Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found David Safavian, Chief of Staff of the General Services Administration ("GSA"), guilty on four counts of a five-count indictment where his convictions were related to a golf trip he took with Jack Abramoff, a lobbyist, who had asked Safavian for information about two properties the GSA owned. At issue was whether Counts Three and Five should be vacated on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; whether Counts Two and Five should be vacated on the grounds that the government failed to prove Safavian's false statements to the ethics officer and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") were materially within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(1); and whether a new trial should be granted on Count One and Count Three where the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding the cost of the private plane. The court held that so long as Safavian's false statements were capable of influencing the course of the FBI's investigation, those statements were material within the meaning of section 1001(a)(1). The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in presuming vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution or in holding that the government overcame that presumption when it offered two reasons why the addition of Count Five was not vindictive. The court further held that its reasons for rejecting Safavian's arguments pertaining to Counts One, Two, and Three were the same as those of the district court and did not need to repeat them.

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.

Appellants appealed jury convictions of numerous crimes that arose from appellants' bank-robberies including subduing innocent bystanders with gratuitous gunplay, pistol whipping a victim, and peppering a pursuing police car with bullets. At issue was whether the admission of "other crimes" evidence was in error where the evidence was offered for an impermissible purpose and where its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Also at issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support one appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) that he carried the AK-47 with two handles and even if the government satisfied its burden of proof as to this issue, the government failed to show he knew the gun was capable of firing automatically. The court held that there was no error in admitting evidence of appellants' commission of three carjackings, theft of forty cars, and use of false names, as well as marijuana cultivation and distribution, where the evidence was relevant to prove appellants' association and the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice. The court also held that evidence of the "Silver Spring" carjacking did not amount to grave error and that the prejudice resulting from the carjacking was slight when compared to the evidence of the violence acts for which appellants were indicated. The court further held that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant carried a machinegun and that section 924(c) did not require proof that appellant knew the weapon was a machinegun. The court finally held that appellants' numerous other claims were without merit.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

Appellee sued the Broadcasting Board of Governors ("Board") after the Board terminated her contract alleging violations of the First and Fifth Amendments when she appeared in a music video that criticized the United States' involvement in Iraq. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendants' motions for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that, while it may be ultimately established in this case that the governmental interest involved was sufficient to outweigh appellee's constitutional right and allowed the Board to take action, it was not sufficiently established at this stage to have required the district court to uphold the assertion of qualified immunity and dismiss the action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of defendants' claims based on qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant filed suit against the United States Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard (collectively "the Government") challenging the Coast Guard's determination to terminate his appointment as an unaffiliated, independent pilot. At issue was whether the Government's action violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), as well as appellant's First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that the Coast Guard's interpretation of the term "voluntary association" in the Great Lakes Pilotage Act ("GLPA"), 46 U.S.C. 9304(a), easily survived review under Chevron. The court also held that appellant's First Amendment claim appeared to be precluded by the Second Circuit's judgment and failed on the merits. The court further held that the Coast Guard did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that appellant's dispatch as an independent pilot expired after the 2003 navigation season. The court also rejected appellant's Fifth Amendment due process claim where he had no constitutionally protected entitlement to continued dispatch by the Coast Guard. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for extra-record discovery.

Petitioners sought review of an order of the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") granting BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") an exemption from the procedures in the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"), 49 U.S.C. 10903-10904, for abandoning a rail line. At issue was whether the STB's decision to exempt the middle segment of the Chickasha Line from the procedures set out in section 10904 was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion and whether the STB's decision was inconsistent with the agency's own regulations under 49 C.F.R. 1152.50(d)(3). The court held that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion for the STB to exempt the middle segment from section 10904 where there was no shipper in the middle segment and abandonment of that section could adversely affect only shippers located in the eastern and western segments. The court also held that it would give deference to the STB's interpretation of its own regulation.

Petitioners sought review of an order of the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") denying them preliminary injunctive relief where one petitioner leased a locomotive from the other petitioner and contracted with BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") to deliver the locomotive care of a third party. At issue was whether the STB properly denied injunctive relief where the petition was moot and where petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court dismissed the petition where it lacked jurisdiction to decide all but one of the claims presented and held that the petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to that claim when petitioners voluntarily dismissed motions pending before the STB to pursue relief in court.

Criminal proceedings were conducted with five defendants, members of the Raven 23 team from Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater"), where Blackwater was hired by American security officials to evacuate a diplomat from a car bomb explosion and where there existed a dispute over who fired shots that killed and wounded Iraqi civilians. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed an indictment against the five defendants on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury, and the decision to prosecute two of the defendants, was tainted by statements of defendants. The court held that the district court erred by treating evidence as single lumps and excluding them in their entirety when at the most, only some portion of the content was tainted; by failing to conduct a proper independent-source analysis as required by Kastigar v. United States and United States v. Rinaldi; by applying the wrong legal standard when it excluded a defendant's journal and his testimony simply because the news reports based on some of the immunized statements were "a cause" for his writing it; and to the extent that evidence tainted by the impact of one defendant's immunized statements may be found to have accounted for the indictment of that defendant, it did not follow that the indictment of any other defendant was tainted.

Defendant appealed jury convictions of four drug and firearm offenses when defendant was found with heroin worth about $30,000, two loaded guns, and $27, 730 in cash. At issue was whether the admission of the state court clerk's letters violated defendant's rights to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause; whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agent's testimony about the meaning of slang was improperly admitted as lay testimony; whether the FBI agent's overview testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay; whether the judge should have instructed the jury to disregard a police officer's reference to the "two large bundles" near the gun; and whether the judge's finding that defendant had a prior drug conviction and reliance on that prior conviction to double defendant's mandatory minimum sentence violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right. The court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right was violated where the clerk's letters were testimonial but he was not subject to cross-examination. The court also held that the FBI agent's interpretation of slang was admissible only as expert testimony but that the error was harmless. The court further held that the FBI agent's objected-to testimony at the beginning of trial was not based on hearsay; the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard the reference to the "bundles;" and the judge's finding about defendant's prior drug conviction did not violate the Sixth Amendment.