Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment, concluding that a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range did not reflect the seriousness of Appellant’s crimes or act as a sufficient deterrence. Appellant argued that the district court exceeded the scope of its resentencing mandate and committed procedural and substantive errors in imposing the life sentence. The DC Circuit affirmed Appellant’s life sentence finding that the district court did not commit a procedural and substantive error. The court further remanded for the correction of several clerical errors in the judgment.   The court first considered whether the district court committed a “significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range or relying on clearly erroneous facts. Here, the court rejected Appellant’s other claims of “significant” procedural error. First, the district court did not use the Guidelines as its basis for the upward variance. It explicitly applied the upward variance based on considerations required by 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), including the “nature and circumstances” and “seriousness” of the crimes.   Next, the court considered“the substantive reasonableness of the sentence” under the “abuse-of-discretion” standard, considering the “totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Here, the court reasoned that the district court distinguished this case from a typical case with the same underlying charges. Further, Appellant's sentence properly considered the purposes of criminal sentencing. View "USA v. Frederick Miller" on Justia Law

Appellate was sentenced to life in prison in 1979 when he escaped prison and killed a federal officer. After serving more than 40 years of his sentence, he sought parole relief but was denied by the U.S. Parole Commission ("the Commission"). The Commission reasoned that Appellant was a high risk.Appellant sued the Commission, claiming that the Commission violated his due process rights and exceeded its statutory discretion when it denied him parole in 2016. Reaching the merits of Appellant's petition, the district court denied relief. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition, finding that the district court's jurisdictional analysis was proper and that the Commission did not violate Appellant's rights. View "Artie Dufur v. USPC" on Justia Law

Eight years after Belgium extradited defendant, a Tunisian national, to stand trial in the United States on terrorism charges, the trial has yet to take place. In this appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motions to reconsider dismissing the indictment in light of intervening, and conflicting, Belgian legal developments.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Belgian legal developments defendant invokes do not constitute significant new evidence that would warrant disturbing this court's 2017 decision affirming the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. The court stated that defendant has selectively picked and chosen phrases from these documents to argue that this court must defer to the Belgian courts' interpretation of Article 5 and revisit its decision in Trabelsi II. However, the court concluded that none of the intervening decisions, communications, or pleadings present significant new evidence or detract from the deference this court owes to the Belgian state. Therefore, defendant has failed to meet the significantly high burden for departing from the law of the case. View "United States v. Trabelsi" on Justia Law

Jackson pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base, entered a plea agreement, and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to an anticipated, not-yet-imposed, prison sentence in another district court. While imprisoned, Jackson filed two unsuccessful motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The D.C. Circuit affirmed his sentence and the denial of the motions. While the judge accepting Jackson’s guilty plea did not fully comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N), as he did not go over the appeal rights that Jackson was waiving, Jackson still knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to appeal. Jackson confirmed to the judge at his plea hearing that he had read the plea agreement carefully, that he understood it, and had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his counsel The language of Jackson’s plea agreement is unambiguous, making any error in the plea colloquy harmless. Jackson’s obesity and sleep apnea did not constitute extraordinary circumstances and, in evaluating the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court did not err in evaluating his continuing dangerousness by considering his dangerousness at the time of his earlier criminal history. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two criminal counts, remanding for resentencing. Both defendant and the government agree that a court may deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines, including by imposing consecutive sentences that exceed the total recommended punishment, after considering the Guidelines range and the other statutory sentencing factors.The court explained that, consistent with the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to promote fairness and uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines provide recommended sentencing ranges based on two factors: a defendant's culpable conduct and criminal history. Chapter 7 of the Guidelines sets out recommended terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. Finding consensus among Chapter 7's text, context, and purpose, the court held that the sentencing ranges in Chapter 7's Revocation Table represent the Guidelines' total recommended punishment for supervised release violations. Those recommendations do not depend on the number of counts for which a defendant is serving supervised release. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's 57 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits certain felons from possessing firearms. Defendant argues that his attorney was ineffective at his sentencing hearing, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, the court concluded that the record from the hearing made clear that irrespective of any alleged deficiencies in representation, the district court would have imposed the same sentence. Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice and thus his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "United States v. Orange" on Justia Law

