Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Intercollegiate Broadcasting, Inc. appealed a final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) setting the default royalty rates and terms applicable to internet-based webcasting of digitally recorded music. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the positions of the CRJs, as currently constituted, violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. To remedy that violation, the Court followed the Supreme Court's approach in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. by invalidating and severing the restrictions on the Librarian of Congress's ability to remove CRJs. The Court concluded that with such removal power in the Librarian's hands, the CRJs are "inferior" rather than "principal" officers, and no constitutional problem remained. Because of the Appointments Clause violation at the time of the decision, the Court vacated and remanded the determination challenged here. View "Intercollegiate Broad. v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to racketeer influenced corrupt organization conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that his conviction was obtained in violation of Kastigar v. United States, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the government breached his plea agreement. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to consider certain of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance but denied his appeal in all other respects, holding (1) with respect to the Kastigar hearing, there was nothing deficient about counsel's performance; but (2) as to the other claims of ineffective assistance, the cause should be remanded for factual development, as Appellant raised the claims for the first time on appeal, and the Court could not tell from the record whether he was entitled to relief. View "In re Sealed Case" on Justia Law

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules: (1) an Endangerment Finding, in which the EPA determined that greenhouse gases may "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"; (2) the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks; and (3) the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which the EPA determined that only the largest stationary sources would initially be subject to the requirements for major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenged all these rules. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules and denied the remainder of the petitions, holding (1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; (2) EPA's interpretation of the governing Clean Air Act provisions is unambiguously correct; and (3) no Petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules. View "Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Edwina Bigesby was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for various drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. Bigesby appealed, contending her convictions should be vacated because the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence critical to her defense. Alternatively, Bigesby claimed her sentence should be reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) the trial judge did not improperly exclude evidence relevant to Bigesby's defense; and (2) Bigesby was not entitled to re-sentencing under the FSA. View "United States v. Bigesby" on Justia Law

Assistant United States Attorney Richard Convertino led the prosecution of the Detroit Sleeper Cell defendants in 2003. Convertino was later removed from the case for alleged violations committed during the prosecution. The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) began an internal investigation into whether Convertino knowingly withheld evidence from the defense. A few months later, a reporter published an article in the Detroit Free Press including details of the OPR referral. Convertino brought suit, alleging that an unidentified DOJ employee willfully or intentionally disclosed confidential information protected by the Privacy Act to the reporter. After several years, Convertino moved for a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground he was pursuing discovery to learn the source's identity. The district court granted summary judgment to DOJ and denied Convertino's motion to stay. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment, holding that the district court committed an abuse of discretion in denying Convertino's motion to stay, as (1) the district court mistakenly assumed Convertino could maintain discovery proceedings even after the Privacy Act litigation ended; and (2) Convertino submitted ample evidence to suggest that additional discovery could reveal the source's identity. Remanded. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Appellee, a government contractor, underwent military detention in Iraq. After his release, he filed this action in the district court alleging claims under the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd et seq., and a Bivens action for violation of his due process rights. Secretary Rumsfeld moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion as to the claims under the DTA and some other claims, but did imply an action under the Bivens due process theory and denied Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss as to those claims. Secretary Rumsfeld appealed from the denial of his motion, arguing both that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action in the first instance. The court agreed that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action and reversed the order. View "Doe v. Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

Five Medicaid recipients filed a class action against the District, alleging that the District systematically denied Medicaid coverage of prescription medications without providing the written notice required by federal and D.C. law. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. At least with regard to one plaintiff, John Doe, the allegations sufficiently established injury, causation, and redressability and the court concluded that Doe had standing to pursue his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the court had no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs had standing and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "NB, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party, along with its 2008 presidential candidate Bob Barr, contended that the District's failure to report the number of votes cast for Barr violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court concluded that because the party had failed to show that the District's law placed a severe burden on its rights, the District's important regulatory interests were generally sufficient to justify the restrictions pursuant to Burdick v. Takushi. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Libertarian Party, et al. v. DC Board of Elections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted for their roles in a PCP-distribution enterprise. Defendants challenged their convictions on various grounds. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant Price's motion to sever; in denying defendant Suggs' motion to suppress evidence seized from his house; in denying the recordings obtained from the wiretap of Suggs' cell phone; by allowing an agent to testify as a lay witness; by dismissing a juror because she knew defendant Glover's wife; and by responding to a jury's question. The court also rejected Glover's and Price's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules. View "Assoc. of Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, et al." on Justia Law