Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). Appellant conditionally pleaded guilty to the firearms charges and preserved his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that appellant's motion to suppress was properly denied where the vehicles' in-tandem driving to and from the scene of a shooting is suggestive of a conspiracy to perpetrate the shooting, in a way that mere presence as a passenger during what might have been an outwardly lawful transaction is not. Furthermore, despite the passage of time, the evidence gathered by the police was sufficient to establish probable cause to search one of the vehicles when it was seized. Finally, the court held that, while it would have been better if the district court had expressly omitted the disputed sentencing points from its calculation of the criminal history score, the record is sufficiently clear that the points did not affect the sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

ESPN published an article about Driscoll, the former president of a nonprofit organization, indicating that a former employee planned to file an IRS whistleblower complaint that might lead to charges of embezzlement and fraud against Driscoll. The following month, Driscoll participated in a child custody hearing against her ex-husband. Valdini, an IRS criminal investigator, watched testimony by a cousin of Driscoll’s ex-husband who was also the IRS whistleblower, and from Driscoll, telling Driscoll that he was a member of the public. Valdini had lunch with Driscoll’s ex-husband, who offered to aid in the criminal investigation.Driscoll was indicted for fraud and tax evasion. Defense counsel asked the court to authorize discovery on whether the government had used a civil “audit” process to gather information for Driscoll’s criminal case. In reply to the government's opposition, Driscoll raised the custody hearing for the first time. The court denied her motion. At trial, Valdini’s conduct at the child-custody hearing was revealed. Government counsel, previously unaware of Valdini’s lunch outing, disclosed Valdini’s actions to the court, which held an evidentiary hearing. Driscoll unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial or dismissal, arguing that Valdini’s presence at the child-custody hearing violated her right against self-incrimination and that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose Valdini’s conduct.The D.C. Circuit vacated Driscoll’s convictions, finding that the court’s anti-deadlock jury instructions likely coerced a unanimous verdict. The court found no prejudice on the Brady claim and did not address Driscoll’s pretrial discovery or Fifth Amendment arguments. View "United States v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellants' motions for reduced sentences under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that if a defendant was convicted of a "covered offense" and is thus eligible for relief under section 404, "the final issues to address are whether relief is available and, if so, to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted as a matter of discretion." Rather, the court explained that there is no additional "availability" requirement in section 404 beyond the covered offense requirement in section 404(a) and the limitations set forth in section 404(c).The court also held that the district court, in reaching its alternative judgment, was unclear as to whether it properly weighed the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Furthermore, there is nothing indicating that the district court weighed the mitigating factors raised by appellants, including post-sentencing conduct. Finally, the district court relied on inaccurate information in weighing the claims raised by Appellant Hicks. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may exercise its discretion under section 404. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted on a ten-count indictment for charges related to armed robbery and kidnapping. Knight was sentenced to more than 22 years' imprisonment and Thorpe was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. Defendants were originally given a plea offer with a lesser sentence of two to six years' imprisonment, but Knight's counsel erroneously advised him that the offer came with ten years' imprisonment. Because Knight rejected the offer, the plea was no longer available to both defendants. On appeal, defendants argued that they had been denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The DC Circuit concluded that defendants' claims were colorable and remanded the case. The district court then denied relief.The DC Circuit now reverses in part, holding that Knight satisfied his burden under both prongs of the standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that the performance by Knight's counsel did not meet minimal professional standards, and the district court's determination that Knight suffered no prejudice rested on subsidiary factual findings that ignored the direct effect of his counsel's deficient performance on Knight's ability to intelligently assess his options and therefore were clearly erroneous. Viewed properly, the court explained that the contemporaneous evidence and Knight's testimony at the evidentiary hearing sufficed to establish a reasonable probability that Knight would have accepted the plea offer but for his counsel's ineffective assistance. However, the court agreed that Thorpe's counsel was not ineffective and there was no violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part. The court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

In July 2019, the Department of Justice announced a revised protocol for execution by lethal injection using a single drug, pentobarbital. Plaintiffs, federal death row inmates, sought expedited review of three of the district court's rulings, and two plaintiffs with upcoming execution dates moved for stays of execution pending appeal.The DC Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the government on plaintiffs' Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) claim. In this case, plaintiffs had pointed to several alleged discrepancies between the 2019 Protocol and state statutes dictating different methods of execution or aspects of the execution process. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no conflict, either because the government had committed to complying with the state statutes at issue or because no plaintiff had requested to be executed in accordance with them.However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenge for failure to state a claim. The court held that, by pleading that the federal government's execution protocol involves a "virtual medical certainty" of severe and torturous pain that is unnecessary to the death process and could readily be avoided by administering a widely available analgesic first, plaintiffs' complaint properly and plausibly states an Eighth Amendment claim. The court denied Plaintiffs Hall and Bernard's request for a stay of execution based on the Eighth Amendment claim. The court also held that the district court should have ordered the 2019 Protocol to be set aside to the extent that it permits the use of unprescribed pentobarbital in a manner that violates the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a permanent injunction to remedy the FDCA violation. View "Roane v. Barr" on Justia Law

