Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of federal insider trading crimes and subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit seeking information from the FBI that he believed would show misconduct by the federal investigators and prosecutors handling the case. At issue was whether the FBI could withhold certain documents pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E). As a preliminary matter, the court held that the documents sought in the case qualified as "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7). The court also held that defendant failed to meet the demanding National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish test for challenging the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemption 7(C), which protected personal privacy. The court also upheld the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemption 7(E), which protected certain law enforcement techniques and procedures, where release of certain information at issue would expose computer forensic vulnerabilities to potential criminals and where disclosure of certain information at issue "could enable criminals to employ countermeasures to avoid detection, thus jeopardizing the FBI's investigatory missions." The court briefly addressed and disposed of defendant's two other claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellants, nonprofit environmental organizations, appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., challenging the EPA Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The court held that the validity of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits issued under the noncompliant State Implementation Plan (SIP), and the possible invalidity of the amended SIP, sufficiently raised a current controversy to save the litigation from mootness. The court also held that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not provide a cause of action to review the EPA Administrator's failure to act under section 7477 of the CAA because her decision was an agency action "committed to agency discretion by law." Therefore, the EPA Administrator's decision was discretionary and not justiciable and thus, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's action because dismissal would otherwise have been proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Appellant, a citizen of El Salvador, pleaded guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and 1326(b)(2), which together prohibited the illegal reentry of an alien who had been deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The district court twice sentenced appellant. The court reversed both times, remanding each time for resentencing - first, because the district court did not consider appellant's Guidelines range under United States v. Booker, and second, because the district court incorrectly calculated appellant's Guidelines range when it did consider it. Appellant appealed his third sentence which resulted in an 84 month prison sentence because the court varied upward from appellant's calculated Guidelines range on the basis of the factors articulated in section 3553(a). The court held that the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and its subsequent findings of fact about appellant's Virginia abduction offense were not clearly erroneous. The court also held that the district court's judgment presented a "reasoned and reasonable decision that the section 3553(a) factors, on the whole justified the sentence." Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence because the district court adequately explained its sentencing decision.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where he maintained that he had not understood that he was pleading guilty to conspiracy and in failing to order a competency hearing before doing so. The court held that, because it found no taint in the taking of defendant's plea, nor any unreasonableness in the district court's determination that defendant had failed to assert a viable claim of innocence, the court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea without first holding a competency hearing or ordering another examination where the district court had the opportunity, over the course of six hearings, to speak with defendant and observe his demeanor and where there was nothing in the record before the court to give it "reasonable cause" to believe that defendant might be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent under 18 U.S.C. 4241(a). Accordingly, the district court's denial of defendant's motion was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for multiple bank robberies and contended that his trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b), 3162(a)(1), that the district court erred in limiting the scope of his counsel's closing argument, and that the court further erred in admitting evidence of an additionally, uncharged bank robbery. The court held that the district court did not violate defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial Act when it did not dismiss his indictment pursuant to the 30 day complaint-to-indictment clock where it applied the exception in section 3162(h) and held that May 23, 2008 was an excluded day because the government made an oral motion to commit defendant to the custody of the Attorney General on that day. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of counsel's closing argument regarding the "best practices" standard for law enforcement officers and DNA evidence. The court further held that, even if it were erroneous, the admission of evidence of the uncharged bank robbery in Virginia was harmless because it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A), case, a Texas death-row inmate sought information from the FBI that he alleged might corroborate his claim that four other men actually committed the quadruple homicide for which he was convicted. At issue was whether the FBI's Glomar response was permitted under FOIA Exemption 7(c), which permitted agencies to withhold information contained in law enforcement records to protect against unwanted invasions of personal privacy. The court held that the public had an interest in knowing whether the federal government was withholding information that could corroborate a death-row inmate's claim of innocence and that interest outweighed the three men's privacy interest in having the FBI not disclose whether it possessed any information linking them to the murders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's approval of the FBI's Glomar response and, with minor exceptions, affirmed the district court's rejection of appellant's other arguments.

The District of Columbia filed this suit to recover its attorneys' fees from a lawyer who brought an administrative complaint against the District on behalf of a student with special educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). At issue was whether the District was a "prevailing party" under the IDEA in this suit. The court held that the facts in this case followed closely in the wake of the court's precedent in District of Columbia v. Straus where that court held that the district was not a "prevailing party" where its own change of position was what had mooted the dispute, causing the case to be dismissed. Therefore, the court held that the District, in this case, was not a "prevailing party" where the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) authorized an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation for the student, which mooted the only issue before the hearing officer. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment ordering the lawyer to pay attorneys' fees was reversed.

Defendant, a pimp who prostituted underage girls, was convicted of various federal sexual abuse crimes and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Defendant appealed the denial of his request to unseal the records of two material witnesses, claiming that the First Amendment guaranteed a right of access to material witness proceedings. The court assumed arguendo that the qualified First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings extended to material witness proceedings. The court held that, even so, under the First Amendment access precedents, the public was not entitled to the records here, which contained "substantial amounts of material of an especially personal and private nature relating to the medical, educational, and mental health progress" of the victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders of the district court.

Appellant sued the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") and the District of Columbia (collectively, "District"), requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to keep the District from preventing appellant's chalking demonstration in front of the White House pursuant to a Defacement Statute, D.C. Code 22-3312.01. Appellant claimed that the Defacement Statute was unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutional as applied to his efforts to chalk the street in front of the White House, and violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. The court held that the Defacement Statute was content neutral, and substantially justified by the District's esthetic interest in combating the very problem appellant's proposed chalking entailed, the defacement of public property. Because the District did not curtail appellant's means of expression altogether, and allowed him to protest in front of the White House in other ways, the Defacement Statute was not unconstitutionally applied. The court also held that appellant's overbreadth challenge failed because he could not show any "realistic danger" that the Defacement Statute actually chilled constitutionally protected speech. The court further rejected appellant's RFRA claims in light of Henderson v. Kennedy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the case.

Plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military sued defendants, seeking damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment while in U.S. custody. Each plaintiff asserted two Bivens claims, namely, defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment and defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the ATS based on defendants' alleged infliction of "prolonged arbitrary detention," "torture," and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their constitutional claims and ATS claims. The court held that defendants were protected from plaintiffs' constitutional claims by qualified immunity. The court also held that, even if defendants were not shielded by qualified immunity and plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the court would decline to sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counseled against doing so. The court further held that plaintiffs' claim under the ATS alleged a violation of the law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore, did not violate a statute of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B). The court finally held that because plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action, they have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal.