Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dual Swedish-Russian national was accused of creating and operating a bitcoin “mixer” service called Bitcoin Fog, which the government alleged was designed to facilitate money laundering and conceal illegal activity. The platform enabled users to deposit and withdraw bitcoin anonymously, making it difficult to trace transactions. Evidence presented at trial included IP address analyses allegedly connecting the defendant to Bitcoin Fog, records of his interest in similar services, and his promotion of illicit darknet marketplaces. Undercover law enforcement also conducted sting operations, sending and withdrawing funds through Bitcoin Fog and communicating intentions to launder proceeds from illegal drug sales. The defendant was arrested in 2021, after which Bitcoin Fog ceased operations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial at which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and conducting a money transmission business without a license. The District Court sentenced him to 150 months in prison and rejected his pre-trial and post-trial motions, including challenges to venue, expert testimony admissibility, evidence sufficiency, and access to proprietary software used in the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that venue was proper in the District of Columbia for all counts, based largely on evidence that Bitcoin Fog served customers there, including undercover agents. The court found no errors in the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony and “Welcome to Video” evidence, and rejected arguments regarding statute of limitations, due process, and Confrontation Clause violations. The appellate court affirmed all convictions and the sentence, finding no merit in any of the defendant’s arguments. View "USA v. Sterlingov" on Justia Law

A minister sought to hold a small prayer event on the lower section of the Eastern Steps of the United States Capitol, advocating for various causes including opposition to federal funding of abortion. Under federal regulations, public demonstrations on these Steps are generally prohibited unless sponsored by a member of Congress, with violations carrying criminal penalties. The minister, unable to secure sponsorship, faced the threat of arrest and had previously been arrested for similar conduct.After protracted litigation and partial settlement, the parties stipulated to key facts and proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ruled in favor of the minister on his First Amendment claim, holding that the lower section of the Eastern Steps was a traditional public forum and that the regulations at issue suppressed more speech than necessary. The district court entered a permanent universal injunction, barring enforcement of the regulations against anyone wishing to demonstrate on the lower Steps. The Capitol Police Board appealed, and the district court later limited the injunction to the minister and up to 14 others pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo regarding summary judgment and for abuse of discretion as to the injunction. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s forum classification, holding that the Eastern Steps constitute a nonpublic forum because of their specialized function and physical integration with the Capitol. Nevertheless, the court held that the regulation’s requirement of congressional sponsorship for demonstrations was unreasonable, as it granted unbridled discretion to members of Congress, violating First Amendment protections. The court affirmed summary judgment for the minister but vacated the universal injunction, remanding for the district court to determine the proper scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance limiting universal injunctions. View "Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Board" on Justia Law

A former high-ranking Navy Admiral served for nearly forty years before retiring. During his last assignment, he interacted with Next Jump, Inc., a company providing leadership training. Despite staff recommendations against further contracts, the Admiral privately negotiated with Next Jump’s executives. They discussed post-retirement employment for him, with substantial compensation and equity, contingent on facilitating a Navy contract. The Admiral pushed through the contract, deviating from usual procedures, and began working for Next Jump after retirement. Subsequent feedback on the training was negative. He later admitted to investigators he had been improperly influenced.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after the Admiral was indicted for conspiracy to accept a bribe, bribery, conflict of interest, and concealment of a material fact. At trial, the government presented evidence of a “contract for a job” arrangement and concealment of the agreement. The jury convicted him on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. Next Jump’s co-CEOs were tried separately; their first trial ended in a hung jury and they were acquitted upon retrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Admiral’s appeal, which challenged evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the fairness of the trial. The Circuit Court held that the evidentiary rulings were either proper or harmless given the overwhelming evidence. Although it identified a legally erroneous jury instruction regarding mens rea for bribery, the error was invited by defense counsel and thus not grounds for reversal. The Court affirmed the convictions, concluding no cumulative error deprived the Admiral of a fair trial. View "USA v. Burke" on Justia Law

In 2011, Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired multiple rounds from an assault rifle at the White House, causing significant property damage. He believed then-President Obama was the anti-Christ and intended to harm him, but the President and First Lady were not present; two other members of the First Family were inside. No one was injured, but the shots struck areas near Secret Service officers and damaged the Truman Balcony. Ortega-Hernandez fled the scene and was arrested in Pennsylvania after a multi-state search.A federal grand jury indicted Ortega-Hernandez on nineteen counts, including attempting to assassinate the President. In 2013, he pled guilty to two counts: injuring a dwelling or placing lives in jeopardy within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 1363), and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The predicate crime for the § 924(c) charge was his § 1363 conviction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced him to 25 years in prison. After subsequent Supreme Court decisions invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, Ortega-Hernandez moved to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that § 1363 did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether Ortega-Hernandez’s § 1363 conviction categorically constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. The court held that willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling necessarily involves the use of physical force against the property of another and that § 1363 targets injury to another’s property, not one’s own. Therefore, Ortega-Hernandez’s conviction under § 924(c) stands, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Ortega-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The case concerns Cesar Gomez Almonte, who was convicted for his role in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy. Beginning in 2016, conspirators based in the Dominican Republic transported large quantities of cocaine into the United States using boats with secret compartments. Almonte was responsible for procuring and outfitting these vessels. After U.S. officials became aware of the operation, Almonte was indicted under seal in Washington, D.C., and later arrested during a layover at Miami International Airport.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw Almonte’s trial, during which a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced him to 184 months in prison. Almonte raised several constitutional claims on appeal: he argued that the 18-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that venue in D.C. was improper under Article III and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and that the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial after certain jurors expressed concerns about his counsel denied him an impartial jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed these claims. The court held that the delay between indictment and arrest did not violate Almonte’s right to a speedy trial, given the government’s good-faith investigative reasons and his failure to show specific prejudice. On venue, the court found that Almonte waived his only meritorious venue argument regarding the Eastern District of Virginia by not raising it when invited, and his other arguments about venue in Florida were either without merit or forfeited. Regarding juror impartiality, the court concluded that the district court handled the matter appropriately through voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Almonte" on Justia Law

