Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, a jury found that the FBI violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. 1447, by launching a security investigation of plaintiff, then an agent in its Saudi Arabia office, in retaliation for his filing of a discrimination complaint. On appeal, the government argued that plaintiff's claim was nonjusticiable under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law because adjudicating Title VII liability called for the jury to second-guess security judgments committed by law to FBI discretion. The court vacated the judgment in plaintiff's favor and held that plaintiff's case, as presented to the jury, invited just such second-guessing. The court remanded for further proceedings, however, and held that plaintiff might be able to pursue his retaliation claims without calling into question unreviewable security decisions.

Appellant, a Yemeni detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant claimed there was insufficient evidence to find that he was part of al-Qaida and that the district court relied on evidence outside the record, abused its discretion in denying additional discovery, and committed various legal errors. The court affirmed the district court's denial and held that a preponderance of the evidence unmistakably showed that appellant was part of al-Qaida in light of his guesthouse and military training camp admissions, his carrying a rifle at the behest of camp superiors, and his suspicious movements and implausible narrative of his final capture in the company of at least one known al-Qaida operative.

Appellant appealed his conviction of seven counts of bank fraud and four counts of immigration fraud whereby he filed hundreds of applications for labor certification containing false representations that various shell companies he controlled would employ his alien clients and he reproduced counterfeit checks to draw on his clients' banks accounts involving hundreds of thousands of dollars. At issue was whether the district court erred in determining that appellant's waiver of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was unequivocal and voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The court held that the district court might have been well advised to inquire about appellant's waiver of counsel on the same day it accepted the waiver, but in viewing the proceedings as a whole, the court concluded that the district court's colloquy was constitutionally adequate to confirm that he voluntarily chose to represent himself and did so knowingly and intelligently. The court also held that, assuming there was a Sixth Amendment right to prepare a pro se defense upon self-representation, appellant failed to show he was denied adequate access to business records seized by law enforcement or that he was prejudiced in his defense by limitations on access to those materials and other government discovery. The court further held that all but one of appellant's challenges to the enhancements imposed by the district court in sentencing lacked merit and as to that enhancement, there was insufficient evidence to show that appellant was a leader under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. Accordingly, the court confirmed the conviction and remanded for resentencing.

Appellant filed a suit against appellees, including the police officer that arrested her, alleging violations of her First and Fourth Amendment rights where the officer arrested her when she refused to stop what she described as "silent expressive dancing" inside the Jefferson Memorial. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that appellant was lawfully arrested for violating the reasonable regulations that govern the Jefferson Memorial, a nonpublic forum reserved for the tranquil commemoration of Mr. Jefferson's legacy, and that the officer had probable cause to make the arrest and used reasonable force to subdue her without injury after she twice refused his lawful orders.

A jury found David Safavian, Chief of Staff of the General Services Administration ("GSA"), guilty on four counts of a five-count indictment where his convictions were related to a golf trip he took with Jack Abramoff, a lobbyist, who had asked Safavian for information about two properties the GSA owned. At issue was whether Counts Three and Five should be vacated on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; whether Counts Two and Five should be vacated on the grounds that the government failed to prove Safavian's false statements to the ethics officer and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") were materially within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(1); and whether a new trial should be granted on Count One and Count Three where the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding the cost of the private plane. The court held that so long as Safavian's false statements were capable of influencing the course of the FBI's investigation, those statements were material within the meaning of section 1001(a)(1). The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in presuming vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution or in holding that the government overcame that presumption when it offered two reasons why the addition of Count Five was not vindictive. The court further held that its reasons for rejecting Safavian's arguments pertaining to Counts One, Two, and Three were the same as those of the district court and did not need to repeat them.

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.

Appellants appealed jury convictions of numerous crimes that arose from appellants' bank-robberies including subduing innocent bystanders with gratuitous gunplay, pistol whipping a victim, and peppering a pursuing police car with bullets. At issue was whether the admission of "other crimes" evidence was in error where the evidence was offered for an impermissible purpose and where its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Also at issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support one appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) that he carried the AK-47 with two handles and even if the government satisfied its burden of proof as to this issue, the government failed to show he knew the gun was capable of firing automatically. The court held that there was no error in admitting evidence of appellants' commission of three carjackings, theft of forty cars, and use of false names, as well as marijuana cultivation and distribution, where the evidence was relevant to prove appellants' association and the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice. The court also held that evidence of the "Silver Spring" carjacking did not amount to grave error and that the prejudice resulting from the carjacking was slight when compared to the evidence of the violence acts for which appellants were indicated. The court further held that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant carried a machinegun and that section 924(c) did not require proof that appellant knew the weapon was a machinegun. The court finally held that appellants' numerous other claims were without merit.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

Appellee sued the Broadcasting Board of Governors ("Board") after the Board terminated her contract alleging violations of the First and Fifth Amendments when she appeared in a music video that criticized the United States' involvement in Iraq. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendants' motions for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that, while it may be ultimately established in this case that the governmental interest involved was sufficient to outweigh appellee's constitutional right and allowed the Board to take action, it was not sufficiently established at this stage to have required the district court to uphold the assertion of qualified immunity and dismiss the action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of defendants' claims based on qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant filed suit against the United States Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard (collectively "the Government") challenging the Coast Guard's determination to terminate his appointment as an unaffiliated, independent pilot. At issue was whether the Government's action violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), as well as appellant's First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that the Coast Guard's interpretation of the term "voluntary association" in the Great Lakes Pilotage Act ("GLPA"), 46 U.S.C. 9304(a), easily survived review under Chevron. The court also held that appellant's First Amendment claim appeared to be precluded by the Second Circuit's judgment and failed on the merits. The court further held that the Coast Guard did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that appellant's dispatch as an independent pilot expired after the 2003 navigation season. The court also rejected appellant's Fifth Amendment due process claim where he had no constitutionally protected entitlement to continued dispatch by the Coast Guard. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for extra-record discovery.