Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three former officers of a local affiliate of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFGE”) filed a lawsuit alleging that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against them for speech protected under Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Specifically, the former officers challenge AFGE’s imposition of a trusteeship on the local union and their removal from office. The district court granted summary judgment to AFGE as to two officers and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on the merits for AFGE as to the third officer.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a prima facie free speech claim under Section 101(a)(2), then, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in speech protected by LMRDA; (2) she was subject to an adverse action; and (3) that action is causally linked to the protected speech. If the non-movant, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, “fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court must enter summary judgment against it. Here, the court wrote that Appellants failed to make the requisite showing, and consequently summary judgment was appropriate on their free speech claims. View "Alexander Bastani v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with six intelligence agencies for any records about the unmasking of members of President Trump’s campaign and transition team. Plaintiff sought to uncover what he alleges was inappropriate intelligence surveillance for political purposes. Declining to produce any records, the Agencies issued so-called Glomar responses, explaining that even the existence or nonexistence of such records was exempted from FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agencies, concluding that FOIA exempted the information Plaintiff requested and that the Agencies had no obligation to search for responsive records before invoking Glomar.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an agency properly issues a Glomar response when its affidavits plausibly describe the justifications for issuing such a response, and these justifications are not substantially called into question by contrary record evidence. Because the Glomar procedure protects information about even the existence of certain records, an agency need not search for responsive records before invoking it. Here, the Agencies have properly invoked Glomar on the grounds that the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by FOIA Exemptions One and Three, and nothing in the record suggests the Agencies acted in bad faith in issuing their responses. View "Gene Schaerr v. DOJ" on Justia Law

In 2005, after a jury convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)), the district court, relying on the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentenced Appellant to 18 years imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. The Supreme Court’s Johnson decision came down in 2015. Within a year Appellant brought a Section 2255 habeas petition, seeking to have his sentence vacated or corrected. The district court used the preponderance of evidence standard in determining that Appellant failed to show that it was more likely than not that his sentence relied on the residual clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the record indicates whether Appellant’s sentence rested on the residual clause, or on the elements clause, or both. The government’s sentencing memorandum, the presentence report, and the court’s statements indicate only that Appellant’s prior convictions were violent felonies and therefore subjected him to the sentencing enhancement. Further, Appellant contended that after his sentencing, there were cases suggesting that a crime with a mens rea of recklessness would not qualify as a violent felony. The aggravated assault statutes punish attempts to cause or causing “bodily injury purposely” or with “extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such” injury. The New Jersey statutes thus required not mere reckless conduct but extreme recklessness. The circuit courts considering “extreme” or “depraved heart” recklessness, as in the New Jersey statutes, have concluded that elevated recklessness satisfied the elements clause. View "USA v. Matthew West" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial. View "USA v. Ivan Robinson" on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a former Guantanamo Bay detainee. He asked the DC Circuit to vacate his convictions for war crimes—including providing material support to terrorism and murder of a United States soldier in violation of the law of war—based on the alleged constitutional and statutory infirmities of those convictions.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition because Petitioner waived his right to appellate review by the DC Circuit. The court explained that a defendant cannot challenge a plea based on an alleged error of law that was raised, rejected and then waived pursuant to the plea. Here, Petitioner, aware that the military judge had rejected his theories, nonetheless chose to plead guilty and expressly waive his right to appeal those erroneous (in his view) rulings. He cannot now have the merits of his waived claims reviewed on appeal by arguing his waiver was invalid because those claims were wrongly decided. Indeed, the basic principle behind an appeal waiver is that the defendant gives up his right to have an appellate court review the merits of his arguments in exchange for valuable consideration. View "Omar Khadr v. United States" on Justia Law

Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).   The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement. View "Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought the services of the customized postage program to print copies of an adaptation of his drawing of Uncle Sam being strangled by a snake labeled “Citizens United” and configured as a dollar sign. However, acting through Zazzle, Inc., a third-party vendor, USPS rejected Plaintiff’s proposed design due to its partisan message, even as it accepted other customers’ postage designs with obvious political content. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court against the Postal Service, contending that USPS’s customized postage program violated the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. In 2018, while Plaintiff’s case was pending in district court, the Postal Service amended the guidelines of its customized postage program to prohibit, inter alia, all “political” stamps. Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Complaint incorporating by reference every allegation from his First Amended Complaint and further alleging that the 2018 Guidelines were unconstitutional on its face. The district court granted summary judgment and declaratory relief to Plaintiff but declined to award injunctive relief.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. The Postal Service rejected his customized stamp design due to its partisan message, even as USPS accepted other customers’ postage designs with obvious political content. As a result, Plaintiff suffered viewpoint discrimination, and his continuing inability to speak through custom stamps while others can is sufficient to support standing. However, the fact that Plaintiff has suffered injury sufficient to confer standing to seek injunctive relief does not necessarily make such relief appropriate on the merits. View "Anatol Zukerman v. USPS" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the basis of his detention at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. Detained in 2004, Mr. al-Hela filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. On appeal, he argued that the length of his detention without trial violated the Due Process Clause. He also argued that the District Court’s procedural decisions and evidentiary rulings deprived him of his right under the Suspension Clause to meaningful review of, and a meaningful opportunity to challenge, the basis for his detention, as well as his rights under the Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejects Appellant’s claim that his procedural due process rights were violated. The court held that it need not decide whether due process protections apply to Guantanamo detainees because even assuming the Due Process Clause applies, the court found that the procedures employed by the district court to adjudicate Appellant’s habeas petition satisfy procedural due process. The court further rejected Appellant’s claims that his detention violates substantive due process because there is insufficient evidence that he was an enemy combatant or solely because of the lengthy duration of the military conflict. The court concluded that even assuming the Due Process Clause applies to Appellant, these claims fail on the merits. The court remanded as to Appellant’s claim that his continued detention violates substantive due process because he no longer poses a significant threat to the United States. View "Abdulsalam Ali Al-Hela v. Joseph Biden (REISSUED)" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Defendant of drug trafficking and unlawful firearm possession, the district court sentenced him to 420 months imprisonment. Defendant challenged that sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred by miscalculating his Sentencing Guidelines range in three ways: overestimating the quantity of phencyclidine (“PCP”) he possessed, finding that he made credible threats of violence, and determining that he acted as a manager or supervisor.   The DC Circuit affirmed on the first two points, reversed the role enhancement, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the district court found that Defendant’s offense involved 3 to 10 kilograms of PCP, which amounts to a base offense level of 32. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Record evidence demonstrates that Defendant bought a 1-gallon shipment from the West Coast and sold another 24 fluid ounces to the buyer. Together, these amounts surpass the 3-kilogram threshold. Further, the court found that the district court committed no error by finding that Defendant made a credible threat.   In imposing the role enhancement, the district court also referenced another dealer and a would-be buyer, but nothing in the record demonstrates Defendant’s control over either. Defendant preferred not to interact with the other dealer, and his only known contact with the potential buyer was to warn him against texting in uncoded language. The court explained that here, the facts simply do not support the district court’s conclusion. View "USA v. Lamont Johnson" on Justia Law