Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Slovenian businessman, who had served as a consultant to the government of Brunei, entered into an agreement to investigate corruption within the Bruneian government. He alleges that after delivering his findings—which implicated high-level officials in theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing—his contractual partners refused to pay him and conspired, along with three corporate entities, to ruin his reputation and business. The suit claims violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various common law contract and tort theories. The corporate defendants are Audley Property Management Company Limited, Seven Properties AG, and The Dorchester Group, LLC.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the corporate defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding neither general nor specific jurisdiction was established. It also denied the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that his allegations were speculative and that the proposed discovery would not show purposeful direction of activities toward the United States. Partial final judgment was entered in favor of the corporate defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. The appellate court assumed, based on the parties’ agreement and post-Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, that personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment required reasonableness and a meaningful nexus to the United States. The court found the plaintiff had not established any concrete interest in litigating in the U.S., nor had he identified any meaningful U.S. interest in the dispute. The burden on the foreign corporate defendants would be unjustified. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorized it to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The FHFA and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements whereby the Treasury would provide capital to these companies, initially in exchange for fixed-rate dividends. In 2012, these agreements were amended so that Fannie and Freddie were required to pay the Treasury dividends equal to their net worth above a specified reserve, a change known as the “Net Worth Sweep.” The announcement of this amendment caused the value of Fannie and Freddie shares to drop significantly, and shareholders, including those holding both common and junior preferred shares, filed suit alleging various statutory and contract violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed most claims, but after appellate review and remand, permitted the shareholders’ implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to proceed to trial. The jury found the FHFA had violated this implied covenant by adopting the Net Worth Sweep, awarding over $612 million in damages, which the district court increased to $812 million with prejudgment interest. The district court denied the FHFA’s post-trial motions and rejected shareholders’ attempts to seek restitution or reliance damages beyond expectation damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the implied covenant claim was not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent or by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, that the claim was available against the FHFA as conservator, and that the Net Worth Sweep violated the reasonable expectations of shareholders. The court also determined that post-Net Worth Sweep purchasers of shares could pursue the claim, and that the denial of restitution and reliance damages was proper. Accordingly, the award of expectation damages was affirmed. View "Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA" on Justia Law

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

A charity gala honoring Joan Hisaoka was held annually at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., with Inova Health Care Services contracting with the hotel for the event and the Smith Center for Healing and the Arts providing financial support. In December 2018, Inova and Omni executed an agreement specifying that the 2019 Gala would be held in the Ambassador and Regency Ballrooms. The contract did not include Omni’s standard clause permitting reassignment of event spaces. A few months before the event, Omni informed Inova it would relocate the Gala to less desirable spaces to accommodate a higher-paying client. Inova objected, found the alternative spaces unsuitable, and relocated the Gala to another venue. Smith Center, though not a party to the contract, paid the deposit as in prior years.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Upon reconsideration, it granted summary judgment on liability to Inova and Smith Center, finding Omni had breached the contract’s express terms and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court limited Omni’s mitigation defense and the case proceeded to a jury trial on damages, resulting in awards to both Inova and Smith Center.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed summary judgment and the jury’s damages award in favor of Inova, holding there was no genuine dispute that Omni materially breached the contract and acted in bad faith. The court also held the district court properly precluded Omni’s mitigation defense regarding the alternative spaces. However, the appellate court vacated the damages award to Smith Center, finding a genuine factual dispute regarding its status as an intended third-party beneficiary, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Inova Health Care Services v. Omni Shoreham Corporation" on Justia Law

A commuter airline that had provided federally subsidized air service to a small community in West Virginia for several years sought to continue serving that community under the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) solicited bids for a new three-year EAS contract. Four airlines, including the incumbent, submitted proposals. The DOT evaluated the applications based on five statutory factors: reliability, agreements with larger carriers, community preferences, marketing plans, and total compensation requested. After reviewing the proposals and soliciting input from the local community, which favored a different airline, the DOT selected a new carrier that offered larger aircraft, a codeshare agreement with a major airline, and a subsidy request within the competitive range.The incumbent airline challenged the DOT’s selection in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and exceeded its statutory authority. The petitioner contended that the DOT failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory factors and improperly chose a more expensive proposal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). On the merits, the court found that the DOT’s findings regarding each statutory factor were supported by substantial evidence and that the agency’s reasoning was adequately explained. The court concluded that the DOT’s selection process was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and that the agency did not exceed its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and upheld the DOT’s selection of the new EAS carrier. View "Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

Michigan Electric Transmission Company (METC) owns a high-voltage transmission line with Michigan Public Power Agency (MPPA) and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative. The case concerns the ownership of new transmission facilities, or "network upgrades," connecting a new solar generation park to the transmission line. METC claims exclusive ownership based on existing agreements, while MPPA and Wolverine disagree.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that no agreement conclusively determined ownership rights. FERC declined to decide the ownership question, leading METC to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with FERC's interpretation that the relevant agreements did not grant METC exclusive ownership of the network upgrades. The court found that the Styx-Murphy line qualifies as a "system" under the Transmission Owners Agreement (TOA), and since METC is not the sole owner, it cannot claim exclusive ownership. The court also found that the Styx-Murphy Agreements did not preclude MPPA and Wolverine from owning network upgrades.The court denied METC's petitions for review, upholding FERC's decision. View "Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law