Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shieldalloy, manufacturer of metal alloys in New Jersey, petitioned for review of the NRC's order reinstating the transfer of regulatory authority to the State of New Jersey under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021. The order at issue addressed concerns raised by this Court in Shieldalloy II. The court concluded that the NRC's transfer of regulatory authority to New Jersey under section 2021 was not arbitrary or capricious because New Jersey's regulations are compatible with the NRC's regulations and its reading of 10 C.F.R. 20.1403(a). The NRC has rationally addressed concerns when it provided a textual analysis of section 20.1403 and explained how New Jersey's regulatory regime is adequate and compatible with the NRC's regulatory program. The order does not conflict with the NRC's prior interpretations or amount to a convenient, post hoc litigation position. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of FERC's orders affecting the administration of the Independent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) and specifically directed to curtailment of the exercise of market power in the New England energy market. The court held that FERC has jurisdiction to regulate the parameters comprising the Forward Capacity Market, and that applying offer-floor mitigation fits within the Commission's statutory rate-making power. The court concluded that none of the petitioners established that FERC has committed reversible error and the court denied the petition for review. View "New England Power Gen. Assoc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Smith Lake filed suit against FERC and others, alleging claims related to the Commission's issuance of a license order. Alabama Power intervened and moved to dismiss the petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because the appeal was untimely, concluding that Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC and Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC stand for the proposition that the court will not hear a case if the petitioner has a rehearing petition pending before the Commission at the time of filing in this court, whether it was required or not. Consequently, a party must choose whether to seek an optional petition for rehearing before the Commission, or a petition for review to the court; it cannot proceed simultaneously. View "Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824d(c), requires regulated utilities to file with the Commission, as a matter of open and accessible public record, any rates and charges they intend to impose for sales of electrical energy that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Consequently, utilities are forbidden to charge any rate other than the one on file with the Commission, a prohibition known as the "filed rate doctrine." At issue on appeal was, when a utility filed more than one rate with the Commission during the time it was negotiating an agreement with a prospective customer, which of the two filed rates governs: the rate at the time negotiations commenced or the rate at the time the agreement was completed? The Commission is of the view that it can pick and choose which rate applies on a case-by-case basis. Because the Commission has provided no reasoned explanation for how its decision comports with statutory direction, prior agency practice, or the purposes of the filed rate doctrine, the court vacated the Commission's orders in part and remanded. View "West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involves challenges to the most recent forms of electric transmission planning and cost allocation adopted by the Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq. In Order No. 1000, as reaffirmed and clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B (together, the Final Rule), the Commission required each transmission owning and operating public utility to participate in regional transmission planning that satisfies the specific planning principles designed to prevent undue discrimination and preference in transmission service, and that produces a regional transmission plan. The court held that the Commission had authority under Section 206 of the Act to require transmission providers to provide in a regional planning process; there was substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the reforms in the Final Rule; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require removal of federal rights of first refusal provisions upon determining they were unjust and unreasonable practices affecting rates, and that determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; the Mobile-Sierra objection to the removal is not ripe; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require the ex ante allocation of the costs of new transmission facilities among beneficiaries, and that its decision regarding scope was not arbitrary or capricious; the Commission reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and the Commission reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule. View "South Carolina Public Service v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

FirstEnergy, acting on behalf of its affiliates (ATSI), filed a complaint with FERC contending that the imposition of costs from transferring from one Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) to another on ATSI was unjust and unreasonable. The Commission disagreed and dismissed the complaint. FirstEnergy then petitioned for review. The court denied the petition for review because FirstEnergy failed to carry its burden under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824(e), that Schedule 12 of PJM's, the RTO FirstEnergy transferred to, tariff was unjust and unreasonable as applied to ATSI. View "FirstEnergy Service Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of FERC's final rule governing what FERC calls "demand response resources in the wholesale energy market." The rule sought to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when economically efficient. The court concluded that, because FERC's rule entails direct regulation of the retail market - a matter exclusively within state control - it exceeds the Commission's authority. Alternatively, even if the court assumed that FERC had statutory authority to execute the final rule, Order 745 would still fail because it was arbitrary and capricious. Given Order 745's regulation of the retail market, the court vacated the rule in its entirety as ultra vires agency action. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the rulings. View "Electric Power Supply Assoc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a coal mine operator, filed suit against the Secretary, challenging a Department of the Interior regulation requiring mine operators to pay a reclamation fee when the coal is ultimately sold or used, rather than immediately after the coal is removed from the ground. Appellant argued that the regulation could not be constitutionally applied to coal sold for export because the Export Clause of the Constitution states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any state." U.S. Const. Art. I. 9, cl.5. Section 1276 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) explicitly provides that all challenges to regulations promulgated under the Act must be brought within sixty days of a rule's promulgation. The court concluded that section 1276 was applicable in this case and the court agreed with the district court that appellant's challenge was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, et al." on Justia Law

Two firms receiving gas storage service in the Washington Storage Field ceased taking service and "released" their storage rights to Paribas. The departing customers exercised their contract rights to buy back so-called "base gas" from the field's operator, Transco. Given the buy-back, Transco had to make new purchases to replenish its base gas so as to maintain service at the levels prevailing before the replacement. At the time of the exiting customers' departure, the historic customers who remained, and the new replacement customers, disputed whether the cost of the new base gas should be charged entirely to the replacement shippers ("incremental pricing") or should be charged to all shippers in proportion to their usage ("rolled-in pricing"). On appeal, Paribas challenged the Commission's ratemaking decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. In a decision purporting to apply the familiar "cost causation" principle, the Commission chose incremental pricing. The court concluded that the Commission failed to offer an intelligible explanation of how its decision manifested the cost causation principle; failed to explain how or why or in what sense the historic customers' continued demand did not share, pro rata, in causing the need for the new base gas, or, how or why or in what sense the historic customers did not share proportionately in the benefits provided by the new base gas; and brushed off Paribas's invocation of a seemingly parallel set of the Commission's own decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC" on Justia Law