Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district court of the District of Columbia and the district court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, reasoning that defendant was required to pursue his challenge in D.C. Superior Court rather than federal court because his D.C. Code 23-110 remedy was not inadequate or ineffective. Defendant subsequently applied for a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that jurists of reason would not find defendant's claim that the district court had jurisdiction "debatable" because Diamen v. United States could not be reasonably read to bar defendant from bringing his federal constitutional claims in D.C. Superior Court under section 23-110. Accordingly, the court denied the COA. View "Ibrahim v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Upon remand to the court after affirming one of his convictions, the district court granted a variance from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for career offenders and re-sentenced defendant for unlawfully distributing more than 5 grams of cocaine base. The court held that, although defendant correctly pointed out that the amount of cocaine base of which he stood convicted was 21.1 grams, not the 29.6 grams of cocaine base stated in the Presentence Report and adopted by the district court in re-sentencing him, both amounts fell within the same quantity range under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(7) and carried a maximum sentence of 40 years. Thus, defendant's Guidelines offense level would have been 34 regardless. The court also held that defendant could not show error, much less plain error, where the district court refused to consider the effect of pending legislation. The court further held that the district court did not plainly err, in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, by referencing at re-sentencing his failure to express remorse and accept responsibility. The court finally held that defendant's challenge to the reasonableness of his below-Guidelines re-sentencing failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in applying the career offender guideline provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the amended judgment. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus to the detainee. Three errors in the district court's analysis required the court to vacate that decision. First, the court failed to accord an official government record a presumption of regularity. Second, the district court failed to determine the detainee's credibility even though the court relied on his declaration to discredit the Government's key evidence. Third, the court's unduly atomized approach to the evidence was one the court rejected. The court remanded so the district court could evaluate the detainee's credibility as needed in light of the totality of the circumstances. View "Latif, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, defendant invoked the Sentencing Commission's reductions in the offense level for certain crack cocaine offenses. The district court denied defendant's motion, noting on the record a host of facts about defendant's criminal record and his disciplinary infractions in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court failed to determine the extent of the reduction for which he was eligible before denying his motion. In particular, defendant believed that the court could have underestimated the permissible reduction in the sentencing range, and that this hypothetical underestimate could have played a role in the court's refusal to make any reduction at all. Although the court agreed with defendant that a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) required the court first to compute the sentence reduction available, the court found that the record established that it did so. View "United States v. David" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence on two counts of attempted tax evasion. Appellant argued that the government failed to prove the element of tax loss because it relied upon a flawed calculation under the "cash method of proof" and attributed to appellant $1.9 million of alleged gain when those funds, as a matter of law, belonged to his two corporations. Appellant challenged his sentence to the extent it rested upon the allegedly incorrect calculation of tax loss. The court found no error in the district court's denial of defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal. The court also held that, because a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt a tax was due and owing on $300,000 of income, the court left for another day how best to interpret the dictum in James v. United States. The court affirmed the sentence because the district court made sufficient factual findings at sentencing to support the inclusion of the $1.9 million in the calculation of tax loss. View "United States v. Khanu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking to obtain documents relating to the government's use of cell phone location data in criminal prosecutions. The district court directed the release of certain specified documents and upheld the Department's decision to withhold others. The court affirmed the district court's order requiring the release of the specified documents. The court held, however, that because there were too many factual uncertainties regarding the remaining documents, the court vacated the balance of the district court's decision and remanded the case for further development of the record. View "American Civil Liberties Union, et al. v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Appellant, a detainee at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that intelligence reports offered by the government to prove his membership in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell were reliable. The court held that there was no error in the district court's careful consideration of the evidence and affirmed the denial of appellant's petition. View "Khan v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, as personal representative of her brother's estate, sued to recover damages for the shooting death of her brother by a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) detective and contended on appeal that she did not receive a fair trial. The principal issue concerned the district court's rulings on the inadmissibility of portions of an internal MPD report regarding the altercation between the detective and appellant's brother. A related issue involved a violation of the pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The court held that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court. The record revealed that the district court properly excluded those parts of the report likely to confuse the jury and unfairly prejudice the government. The court held that the government failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(E) by not supplementing the medical expert's disclosure to reflect an interview with the detective on which the expert intended to rely at trial, but that the violation was harmless and so the district court's refusal to strike the expert's testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, because appellant's other claims of error and her bias claim were unpersuasive, the court affirmed the judgment. View "English v. District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted enticement of a minor and for traveling across state lines with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; whether his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel; and whether the conditions of supervised release the district court imposed were erroneous. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the necessary intent beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes. The court remanded defendant's ineffective assistance claims for analysis by the district court in the first instance. The court further held that defendant's challenge to the condition that restricted his loitering in arcades and parks and on possessing a camera were foreclosed by United States v. Love where the Love court withheld the same conditions on plain error review. The court also held that the computer-related conditions of supervised release were not plainly erroneous.

In 1988, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape while armed; assaulting, resisting or interfering with a police officer with a dangerous weapon; and two counts of first-degree burglary while armed. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 18 years to life and while defendant was in prison, the District of Columbia enacted the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), D.C. Code 22-4001 to -4017. Defendant challenged SORA under various provisions of the U.S. Constitution, most notably the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court held that, like the sex offender registration requirement in Smith v. Doe, SORA's registration requirement did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause where neither the Council of District Columbia's intent nor SORA's effects were so punitive as to render SORA a form of punishment. The court also held that defendant failed to show that he was entitled to relief in regards to his Fifth Amendment claims. The court further rejected defendant's Eighth Amendment and equal protection claim and defendant's claim under the D.C. Human Rights Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.