Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued United States Attorney General Eric Holder, alleging that the FBI refused to hire him as a special agent because of his Type I diabetes in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages. Subsequently, the district court denied both Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law and plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Both parties appealed. The court held that a reasonable jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff's diabetes and treatment regiment "substantially limited" his major life activity of eating and that plaintiff was therefore disabled within the meaning of the Act. Rejecting the remaining arguments, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of equitable relief to plaintiff and rejected plaintiff's assertion that the district court erred in denying him front pay or instatement based on Holder's after-acquired evidence defense and in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to back pay based on the testimony of Holder's expert witness. View "Kapche v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department. View "Petit, et al. v. US Dept. of Education, et al." on Justia Law

Between defendant's first and second trials, he filed a pro se complaint alleging that federal officials violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting warrantless searches of his apartment and a warehouse leased in his name. On May 28, 2008, after defendant's conviction in the second trial, the district court dismissed his civil case sua sponte under Heck v. Humphrey. More than eight months after that dismissal, on January 31, 2009, defendant filed a document in the district court styled as a "Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal pro se by Plaintiff" (January Motion). The district court denied defendant leave to file the January Motion and he responded by filing a document he styled a "Notice of Appeal," which stated that he wished to obtain review of the denial of the January Motion. The court determined that defendant was appealing the district court's denial of leave to file a notice of appeal, and therefore deemed defendant's filing a petition for mandamus. The court held that mandamus was unwarranted because the district court properly denied defendant leave to file. Accordingly, the court denied defendant's petition for mandamus. View "In re: Antoine Jones, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant alleged that his employer, the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency, repeatedly rejected him for promotions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims stemming from John Milne's promotion where the district court never reached the issue; reversed its grant of summary judgment with respect to his age and race discrimination claims stemming from Mark Reefe's promotion where genuine issues of material fact existed; and remanded for further proceedings. The court disposed of appellant's remaining arguments and affirmed in all other respects. View "Gilbert v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs opposed the use of vaccines that contain thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative, and believed that vaccines containing mercury harm young children and pregnant women. Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the FDA, by allowing thimerosal-preserved vaccines, violated its statutory duty to ensure the safety of vaccines. Plaintiffs asked for a court order requiring the FDA to prohibit the administration of vaccines containing more than a trace level of thimerosal to young children and pregnant women and sought to force the FDA to remove thimerosal-preserved vaccines from the market. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. The court concluded that plaintiffs were not required to receive thimerosal-preserved vaccines; they could readily obtain thimerosal-free vaccines; they did not have standing to challenge the FDA's decision to allow other people to receive the vaccines; and plaintiffs could advocate that the Legislative and Executive Branches ban the vaccines. But because plaintiffs were suffering no cognizable injury as a result of the FDA's decision to allow the vaccine, their lawsuit was not a proper subject for the Judiciary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Coalition for Mercury-Free Drugs, et al. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Salazar, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the duration and conditions of his supervised release. As a threshold matter, the court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived any appeal of the length and conditions of his supervised sentence or "invit[ed]" the alleged error. The court disagreed with defendant's contention that his offenses did not fall within U.S.S.G. 5D1.2 because they were not "perpetrated against a minor." The court found that the district court's reasons for imposing a 40-year sentence to be apparent from the record and rejected defendant's claim that the district court failed to adequately explain his sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c). In light of the particular factual circumstances of the case and the caselaw approving similar sentences, the court found that the district court did not substantively err in ordering a 40-year term of supervised release. The court further held that the district court did not plainly err in imposing any of the challenged conditions, though the court subjected the prohibition on patronizing any place where pornography was available to a limiting construction to prevent it from being impermissibly vague. Finally, the district court held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel made strategic choices in representing defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Accardi" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his sentence after he entered a conditional plea to possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence where, upon arresting defendant with probable cause to believe he was driving in possession of an open container of alcohol, the police had a reasonable basis to search the car for evidence of that offense. Given the district court's consideration of the statutory facts and of defendant's arguments in aid of sentencing, and the district court's reasoned explanation of its sentencing determination, there was neither procedural error nor substantive abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants, as representatives of the estates of their deceased sons, brought this action against federal officials and employees in district court seeking money damages relating to the alleged mistreatment and eventual death of those sons while they were detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The district court granted the motion of the United States to be substituted as defendant and the motion of the United States for dismissal of the claims. Because the court was satisfied that neither the district court nor this court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action due to the jurisdictional bar created by section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court did not declare section 2241(e)(2) unconstitutional under Boumediene v. Bush and that provision retained vitality to bar those claims. Therefore, the decision of the district court dismissing the claims should be affirmed, although for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Al-Zahrani v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law