Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Abdul Razak Ali was captured in 2002 by U.S. and Pakistani forces and detained as an enemy combatant. When captured at a guesthouse in Pakistan, Ali was with an al Qaeda-associated terrorist leader named Abu Zubaydah. Ali subsequently challenged the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Based on Ali's presence at the guesthouse with Abu Zubaydah, his participation in Abu Zubaydah's training program, his admission to traveling to Afghanistan to fight in the war against U.S. and Coalition forces, and other evidence connecting Ali to Abu Zubaydah fighters, the district court concluded that it was more probable than not that Ali was in fact a member of Abu Zubaydah's force. The court concluded that the facts justify the President's decision to detain Ali as an enemy combatant under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Pub. L. No. 107-40, section 2(a), 115 Stat. 224. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ali's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Ali v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to a charge related to his sexual involvement with a 14 year-old. At issue on appeal are the conditions of supervised release. On the merits, the court found that the district court's own statements, and the sweeping nature of several of the conditions, demonstrated that the court failed to weigh the burden of the conditions on defendant's liberty against their likely effectiveness, as required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). Accordingly, the court vacated all the challenged conditions and remanded to the district court to impose special conditions of supervised release in compliance with section 3583(d). View "United States v. Malenya" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant did not qualify for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) because his criminal history score under the Sentencing Guidelines was more than one point. Because of a prior driving-under-the-influence conviction in Georgia, for which he was on probation at the time of his arrest, his criminal history score was three points. Therefore, the district court found defendant ineligible for a sentence reduction. Defendant argued that at the time of his plea to the DUI charge he was not properly informed of his right to counsel and did not validly waive that right, so that the DUI charge was in violation of the Constitution. The court held that the government had the burden of persuasion, but only once the defendant produced objective evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that his right to counsel was not validly waived. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court could reexamine the evidence introduced by defendant. If defendant has produced objective evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that he did not validly waive the right to counsel, then the government must, by a preponderance of the evidence, persuade the court that the waiver was in fact valid. View "United States v. Martinez-Cruz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District and others, alleging that strip searching incoming detainees violated the Fourth Amendment and, where men were not similarly strip searched, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The court concluded, under Bame v. Dillard, that the Superior Court Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right he was accused of violating was not clearly established at the time of any violation. The court agreed with the district court that there was no circumstantial evidence that the Marshal purposefully directed that women and men be searched differently at the Superior Court cellblock. According, the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because class members have failed to show that he violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson, et al. v. Government of the District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to possess and distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. The court concluded that the district court did not violate defendants' rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). However, the court concluded that the district court erroneously admitted evidence obtained pursuant to a "facially insufficient" warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 2107, an appeal must be filed within 60 days after the entry of judgment, order or decree. At issue was whether "the entry" of the order at issue occurred when the district court's clerk's office posted on its docket a notice that the district court had issued a classified memorandum and order denying a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that a redacted version would be posted when it became available, or when the redacted opinion and order were subsequently posted on the docket. The court concluded that the first posting qualified as an "entry" under section 2107 and, therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely filed in this case and the court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hentif, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiring to distribute heroin. The court concluded that, even if it assumed that the district court erred in failing to give a multiple conspiracies instruction, and even if the court assumed that failure produced a variance, a reversal of defendant's conviction was unwarranted where defendant was not prejudiced. The court rejected defendant's remaining argument that the prosecutor made improper remarks during his rebuttal argument. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Cross" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and subsequently appealed the district court's partial denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Defendant argued that the district court should have applied the Fair Sentencing Act's, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, new 60-month mandatory minimum retroactively in his section 3582(c)(2) proceeding. The court concluded that defendant's argument was foreclosed by its decisions in United States v. Bigesby and United States v. Fields, which held that a defendant convicted and sentenced prior to the Act's effective date could not benefit from the Act's new mandatory minimums in a subsequent proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Swangin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud. The conviction arose out of his work for former United States Representative Curt Weldon where defendant intentionally failed to disclose certain payments made to his wife. After the Supreme Court handed down Skilling v. United States, a decision that substantially limited the permissible reach of the honest-services fraud statute, defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate and set aside his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that defendant was denied an opportunity to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence because he could not demonstrate that he was also innocent of a separate and uncharged offense that had a lower sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court reversed the order denying defendant's motion to vacate his conviction because defendant was not required to make such a showing. View "United States v. Caso, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for drug conspiracy. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence of prior drug activity and in denying defendant's motion requesting that the drug conspiracy charge and the witness tampering charge be severed for purposes of trial where, in both instances, the district court gave reasoned explanations for its decisions and the jury was given limited instructions. The court also concluded that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not substantially prejudice defendant. In regards to defendant's sentence, the court concluded that defendant was not entitled to safety-valve relief where he had not fulfilled all the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and, consequently, his counsel was not ineffective for not arguing the issue with more vigor. Finally, the district court correctly determined that it did not have the discretion to award a United States v. Smith departure of any length beneath the statutory minimum. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law