On April 22, 2019, the district court denied petitioner's first three claims for habeas relief, but reserved his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) claim for later resolution because, at the time, United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019), had not been decided. The district judge explained that his opinion resolves three of petitioner's claims but leaves the 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion open until the court is able to resolve petitioner's fourth claim. In order for petitioner to appeal the final order in a section 2255 habeas case, section 2253(c)(1) requires him to obtain a certificate of appealability. Petitioner moved for a certificate of appealability a week after the district court issued its order and the district judge granted the certificate solely on petitioner's recantation claim without commenting on the finality of the underlying order— which, of course, left one claim pending.The DC Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court's judgment was not final. The court rejected petitioner's claims under Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), which he claims "opens the door a little bit" and allows ostensibly nonfinal orders to be regarded as "practically" final. The court also concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 do not facilitate jurisdiction here. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to FBI agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. In May 2020, before sentencing, the government moved to dismiss all charges with prejudice. Flynn consented to that motion and moved to withdraw his pending motions, including a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s motion and to address whether the court should issue an Order to Show Cause why Flynn should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury.Flynn filed an emergency mandamus petition. A panel of the D.C. Circuit issued the writ to compel the district court to immediately grant the government’s motion. On rehearing, en banc, the D.C. Circuit denied Flynn’s requests to compel the immediate grant of the government’s motion and to vacate the district court’s appointment of amicus. Flynn has not established that he has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.” The court also declined to mandate that the case be reassigned to a different district judge; Flynn has not established a clear and indisputable right to reassignment. The court noted the interest in allowing the district court to decide a pending motion in the first instance; that Flynn is not in custody; and that “it is simply not the case that the Executive will be irreparably harmed by the procedures." View "In re: Flynn" on Justia Law

Al Bahlul, a Yemeni national, was Osama bin Laden’s head of propaganda at the time of the September 11 attacks. After he was captured in Pakistan, Al Bahlul was convicted by a military commission in Guantanamo Bay of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and soliciting others to commit war crimes. The D.C. Circuit vacated two of his three convictions on ex post facto grounds. On remand, the Court of Military Commission Review, without remanding to the military commission, reaffirmed Al Bahlul's life sentence for the conspiracy conviction.The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. The CMCR failed to apply the correct harmless error standard, In reevaluating Al Bahlul’s sentence, the CMCR should have asked whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the military commission would have imposed the same sentence for conspiracy alone. The court rejected Al Bahlul’s remaining arguments. The appointment of the Convening Authority was lawful; there is no reason to unsettle Al Bahlul I’s ex post facto ruling, and the court lacked jurisdiction in an appeal from the CMCR to entertain challenges to the conditions of Al Bahlul’s ongoing confinement. View "Al Bahlul v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on all counts related to his involvement in a violent narcotics-distribution conspiracy, except one count of aiding and abetting first-degree murder and a corresponding count of aiding and abetting continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing a juror who, after deliberations began, expressed her disagreement with the applicable law and her inability to apply it. The court held that intent to disregard the law constitutes a valid ground for dismissing a juror and that the district court permissibly dismissed Juror 0552 on that basis. The court also held that the RICO conspiracy count was not time-barred; statements made by witnesses and the prosecution did not deprive defendant of a fair trial; the district court properly gave a Pinkerton instruction; the evidence was sufficient to support the two CCE murder counts; there was no Brady error; and defendant's claim that his indictment unlawfully relied on testimony from a witness obtained in violation of the witness's Fifth Amendment rights was rejected. View "United States v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

In two related cases under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Plaintiffs Gorbey and Pinson, both incarcerated three-strikers, seek to bring their appeals in forma pauperis (IFP) on the ground that they face imminent danger. Pinson argued, in the alternative, that the three-strikes rule is unconstitutional.The DC Circuit rejected plaintiffs' requests and explained that, to proceed under the exception, three-strike prisoners must show an imminent danger at the time of their appeal and a nexus between that danger and their underlying claims. The court held that Gorbey has failed to demonstrate a nexus between the danger he faced and the claims he brought, and Pinson has failed to show that she faced imminent danger at the time she noticed her appeal. In regard to Pinson's alternative argument, the court held that even assuming that some prisoners can make out viable as-applied constitutional challenges to the three-strikes rule, she has failed to do so here. View "Pinson v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law