Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was incarcerated when he petitioned the court for writs of mandamus to prevent the district court from transferring two of his civil cases to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The court had recently held that the filing fee provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 38 U.S.C. 1915(b), applied to a prisoner who filed a petition for writ of mandamus in connection with an underlying civil case. At issue was whether the PLRA's three-strikes provision, section 1915(g), likewise applied to a mandamus petition in an underlying civil case. The court held that petitioner's mandamus petitions were subject to the PLRA's three-strikes provision and consequently, petitioner was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis where the underlying actions, which the district court ordered to be transferred to Maryland, were civil in nature. Therefore, the court denied the motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered petitioner to pay the full fee in each case before the court would consider his petitions.

Petitioner petitioned the court on July 14, 2010, for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant him in forma pauperis status and permit him to file his civil rights damages suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. At issue was whether a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim based on Heck v. Humphrey counted as a "strike" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 38 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that it did and joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in holding that in the absence of proof "that the conviction or sentence ha[d] been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus," the petitioner failed to state a claim for purposes of section 1915(g). Accordingly, because petitioner, while incarcerated, had filed at least three civil actions that were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, and he had neither offered any valid reason as to why he should not be required to pay in full the appellate filing fee before the court would consider his mandamus petition, nor claimed he was in imminent danger within the meaning of the exception under section 1915(g) of the PLRA's three-strikes provision, the court denied petitioner's motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and ordered him to pay the full fee before the court would consider his petition.

Appellant appealed the decision of the district court to detain him prior to trial where appellant was considered a flight risk. At issue was whether the recorded findings, even if not in the form required by the Bail Reform Act (Act), 18 U.S.C. 3142, were sufficient to support the conclusion that appellant's pretrial detention was necessary in order to assure his presence at trial. The court held that because the district court failed to conform to the requirements of section 3142(g), i(l), the court must remand the case for the district court to consider all the relevant facts and to prepare findings of fact and a statement of reasons in support of appellant's pretrial detention pursuant to the Act, or otherwise to order appellant's pretrial release subject to appropriate conditions.

Six defendants appealed from judgments of conviction on multiple charges related to a drug distribution business, including drug conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, murder, and other related charges in violation of federal and District of Columbia laws. On appeal, defendants asserted numerous issues of error covering, among other things, evidentiary issues, conduct of the trial, prosecutorial misconduct, and jury instructions. Upon review, the court held that most of the asserted errors either were not erroneous or were harmless. As to one category of issue involving alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause, a Supreme Court decision intervening between the trial and the court's consideration of the case compelled the court to remand convictions for some drug charges (Counts 126-138) for further consideration in light of Bullcoming v. New Mexico. The court also remanded for further proceedings for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Calvin Smith (Counts 4 and 5) and vacated one murder conviction as to Rodney Moore that, as the parties agree, merged with another conviction (Count 32). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This was an appeal from the denial of the petition of a detainee at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court erred in determining that the detainee was being lawfully detained on the record as it stood before that court and whether the district court's procedural errors deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to develop a record upon which he could challenge his detention. The court rejected the detainee's contention that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and because those findings were enough to establish that the detainee was "part of the Taliban or al Qaeda," the court rejected his contention that the record before the court was insufficient to establish the lawfulness of his detention. Given the time the detainee's attorneys had after their receipt of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal record, the district court's grant of leave to file an amended traverse, and the absence of any subsequent request for additional time or discovery, the court held that the detainee had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of the thirty-day continuance. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to issue further discovery orders without a showing that there was a basis for believing that the requests satisfied the Case Management Order's predicate conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of identity theft as part of a plea agreement where defendant had treated hundreds of patients while falsely representing that he was a licensed physician. In determining defendant's sentence, the district court increased his sentence under U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1) because some of his patients were children with serious mental health conditions. On appeal, defendant disputed the increase in his offense level, contending that section 3A1.1(b)(1)'s 2-level adjustment for vulnerable victims applied only to victims of defendant's offense of conviction, who in this case would include only those victims who suffered financial loss. The court disagreed and held that the adjustment applied not only to victims of the offense of conviction, but also to victims of defendant's relevant conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The United States detained Nazul Gul and Adel Hamad for several years at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and during that time, each filed with the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to any hearing on the merits of their petitions, the United States transferred the detainees to the custody of foreign sovereigns and did not then rescind their designation as "enemy combatants." Gul and Hamad wanted to continue litigating their habeas petitions but the district court dismissed their petitions as moot because they were no longer held by the United States. Gul and Hamad subsequently appealed, arguing among other things, that their petitions were not moot because they continued to be burdened by the collateral consequences of their prior detention and continuing designation. The court held that, having determined that Gul and Hamad identified no injury sufficient to bring their cases within the court's jurisdiction under Article III, the court affirmed the order of the district court.

Appellee alleged that six U.S. Postal Inspectors wrongly caused him to be criminally prosecuted in retaliation for his public criticism of the United States Postal Service (USPS) and its personnel. The Postal Inspectors appealed the district court's qualified immunity, on appellee's claim of retaliatory inducement to prosecution in violation of his right to free speech under the First Amendment. Insofar as the appeal challenged the district court's determination that there were genuine issues of material fact, the court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Insofar as the district court declined to find the Postal Inspectors protected by qualified immunity based on "arguable probable cause," the court affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for trial on the merits.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of a firearm during a trafficking offense. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's finding that he consented to the search of his car, and the district court's refusal at sentencing to consider all of the proffered facts concerning his relevant history and characteristics. The court held that defendant failed to show that the district court's credibility finding with regard to the police officers' testimony that he gave consent was based on "exceedingly improbable testimony" and thus clearly erroneous. A review of the record indicated that the inconsistencies between the suppression testimony and one of the officers' prior statements were not so glaring as to render incredible the officers' testimony that defendant consented to the search of his car. Nor did apparent violations of departmental protocols unrelated to defendant's consent so undermined the officers' credibility that it was clear error for the district court to credit their testimony regarding defendant's consent. A remand for resentencing, however, was required because the district court must take into account all relevant facts related to a defendant's "history and characteristics," where the sentencing record reflected that the district court appeared to have "misunderstood its sentencing authority" to consider certain proffered facts, even though the government agreed defendant properly requested the court to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction with regard to defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Defendant appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to five counts of filing a false tax return. At issue was whether the district court erred in applying the Guidelines by increasing his base offense level and by denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility. Also at issue was whether the district court erred by varying upward from the Guidelines range pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court held that the district court did not err by increasing defendant's base offense level because he significantly disrupted a governmental function. The court held, however, that it was unable to determine whether in denying his credit for acceptance of responsibility and varying upward from the Guidelines range, the district court relied solely upon constitutionally permissible factors. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded his case for resentencing.