expected those costs to exceed the estimates in the audit report—and to do so by a substantial amount. View "Jill Stein v. FEC" on Justia Law
Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan
Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law
USA v. Louis Wilson
Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, Section 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)). He argued that intervening changes in law, in combination with other factors, warrant that his motion be granted.
The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion for compassionate release. The government maintains that Appellant failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to these additional grounds such that the court may not consider Appellant’s contentions on the merits. The court held that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional because Congress did not use express language to make it so. The court explained that Appellant’s change in law arguments cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, whether alone or in combination with other factors. View "USA v. Louis Wilson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Intellistop Inc. v. DOT
Intellistop, Inc. (Intellistop) invented and sells a module that fits into a commercial motor vehicle’s existing brake light system and pulses the brake lights with each application of the brakes. Because the module replaces the steady-burning lights with pulsing lights when installed, Intellistop applied for an exemption. The FMCSA denied Intellistop’s application, and Intellistop petitioned for review, arguing that the FMCSA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The DC Circuit denied Intellistop’s petition. The court explained that the FMCSA sufficiently explained the difference between Intellistop’s application and the exemptions it had previously approved. The FMCSA explained that the “crucial distinction” between Intellistop and the previous exemption applicants was that only Intellistop’s technology modified “the functionality of original equipment manufacturers’ lamps, which are covered by an existing FMVSS.” The FMCSA adequately explained that it treated Intellistop’s application differently because Intellistop was the only exemption applicant that altered the vehicle’s brake light system to function in a way that would not maintain steady-burning brake lights.
Finally, the FMCSA’s concern that Intellistop’s exemption would alter original equipment manufacturer's lights covered by an FMVSS buttresses its conclusion that monitoring Intellistop’s module would be more difficult than monitoring other exemptions. Because previous exemptions used a supplemental pulsing light while maintaining steady-burning brake lights, they did not present the monitoring complication both the FMCSA and the NHTSA feared could result from Intellistop’s module. View "Intellistop Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Devon Tinius v. Luke Choi
D.T. and six other Plaintiffs were arrested for violating a citywide temporary curfew in Washington, D.C., in June 2020. At the time of their arrests, Plaintiffs were standing on a public street peacefully protesting police killings of Black Americans. Plaintiffs alleged they were out on the streets four hours after the start of the curfew on June 1, 2020, when they were arrested for violating the mayor’s order. Plaintiffs sued the arresting officers and the city for damages. Their principal claim is that, because they were engaging in peaceful public protests, their arrests for breaking the curfew violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the June 1 curfew order was a constitutionally valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court held that the remaining claims also failed because they were contingent on the order’s asserted invalidity under the First Amendment.
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs included an allegation that their overnight detention in handcuffs injured their wrists, but they sued the arresting officers, not persons responsible for the conditions of their detention. That allegation thus does not support an excessive force claim against these Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs argued that the June 1 Order violated their fundamental right to travel, but that claim is forfeited. Plaintiffs neither pleaded nor pressed a right-to-travel claim in the district court. View "Devon Tinius v. Luke Choi" on Justia Law
Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. USA
In 2018, Congress enacted the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (commonly referred to as “FOSTA”). FOSTA adds a new definitional provision to the Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(e)(4), and authorizes parens patriae suits by States against persons who violate that same Act’s prohibition of sex trafficking. The Woodhull Freedom Foundation and four other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of FOSTA on numerous grounds, but the district court upheld FOSTA in full.The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither Section 2421A of FOSTA nor FOSTA’s amendments to the Trafficking Act are overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. FOSTA’s clarification that Section 230 withholds immunity for violations of federal sex trafficking laws comports with the First Amendment. And the district court correctly dismissed the challenge to Section 230(e)(5)’s retroactive application. View "Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. USA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR
GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.
The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise. View "GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR" on Justia Law
USA v. Theodore Douglas
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, finding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant.In dissent, Judge Wilkins would have granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that police officers acted on a hunch rather than articulable facts supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion.Judges Randolph and Rodgers each wrote concurring opinions. View "USA v. Theodore Douglas" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law