Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia.After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., arrested a man after he fled from them, dropping a loaded firearm and a satchel containing PCP, other controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant, previously convicted of firearm and drug offenses, was charged with six offenses, but entered a Plea Agreement to plead guilty to two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of PCP with intent to distribute. The Plea Agreement capped the government's sentencing recommendation at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, which was ultimately determined to be 77 to 96 months.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the plea and, after reviewing presentence reports and submissions from both parties, imposed an upward variance, sentencing the defendant to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court cited four reasons: the defendant’s extensive criminal history, his “brandishing” of the firearm, abandoning the gun near an elementary school, and possession of multiple dangerous drugs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the Plea Agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range and that the district court erred procedurally by relying on erroneous findings and failing to adequately explain the above-Guidelines sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while the government did breach the Plea Agreement by implicitly suggesting an above-Guidelines sentence, the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the breach affected his sentence, and thus, reversal was not warranted under plain error review. The appellate court also found no procedural error in the district court’s sentencing rationale or explanation. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Honesty" on Justia Law

A Mexican national with a long history of drug trafficking from South America through Mexico into the United States was arrested in 2017. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of cocaine, with the intent that it be unlawfully imported into the United States. Prior to sentencing, he admitted responsibility for up to 450 kilograms of cocaine. At sentencing, witnesses described his leadership of an organization involving at least 20 people, including bodyguards and various workers handling logistics, payments, and transportation of drug proceeds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a three-day sentencing hearing, during which it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine and that he was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court applied a four-level increase for his aggravating role and denied his request for a two-level reduction under the “zero-point-offender” guideline, finding him ineligible due to his leadership role. The court sentenced him to 21 years and 10 months in prison, plus five years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s use of the preponderance standard, its factual findings regarding his leadership role, and the denial of the zero-point-offender reduction. The appellate court held that the district court properly used the preponderance standard for sentencing facts, did not clearly err in finding the defendant was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, and correctly interpreted the guidelines to deny the zero-point-offender reduction. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Flores-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Law enforcement agencies from the FBI, ATF, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police jointly investigated two individuals suspected of drug and firearms trafficking in the D.C., Maryland, and Virginia area. Through surveillance and controlled purchases, officers identified Linwood Thorne as a key supplier. They determined Thorne likely resided in D.C. and operated a business in Maryland. Searches of both locations produced significant quantities of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms, some of which were unregistered and linked to Thorne. When authorities sought to arrest Thorne, they obtained warrants to track two of his cell phones, using both GPS-ping and cell-site-simulator methods. The D.C. magistrate judge issued these warrants. Officers ultimately located and arrested Thorne in Baltimore, Maryland, using the warrant for his D.C.-area code phone.A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Thorne on multiple drug and firearms charges. Before trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Thorne moved to suppress evidence obtained via the cell-site-simulator warrant, arguing the warrant violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) because there was insufficient evidence that the targeted phone was in D.C. when the warrant was issued. The district court denied suppression, reasoning that the warrant was valid or, in the alternative, that the good-faith exception applied. After trial, a jury convicted Thorne on most counts, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that a Rule 41(b) violation may have occurred, but held that suppression was unwarranted because the law enforcement officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and the convictions, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to warrants with potential Rule 41(b) venue defects. View "USA v. Thorne" on Justia Law

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Derrek Arrington was convicted by a jury of assaulting a Park Police officer with a deadly weapon—specifically, using a car to trap and drag the officer before shooting him in the face—and for being a felon in possession of a stolen firearm. He received a 240-month prison sentence for these offenses. After completing his federal sentence, Arrington remained incarcerated because his actions violated parole from a prior armed robbery conviction in D.C. Superior Court, resulting in an additional 11-year sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia originally imposed the 240-month sentence. Years later, after Arrington had served his sentence for the assault and firearm convictions, a different district judge vacated the original sentence and resentenced Arrington, again imposing the 240-month term. The resentencing judge decided to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 140-175 months, citing the extreme moral depravity of Arrington’s actions, including the severe and permanent injuries caused to the officer. The judge also referenced Arrington’s criminal history and questioned whether the Guidelines adequately accounted for the felon-in-possession charge.Arrington appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the resentencing judge failed to consider his rehabilitation during his incarceration. The court found that, while the judge’s oral remarks could be interpreted as ambiguous, the record did not show that the judge ignored the rehabilitation evidence. The appellate court held that any error was not plain and that the upward variance was justified by the egregious nature of the conduct. The court also determined that any error regarding consideration of the firearm conviction was harmless. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Michael Lawrence Rosebar was convicted of multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud, wire fraud, and first-degree fraud after misrepresenting himself as a licensed home improvement contractor and misappropriating funds from homeowners over a seven-year period. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Rosebar was found guilty on several counts and sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and thirty-six months of supervised release. His sentence was calculated using a criminal history category of II, which included two status points for committing the offenses while on probation.Rosebar appealed his conviction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. After the Sentencing Commission amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines with Amendment 821, which changed the calculation of status points for defendants with fewer criminal history points, Rosebar filed a motion in the district court seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10. The district court found Rosebar eligible for a reduction but, after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), denied the motion, citing the seriousness of his offenses, their impact on victims, and his lack of remorse.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly followed the required two-step inquiry, considered all relevant factors, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the sentence reduction. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Rosebar’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "USA v. Rosebar" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., was involved in two separate incidents within five days, during which he used neck restraints—specifically, trachea and carotid artery holds—on two individuals while on duty. Both incidents occurred at McDonald’s restaurants, and in each case, the officer initiated physical contact and applied prohibited neck restraints, despite the individuals not posing an immediate threat or actively resisting arrest. The officer was aware that such holds were forbidden by department policy, and in one instance, had been warned about his conduct just days before repeating it.A grand jury indicted the officer on five charges related to these events. Before trial, three charges were dropped. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial, after which the officer was convicted on two counts of depriving individuals of their rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The jury found that the officer acted willfully, used excessive force, and caused bodily injury. The court sentenced him to concurrent six-month prison terms and supervised release. The officer moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury instructions on willfulness were improper and that the evidence was insufficient. The District Court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the officer’s challenges. The court held that the jury instructions on willfulness were not plainly erroneous, as precedent allows conviction under § 242 for conduct done in reckless disregard of constitutional rights. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings of excessive force and willfulness, and that no impermissible amendment or variance of the indictment occurred. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and the officer’s convictions. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law