Brevard left a halfway house, where he was serving a sentence for unlawful firearm possession, and did not return. Weeks later, he was apprehended and charged with escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). The U.S. Attorney’s Office calculated a Guidelines range of 15–21 months, and recommended 15 months, noting Brevard suffered from mental health issues and had accepted responsibility. Based on a “threats” incident that occurred during his escape, Brevard had been charged under the D.C. Criminal Code; those charges had been dismissed when the complainant did not appear for trial. The district court sentenced Brevard to 30 months’ imprisonment, departing upward, under Sentencing Guidelines 5K2.21, based on that uncharged conduct. Alternatively, the court found, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), that the same upward variance was appropriate, given Brevard’s criminal history.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Although the departure was procedurally erroneous, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Because the uncharged D.C. Code offenses could not have been properly joined with Brevard’s federal escape charge, the "threats" conduct did not “underl[ie] a potential charge” that could have been “pursued in the case,” U.S.S.G. 5K2.21. The court could properly rely on factors in Brevard’s criminal history, without regard to the uncharged threats conduct, to conclude that the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range did not “fully account for” the seriousness of Brevard’s repeated failure to conform his conduct to the law. View "United States v. Brevard" on Justia Law

Hillie was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(e), possession of images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and various counts relating to sexual abuse of children and minors, under D.C. law. A search of his electronic devices had revealed videos, recorded by cameras hidden in the bedroom and bathroom, of minors in the nude. Hillie had also touched the girls in a sexual manner. He was sentenced to 354 months’ imprisonment.The D.C. Circuit vacated in part, agreeing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and possession of images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. No rational trier of fact could find the girl’s conduct depicted in the videos to be a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person,” under section 2256(2)(A) nor that Hillie intended to use the girl to display her anus, genitalia, or pubic area in a lustful manner that connotes the commission of sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, or sadistic or masochistic abuse, and took a substantial step toward doing so. The court rejected arguments that the court erroneously instructed the jury, erroneously admitted certain testimony, and erroneously denied a motion to sever the federal counts from the remaining counts. View "United States v. Hillie" on Justia Law

Six defendants were indicted in 2018 following an ATF investigation of drug activity at a D.C. barbershop. During a 2017 traffic stop, officers had found what appeared to be a drug ledger, approximately $9,000, and drug paraphernalia in Fields’s vehicle. The ATF executed a search warrant on the barbershop three months later. In a suite above the barbershop, agents found cash, firearms, more drug paraphernalia, and large quantities of heroin mixed with fentanyl, PCP, Suboxone, and synthetic marijuana. They also found a document listing a medical appointment for Fields and a receipt for a purchase made with his credit card. A search of Fields’s home led to more drug ledgers, two of which listed “Foots” (Samuels). During subsequent searches of Samuels’s home, ATF agents found a shotgun, drug paraphernalia, crack cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic marijuana. Samuels admitted that he kept a gun under his bed for protection.Fields, Samuels, and Tucker were convicted on several drug- and firearm-related offenses. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the convictions, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and Samuels’s 84-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the 2017 traffic stop, evidentiary rulings, and the denial of Fields’s request to represent himself, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court cured any potential prejudice to Samuels and Tucker with limiting instructions and did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions to sever. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Gaskins served almost eight years of a 22-year sentence on a narcotics conspiracy charge before the D.C. Circuit reversed his conviction for insufficient evidence in 2012. At his trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. After the reversal of his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513, a prerequisite to a claim against the government for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery.The D.C. Circuit vacated. A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind--whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. His actions, as established by the trial evidence, do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. The court declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Gaskins" on Justia Law