Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as time-barred, seeking a certificate of appealability (COA) from the DC Circuit. Because the petition was plainly time-barred and no jurist of reason could take issue with the procedural ruling by the district court, the court denied his request for a COA without having to reach his constitutional claim. View "Blount v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se petition seeking relief by way of writ from what he alleged to be an illegally imposed sentence. The DC Circuit rejected plaintiff's claims under the international doctrine of specialty and the international doctrine of dual criminality. Even assuming that 18 U.S.C. 3192 created an implied individual claim for relief and that the district court would have the authority to compel the President to perform this duty, the only relief that plaintiff seeks is release from a conviction and sentence which he claims were imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The court explained that plaintiff's arguments classically described habeas relief. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "Day v. Trump" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of PCP (Count 1), unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person convicted of a felony (Count 2), and using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense (Count 3). The DC Circuit reversed defendant's conviction on Counts 1 and 3, holding that the evidence was equivocal about his relationship to the PCP and his ability to exercise dominion and control over it. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to show that he constructively possessed the PCP and thus insufficient to show a drug trafficking offense. The court affirmed defendant's conviction on Count 2, holding that his evidentiary and constitutional challenges did not warrant a reversal of his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. View "United States v. Dorman" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government based on claimants' lack of Article III standing in a civil forfeiture case. The court held that claimants met their burden of making an assertion of ownership and provided some evidence of ownership to establish standing. The court explained that credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts were jury functions and not those of a judge. In this case, the record was devoid of contradictory evidence, claimants consistently maintained that the money was theirs, nothing in their account was physically impossible, and the couple explained how they came to own the money in considerable detail. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. $17,900.00" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, the former chair of the United States Parole Commission, alleging that plaintiff's denials of parole were infected by unconstitutional decisionmaking. The district court dismissed the case sua sponte, concluding that parole commissioners were entitled to absolute immunity from such lawsuits. The DC Circuit affirmed on the ground that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that, even under the most generous reading of the complaint, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to each of the five claims alleged against him. View "Redmond v. Fulwood, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellants, the majority shareholder of Banca Privada d'Andorra S.A., filed suit claiming that FinCEN violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a Notice of Finding and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to cut off the Bank's ties to the United States' financial system. While the case was pending, FinCEN withdrew both Notices and the district court subsequently granted FinCEN's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds. The DC Circuit held that the case should be dismissed, but for different reasons than the district court. The DC Circuit explained that when FinCEN withdrew the Notices, appellants received full relief on their first claim. Therefore, the first claim of relief was moot. As for appellants' second claim, they no longer have standing to press this claim, because appellants have not met their burden of demonstrating that they still had standing to seek a declaratory order that the Notices were unlawful. Furthermore, even assuming that appellants do have the requisite injury and causation to support standing, they failed to show that a judicial order would effectively redress their alleged injuries. View "Cierco v. Mnuchin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 144 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of distributing child pornography. The DC Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court met its procedural duty to offer specific reasons as to why it imposed an above-Guidelines sentence. In this case, the district court thought the Guidelines did not fully account for the egregiousness of defendant's pattern of abuse, and the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness and frequency of the sexual abuse, as well as the young age of the victims, and the abuse of trust by someone who was supposed to be protecting his own daughters and granddaughters. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction related to involvement in an attempted robbery. The DC Circuit held that the district court remedied what little prejudice an emergency room nurse's testimony might have produced by giving a curative instruction to the jury, and that the district court did not plainly err by striking the entirety of defendant's witness' testimony because she asserted a blanket constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. View "United States v. Crews" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals who resolved their misdemeanor charges using the District of Columbia's post-and-forfeit procedure, filed suit challenging the procedure and the statute authorizing it as unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the claims. The court concluded that the post-and-forfeit statute does not deprive arrestees of their procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause. The court could not say that the post-and-forfeit procedure offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, and does not transgress any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation. The court explained that offering arrestees an option to participate in the voluntary post-and-forfeit procedure does not unfairly deprive any arrestee of an opportunity for a hearing. The court concluded that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the post-and-forfeit statute is likewise unavailing. The court explained that the fact that the post-and-forfeit statute gives police the discretion to offer an arrestee an opportunity to post and forfeit does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the post-and-forfeit statute complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Kincaid v. Government of the District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The court affirmed defendant's convictions on direct appeal for convictions of conspiracy and related offenses involving the large-scale distribution and sale of unlawful drugs in Washington, D.C. Defendant then filed a series of motions collaterally attacking his convictions. This appeal challenged the amended judgment entered by the district court following the partial grant of defendant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court explained that it need not decide whether the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372, 2374, applies to a resentencing upon a successful collateral attack pursuant to Section 2255; the district court left intact defendant's original trial sentence in 1989 except to apply intervening changes in the law on the merger of offenses; the district court's limited revision to an otherwise final judgment was not a reevaluation of the appropriateness of defendant's original sentence; as a Section 2255 "correction" and not a "resentencing" at which the government has acknowledged the more lenient penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act would apply, this entitled defendant to no relief under the Act; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment because defendant's due process challenge to his continuing criminal enterprise conviction also afforded no relief. View "United States v. Palmer" on Justia Law