Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners sought review of FERC's final rule governing what FERC calls "demand response resources in the wholesale energy market." The rule sought to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when economically efficient. The court concluded that, because FERC's rule entails direct regulation of the retail market - a matter exclusively within state control - it exceeds the Commission's authority. Alternatively, even if the court assumed that FERC had statutory authority to execute the final rule, Order 745 would still fail because it was arbitrary and capricious. Given Order 745's regulation of the retail market, the court vacated the rule in its entirety as ultra vires agency action. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the rulings. View "Electric Power Supply Assoc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a coal mine operator, filed suit against the Secretary, challenging a Department of the Interior regulation requiring mine operators to pay a reclamation fee when the coal is ultimately sold or used, rather than immediately after the coal is removed from the ground. Appellant argued that the regulation could not be constitutionally applied to coal sold for export because the Export Clause of the Constitution states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any state." U.S. Const. Art. I. 9, cl.5. Section 1276 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) explicitly provides that all challenges to regulations promulgated under the Act must be brought within sixty days of a rule's promulgation. The court concluded that section 1276 was applicable in this case and the court agreed with the district court that appellant's challenge was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, et al." on Justia Law

Two firms receiving gas storage service in the Washington Storage Field ceased taking service and "released" their storage rights to Paribas. The departing customers exercised their contract rights to buy back so-called "base gas" from the field's operator, Transco. Given the buy-back, Transco had to make new purchases to replenish its base gas so as to maintain service at the levels prevailing before the replacement. At the time of the exiting customers' departure, the historic customers who remained, and the new replacement customers, disputed whether the cost of the new base gas should be charged entirely to the replacement shippers ("incremental pricing") or should be charged to all shippers in proportion to their usage ("rolled-in pricing"). On appeal, