Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Five police officers from the Crime Suppression Team were patrolling Southeast Washington, D.C., when they encountered Antonio Malachi Bryant. Upon searching him, they found a firearm. Bryant, a previously convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun, arguing it was obtained through an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Bryant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Bryant when they observed a bulge in his waistband, which they believed to be a weapon. The court concluded that the seizure was constitutional and did not need to determine the exact moment the encounter turned into a seizure, as the reasonable suspicion was established by the time the bulge was observed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and search Bryant when they saw the bulge in his waistband. The court found that Bryant was not seized until after the officers observed the bulge, and thus the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court also noted that the officers’ approach and initial questioning did not constitute a seizure, as police officers are permitted to approach individuals in public places without it being considered a seizure. The court concluded that the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Naquel Henderson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(1) and (b)(1). After his plea but before sentencing, the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States held that the government must prove a defendant knew they possessed a firearm and belonged to a prohibited category. Henderson did not appeal directly but later moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Henderson's motion, finding he failed to show cause for procedural default, actual prejudice, or actual innocence. The court noted that Henderson knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm, as evidenced by his prior conviction and interactions with the judicial system.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Henderson did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial if informed of the Rehaif decision. The court found substantial evidence that Henderson knew of his felon status, including his prior guilty plea to attempted robbery and subsequent charges for firearm possession. Consequently, Henderson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing plea failed, as he could not show actual prejudice or actual innocence. The court affirmed the denial of Henderson's motion to vacate his conviction. View "USA v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Joseph Smith was convicted of child sexual abuse and related offenses after sexually abusing his stepdaughter, A.S., starting when she was twelve years old. Smith forced A.S. to engage in sexual acts, sent her explicit messages, and coerced her into sending him nude photos. The abuse was reported to the police in April 2017, leading to a search of Smith’s residence, where incriminating evidence was found on a personal computer and two cell phones.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Smith’s pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged underrepresentation of Black residents in the jury pool, a motion to suppress evidence found on the seized devices, and motions related to the government’s case agent’s presence and testimony. Smith was convicted on multiple counts, including child sexual abuse, production and possession of child pornography, and enticement of a minor, and was sentenced to two concurrent life terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Smith’s appeal and rejected all four of his challenges. The court held that Smith failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of Black residents in the jury-selection process, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court also found that the search warrant for Smith’s residence was sufficiently particular and that the good-faith exception precluded suppression of the evidence. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not plainly err in allowing the case agent to remain in the courtroom and testify based on her knowledge of Cellebrite, as any error did not affect the trial’s outcome given the overwhelming evidence against Smith. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed Smith’s convictions. View "U.S. v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2016, Chance Barrow was employed as a digital forensic examiner by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (Army-CID) in Irvine, California. By 2018, he was a special agent. In March 2018, Barrow's ex-wife reported him to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) for alleged sexual assault. Consequently, Army-CID placed Barrow on administrative duty. After a meeting in April 2018, where officials suggested he resign, Barrow resigned. In May 2018, Barrow applied for a position with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), providing false information about his employment status and history. TIGTA hired him, but later discovered the allegations and initiated a criminal investigation, leading to Barrow's suspension and eventual termination.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried Barrow, who was indicted on two counts of wire fraud and one count of concealment of material facts. The district court excluded evidence related to Barrow's job performance and the NCIS investigation details. The jury found Barrow guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to seventeen months in prison and ordered him to pay $77,057.00 in restitution. Barrow appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and errors in the district court's rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the wire fraud convictions, as the government failed to prove that Barrow's lies deprived TIGTA of money or property. The court vacated the wire fraud convictions and remanded for a judgment of acquittal. Additionally, the court reversed Barrow's conviction for concealment of material facts due to the exclusion of critical evidence and remanded for further proceedings. The restitution order was also vacated. View "USA v. Barrow" on Justia Law

The case involves LaFonzo Iracks, who pleaded guilty to unlawful firearm possession and possession with the intent to distribute Phencyclidine (PCP). Iracks had a previous conviction for involuntary manslaughter and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in Maryland. He was released from prison in March 2021 and was caught with a firearm and PCP in January 2022. He pleaded guilty to these offenses later that year. During sentencing, the District Court had to decide whether Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction was a crime of violence, which would determine the base offense level for the recent firearm charge. The District Court decided not to treat Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction as a crime of violence and applied a lower offense level, resulting in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. However, considering the severity of Iracks’s conduct, the District Court departed from the Guidelines range and sentenced Iracks to 41 months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release.The District Court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Iracks challenged his above-Guidelines sentence on three grounds. First, he asserted that the District Court erred in justifying its upward variance based on the probation office’s recommendation when no such recommendation was made. Second, he argued that the District Court’s reasons for an upward variance were already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Finally, he contended that the District Court needed to, but failed to, address his argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland support a downward variance.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's sentence. It found that the District Court did not rely on the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance, which was a clearly erroneous fact. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court's reasons for an upward variance were not already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not plainly err in failing to consider Iracks’s argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland warrant a downward variance. View "United States v. Iracks" on Justia Law

The case involves Tristan Stevens, who participated in an attack on police officers at the United States Capitol’s Lower West Terrace on January 6, 2021. The district court convicted him of four counts of feloniously assaulting and impeding police officers and one count of committing civil disorder. At sentencing, the court concluded that Stevens committed the offenses with an intent to commit another felony: civil disorder. Stevens appealed his sentence, arguing that the court should have applied a different sentencing guideline to his offenses.The district court had previously determined that Stevens committed felonies because he acted with the intent to commit another felony—civil disorder. The court applied the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault to Stevens' offenses, which Stevens disputed. He argued that his conduct did not constitute "aggravated assault" even under the commentary definition.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Stevens. The court held that "aggravated assault" unambiguously includes assault with intent to commit another felony. Therefore, the court properly applied the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault to Stevens’ offenses because his conduct constituted “felonious assault” and he acted with the “intent to commit another felony.” The court affirmed his sentence. View "USA v. Stevens" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Gerald Smith, was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking charges three decades ago. He was sentenced to multiple life sentences under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which allows courts to resentence defendants convicted for certain drug crimes that carry lighter sentences today than at the time of sentencing. In 2019, the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague one aspect of the “crime-of-violence” definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Smith sought vacatur of his crime-of-violence convictions and for First Step Act resentencing for other convictions. The district court denied both forms of relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Smith's convictions for Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) murder involved the intentional use of force against others, qualifying them as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of resentencing under the First Step Act, as Smith was not eligible for resentencing on most counts, and the district court reasonably explained its denial of resentencing on the eligible counts. The court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of entering a revised judgment and conviction order that reflects this court’s prior vacatur of Smith’s felony-murder and attempted-armed-robbery convictions. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves Troy Sargent, who participated in the January 6, 2021, protest at the U.S. Capitol. During the protest, Sargent assaulted a U.S. Capitol Police officer and attempted to do so again after being explicitly ordered not to. He was charged with assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Sargent pleaded guilty, and the District Court sentenced him according to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court had to determine which of two guidelines was most appropriate for Sargent's conduct: § 2A2.2, which applies to aggravated assaults, or § 2A2.4, which applies to obstructing or impeding officers. The District Court determined § 2A2.2 was most applicable, which carries a higher base offense level than § 2A2.4.Sargent appealed, arguing that his conduct did not fall within the plain meaning of "aggravated assault" in the guideline text of § 2A2.2. He relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which held that courts may apply Auer deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations only if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after applying “all the standard tools of interpretation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the District Court was correct to apply § 2A2.2. The court found that the plain meaning of "aggravated assault," according to the text, structure, and context of the Guidelines, unambiguously captures Sargent’s conduct. Therefore, the court did not need to address the degree of deference to afford the commentary to the Guidelines. View "USA v. Sargent" on Justia Law

A retired New York police officer, Thomas Webster, attended a rally convened by former President Trump on January 6, 2021, and subsequently assaulted Officer Rathbun of the Metropolitan Police Department at the Capitol. Webster was convicted of five felonies and one misdemeanor offense and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.Webster's trial took place in the District of Columbia. He had requested a change of venue, arguing that he could not get an impartial jury in the District due to its political leanings and exposure to news coverage of the January 6th events. The district court denied his motion, finding no presumption of prejudice against Webster in the District's jury pool. The court also noted that other January 6th cases had proceeded to trial in the District without any jury-bias issues. A jury subsequently found Webster guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Webster's convictions and sentence. The court rejected Webster's arguments that the jury was not impartial, that he was wrongly denied his right to effectively cross-examine Officer Rathbun, and that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on his Section 111(b) charge. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement for Webster's use of body armor during the commission of the offense, and it rejected Webster's argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable compared to other January 6th defendants. View "USA v. Webster" on Justia Law

Eghbal Saffarinia, a former high-ranking official in the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of the Inspector General (HUD-OIG), was required by federal law to file annual financial disclosure forms detailing most of his financial liabilities over $10,000. One of Saffarinia’s responsibilities was the allocation of HUD-OIG’s information technology contracts. An investigation revealed that Saffarinia had repeatedly falsified his financial disclosure forms and failed to disclose financial liabilities over $10,000. The investigation also revealed that one of the persons from whom Saffarinia had borrowed money was the owner of an IT company that had been awarded HUD-OIG IT contracts during the time when Saffarinia had near-complete power over the agency operation.Saffarinia was indicted on seven counts, including three counts of obstruction of justice. A jury convicted Saffarinia on all seven counts, and the District Court sentenced him to a year and a day in federal prison, followed by one year of supervised release. Saffarinia appealed his conviction, arguing that the law under which he was convicted did not extend to alleged obstruction of an agency’s review of financial disclosure forms because the review of these forms is insufficiently formal to fall within the law’s ambit. He also argued that the evidence presented at trial diverged from the charges contained in the indictment, resulting in either the constructive amendment of the indictment against him or, in the alternative, a prejudicial variance. Finally, Saffarinia challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no basis to overturn Saffarinia’s conviction. The court held that the law under which Saffarinia was convicted was intended to capture the sorts of activity with which Saffarinia was charged. The court also found that the government neither constructively amended Saffarinia’s indictment nor prejudicially varied the charges against him. Finally, the court found that the evidence presented at Saffarinia’s trial was sufficient to support his conviction. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Saffarinia" on Justia Law