A man with two prior felony convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in the District of Columbia was sentenced in 2022 to a period of supervised probation in lieu of imprisonment for his second offense. While still under this court-ordered supervision, he knowingly possessed a firearm, which was reportedly stolen and modified for automatic firing, and was alleged to have brandished it during a shootout. He was indicted by a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which emphasized historical tradition over means-end scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. The district court rejected his arguments, holding that earlier circuit precedent (Medina v. Whitaker) upholding § 922(g)(1) remained good law, and denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, even assuming prior precedent did not control and that § 922(g)(1) implicated conduct covered by the Second Amendment, there exists a widespread historical tradition of temporarily disarming felons while they are serving their criminal sentences, including during periods of noncustodial supervision such as probation or supervised release. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals still serving their sentences, and is not facially unconstitutional. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Three individuals were indicted for participating in a string of ten armed robberies targeting businesses in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia in January 2018. The robberies followed a consistent pattern: two of the men would enter a store masked and armed, threatening employees and collecting cash and valuables, while the third waited nearby. In one instance, all three entered and used physical violence against staff. Security footage and other evidence linked the defendants to the crimes. Several weeks after the robberies, police responded to an unrelated home invasion, arresting two of the men and discovering a car registered to one of them nearby, which contained clothing and items connected to the earlier robberies.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a joint trial, after which a jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and for two defendants, additional counts of completed Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court imposed sentences ranging from 166 to 234 months. The defendants appealed, challenging, among other things, the admission of evidence from a subsequent Missouri traffic stop, the search of the car, the admission of evidence from a cell phone, jury instructions, and the sufficiency of evidence for firearm-related charges. They also raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed each challenge. The court held that evidence from the Missouri traffic stop was properly admitted to show association among co-conspirators and was not unduly prejudicial. It found the seizure and search of the car lawful under the automobile exception and rejected claims that mistakes in the warrant affidavit required suppression. The court concluded that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), supporting the firearm-related convictions. It also held that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit because no prejudice was shown. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences in full. View "USA v. Onyewu" on Justia Law

Edward Williams pleaded guilty in 1997 to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, based on a prior felony drug conviction for which he had served over two years in prison. Years later, following a Supreme Court decision clarifying that a defendant must know of their felony status to be convicted under the relevant statute, Williams sought to vacate his sentence. He argued that he was not properly informed that knowledge of his felony status was an element of the offense, and claimed he believed his prior conviction was a juvenile matter that had been expunged.After Williams’ initial conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, he filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding Williams had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise the argument on direct appeal or at sentencing, and that the default was not excused. The district court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Williams failed to show either cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his procedural default. The court found overwhelming evidence that Williams knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year and concluded that a hearing was unnecessary because the record conclusively demonstrated he was not entitled to relief. The denial of Williams’ § 2255 motion was therefore affirmed. View "USA v. William" on Justia Law

A Slovenian businessman, who had served as a consultant to the government of Brunei, entered into an agreement to investigate corruption within the Bruneian government. He alleges that after delivering his findings—which implicated high-level officials in theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing—his contractual partners refused to pay him and conspired, along with three corporate entities, to ruin his reputation and business. The suit claims violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various common law contract and tort theories. The corporate defendants are Audley Property Management Company Limited, Seven Properties AG, and The Dorchester Group, LLC.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the corporate defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding neither general nor specific jurisdiction was established. It also denied the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that his allegations were speculative and that the proposed discovery would not show purposeful direction of activities toward the United States. Partial final judgment was entered in favor of the corporate defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. The appellate court assumed, based on the parties’ agreement and post-Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, that personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment required reasonableness and a meaningful nexus to the United States. The court found the plaintiff had not established any concrete interest in litigating in the U.S., nor had he identified any meaningful U.S. interest in the dispute. The burden on the foreign corporate defendants would be unjustified. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei" on Justia Law

After a drive-by shooting targeted Antonio Payne’s home in Washington, D.C., police responded to the scene. Surveillance footage from neighbors captured Payne confronting an unidentified man, during which Payne was seen holding a gun, frisking the man, and making threatening statements. Payne was observed stepping off his driveway onto the alley while armed. Officers, invited into the home by Payne’s mother, saw ammunition in plain view. Detective interviews and a review of the footage led to a search warrant application for the home for evidence of carrying a pistol without a license. The warrant, which contained a typographical error in the cited statute but correctly described the offense, was granted. Upon execution, multiple firearms, drugs, and related materials were found. DNA testing linked Payne to several firearms.Before trial, Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Payne’s matching clothing, video evidence of him with a gun, and the shooting incident. At trial, Payne conceded he was filmed carrying a gun and stipulated he lacked a license. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including carrying a pistol without a license. Payne was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The appellate court held that, even assuming the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant triggered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court also found sufficient evidence supported Payne’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, as video footage and trial concessions established the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Payne’s new arguments regarding the statute’s typographical error and self-defense. View "USA v. Payne" on Justia Law