Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise. View "GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR" on Justia Law

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, finding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant.In dissent, Judge Wilkins would have granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that police officers acted on a hunch rather than articulable facts supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion.Judges Randolph and Rodgers each wrote concurring opinions. View "USA v. Theodore Douglas" on Justia Law

The Seminole Tribe of Florida (“Tribe”) and the State of Florida entered into a compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). That gaming compact (“Compact”) purported to permit the Tribe to offer online sports betting throughout the state. The Compact became effective when the Secretary of the Interior failed to either approve or disapprove it within 45 days of receiving it from the Tribe and Florida. The Plaintiffs, in this case, brick-and-mortar casinos in Florida, object to the Secretary’s decision to allow the Compact to go into effect because, in their view, it violated IGRA. They also believe that the Compact violates the Wire Act, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, and the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary was required to disapprove the Compact for those reasons as well. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion and granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Secretary. The court explained that IGRA does not prohibit a gaming compact—which is, at bottom, an agreement between a tribe and a state—from discussing other topics, including those governing activities “outside Indian lands.” Accordingly, the court explained that the district court erred by reading into the Compact a legal effect it does not (and cannot) have, namely, independently authorizing betting by patrons located outside of the Tribe’s lands. The court held only that the district erred by reading into the Compact a legal effect it does not (and cannot) have, namely, independently authorizing betting by patrons located outside of the Tribe’s lands. View "West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. Debra Haaland" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2018, 189 people boarded a Boeing 737 MAX airplane in Jakarta, Indonesia. A few minutes after takeoff, the plane crashed. No one survived. Five months later, 157 people aboard a 737 MAX in Ethiopia suffered the same fate. The Federal Aviation Administration then grounded the 737 MAX, prompting modifications by Boeing that eventually led the agency to recertify the plane. In this Freedom of Information Act suit, Flyers Rights Education Fund and its president seek documents that the FAA relied upon during the recertification process. Congress exempted from FOIA’s reach “commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and the district court determined that is precisely what the FAA withheld.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when an agency incorporates exempt information into its own comments, it will often be able to release at least part of those comments without revealing the exempt information. Here, however, the FAA explained that these documents “contained FAA comments to Boeing’s project deliverables, which in themselves would reveal technical data and Boeing’s proprietary methods of compliance.” Notably, the FAA released two other documents containing its comments in redacted form. That fact, coupled with the FAA’s nonconclusory affidavits and Vaughn index, demonstrates that it understands the difference between comments that reveal Boeing’s confidential information and comments that do not. Accordingly, even as to these two withheld documents, the FAA has demonstrated that it complied with its segregability obligations. View "Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

In January 2021, the United States House of Representatives adopted Resolution 38, which required wearing a mask when in the Hall of the House and provided fines for the failure to do so. When three representatives entered the House chamber without masks, they were each fined $500. The Representatives sued the Speaker of the House, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the Chief Administrative Officer, challenging the constitutionality of the Resolution and its enforcement. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding the Speech or Debate Clause barred the suit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Speech or Debate Clause’s immunity from suit extends to all legislative acts, including matters within the constitutional jurisdiction of the House. The House adopted the Resolution pursuant to its authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” and it fined the Representatives pursuant to its authority to “punish its members for disorderly Behaviour.” Both the adoption and execution of the Resolution are legislative acts over which the Speech or Debate Clause confers immunity. View "Thomas Massie v. Nancy Pelosi" on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

A Council of ten members, appointed by the President, supervises the work of the Conference. The question, in this case, is whether an appointee to the Council is removable at will by the President. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Congress designed the Conference to be a forum inside the Executive Branch for shop talk and collaboration with external experts. It has no adjudicatory or legislative features that would clearly signal a need for some measure of independence from Presidential control. And nothing in the text of the legislation creating the Conference and Council hints at a congressional intent to limit the President’s removal power, let alone overcomes the presumption of presidential control over Executive Branch officials. The statute, in other words, gives no indication that Congress intended to take the unusual and potentially constitutionally troublesome step of tying the President’s hands when it comes to the at-will removal of such a core Executive Branch officer as a member of the Administrative Conference’s Council. View "Roger Severino v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant applied for a visa to enter the United States. But the Government denied his application, fearing that he was part of a criminal organization. Appellant and his wife (collectively “Appellants”) — who is an American citizen — filed this suit to challenge that decision. But their suit faced an uphill struggle: With narrow exceptions, a court may not review the government’s decision to deny a visa. To show that their suit fits within an exception, Appellants pointed to a rule allowing American citizens to challenge visa denials that burden their constitutional rights. Appellant’s wife argued that the rule applies because denying her husband a visa interfered with her constitutional right to marriage. The district court rejected that argument and dismissed it.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that though marriage is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to live in America with one’s spouse. So the right is not burdened when the government denies a spouse’s visa application. Further, the court wrote that even if the exception applied, allowing us to review the Government’s visa denial, Appellant’s wife’s challenge would fail on the merits. To survive judicial review, the Government need only cite a statute listing a factual basis for denying a visa. It did that here. View "Kristen Colindres v. DOS" on Justia Law

Appellants, individual protestors and Black Lives Matter D.C. brought consolidated actions against federal law enforcement officers, alleging that officers’ actions in clearing protestors from Lafayette Park in June 2020 violated their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellees, former Attorney General Barr and various named U.S. Park Police officers moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that a Bivens remedy is unavailable in this context. The district court granted the motions.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that, in applying Supreme Court precedent, Appellants’ claims arise in a new context and that special factors counsel hesitation against extending the availability of Bivens claims to that context. The court explained that it did not reach Appellees’ other special factors arguments regarding the availability of alternative remedies, congressional involvement in the intersection between presidential security and protestors’ rights, the political branches’ activity in investigating the events underlying Appellants’ claims, and the risk that discovery might expose “sensitive Executive Branch communications between high-ranking officials.” View "Radiya Buchanan v. William Barr" on Justia Law

Appellant complaint, filed in 2021, repeated the claims she had made against the defendants in her 2018 complaint. The district court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the D.C. statutory limitations period had run. In both of her complaints Appellant alleged that in 2004, when she was 14 years old and a student at a KIPP charter school in the District of Columbia, one of her teachers began having sexual relations with her. She further alleged that this man continued to abuse her after she enrolled in another school and that they began living together in Maryland. She claimed that she ended her relationship with him in 2009. At issue is whether, as the district court ruled, res judicata barred Appellant’s second action.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act went into effect on May 3, 2019. The new and expanded limitations period extends to “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” Here, the court held that the district court did not decide whether the old or the new D.C. statute of limitations applied to several of Appellant’s claims. The court wrote that the district court also concluded that its interpretation of the new Act depended on constitutional avoidance, which the DC Circuit determined to be inapplicable. View "Shanique Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corporation" on Justia Law