Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two drug possession offenses and one drug conspiracy offense. The court applied the especially deferential "manifest miscarriage of justice" standard and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the drug conspiracy offense. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of defendant's prior acquittal on the drug distribution counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except that, consistent with the court's ordinary practice in these circumstances, the court remanded the case so that the district court may address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first instance. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In April 2011, Mathis-Gardner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and making false claims against the United States. The charges were related to the falsification of information regarding the performance of government contracts. She was sentenced to concurrent 18-month terms of imprisonment and concurrent three-year terms of supervised release and ordered to perform community service and to pay restitution. Mathis-Gardner served her time without incident and began her term of supervised release on December 31, 2012. On February 25, 2014, Mathis-Gardner filed a motion for early termination of her supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e). The government supported her motion. The court denied the motion in a minute order that stated, in its entirety, “It is hereby ordered that defendant’s motion is DENIED.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded. While a district court is required to consider certain factors before granting or denying a motion to terminate supervised release, there is no requirement that it explain its decision to deny such a motion so long as the court’s reasoning is discernible from the record. In this case, the reviewing court could not discern the reasoning from the record. View "United States v. Mathis-Gardner" on Justia Law

Gun Recovery Unit officers were in an unmarked car, wearing vests that said “police.” Gross was walking the sidewalk. Officer Bagshaw slowed the car and shined a flashlight, saying “[H]ey, it is the police, how are you doing? Do you have a gun?” Gross stopped, but did not answer. Bagshaw stopped the car and asked, “Can I see your waistband?” Not speaking, Gross lifted his jacket to show his left side. Bagshaw began to move the car. Officer Katz asked Bagshaw to stop, opened his door and asked, while stepping out, “[H]ey man, can I check you out for a gun?” Gross ran. Katz gave chase, saw Gross patting his right side, and smelled PCP. Katz apprehended Gross, performed a frisk, and recovered a handgun from Gross’s waistband. Denying a motion to suppress, the court reasoned that no seizure occurred until after Gross fled because nothing would have indicated to a reasonable person that he lacked freedom to disregard the questions and walk away; Gross’s flight and other behavior, provided reasonable grounds to detain him and conduct a pat-down frisk. Gross was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Given the totality of the circumstances and precedents involving comparable interactions, Bagshaw’s questioning did not effect a Fourth Amendment seizure. Once he attempted to flee, officers had authority to stop him and conduct the frisk. View "United States v. Gross" on Justia Law

Shabban, an Egyptian national, met Hernandez, a Mexican national, in Washington, D.C. They had a son in 2001. They entered into a consensual order giving Hernandez primary physical custody of the boy. Shabban had unsupervised visitation rights; their son was not to be removed from the country without the written consent of both parties. Three years later, Shabban sold his business and had his roommate to take over their apartment lease. Shabban and his son boarded a flight, with Shabban flying under the name “Khaled Rashad.” Days later, Shabban called and told Hernandez that they were in Egypt. Hernandez worked with the FBI for 22 months to convince Shabban to bring the child back to the U.S. During taped conversations, Shabban referred to their son’s difficulty learning to communicate and told Hernandez that he had taken the child to learn a single language, Arabic, rather than the three he was hearing at home, Arabic, Spanish, and English. Shabban admitted taking the child without permission. Charged with international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1204(a), Shabban argued that he lacked the specific intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights because his sole purpose was to place the child in an environment that would improve his speech. The trial judge sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Regardless of his motive, Shabban was aware his actions would obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights. View "United States v. Shabban" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Adams based on a scheme to defraud the United States Agency for International Development. Adams agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud; in return the government would move to dismiss the other 21 counts in the indictment. The agreement explained the sentence would be determined by the court and the range indicated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 51 to 63 months imprisonment. The parties agreed that a sentence within that range would constitute a reasonable sentence and that Adams waived the right to appeal his sentence or the manner in which it was determined under 18 U.S.C. 3742, “except to the extent that (a) the Court sentences [Adams] to a period of imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum, or (b) the Court departs upward from the applicable Sentencing Guideline range pursuant to the provisions of U.S.S.G. 5K.2 or based on a consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).” The district court sentenced him to 51 months imprisonment and to three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution. The D.C. Circuit dismissed his appeal, based on the waiver. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Investigating narcotics activity at Potomac Gardens, a D.C. housing project, agents obtained a wiretap on a telephone owned by Joseph, a former resident, and learned that Joseph coordinated a distribution network for heroin, suboxone pills, and crack cocaine. An acquaintance described Sanders to Joseph as a potential heroin supplier. The three met at a shopping center, where Joseph purchased 200 grams of heroin for $15,000. Joseph purchased heroin from Sanders five more times. Officers obtained a wiretap on Sanders’ phone and searched Sanders’ house. Sanders and eight others were indicted. Sanders was named only in Count One, which charged all nine with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, and 100 grams or more of heroin. Eight codefendants pled guilty; Joseph testified as a cooperating witness at Sanders’ trial. Sanders represented himself, with standby counsel. He did not testify or present defense evidence. The jury convicted Sanders with respect to heroin; it acquitted him as to cocaine and crack cocaine. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred by foreclosing a request for hybrid legal representation, by denying a request for a multiple conspiracies jury instruction, and by failing to give an adequate response to a note from the jury. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

McLaughlin’s friend (Buck) encouraged McLaughin to end a relationship with Taplet. Taplet told Thomas, a stranger he met at a truck stop, that he wished he could “have something seriously done to her.” Thomas responded that he could “take care” of Buck for $7,000 to $10,000. Thomas worked as a paid informant for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. They discussed the murder-for-hire over the phone and in person; Taplet provided Thomas with the address, a photo, and the name of a secluded town where Thomas could kill Buck and dispose of her body. Following Thomas’s instructions, Taplet drove to a D.C. parking lot where and ICE Special Agent, posing as Thomas’s partner, joined them. They agreed to murder Buck in exchange for future payment while Taplet was at work in West Virginia. Charged with murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958, Taplet moved, to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, but did not seek dismissal on constitutional grounds. The district court denied Taplet’s motions. At trial Taplet argued that there was insufficient evidence of interstate commerce because the government had manufactured jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, the jury found Taplet guilty, and the court sentenced Taplet to 10 years in prison, the statutory maximum. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Taplet “freely participate[d]” in the jurisdictional act and cannot claim manufactured jurisdiction. View "United States v. Taplet" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug possession offenses and firearm offenses, appealed the district court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argued that the government's search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to search his residence. Even assuming that the law enforcement officer's affidavit in this case did not support a finding of probable cause, this case falls within the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon where the affidavit relies overwhelmingly on the confidential informant (whose reliability defendant does not question) and the records checks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law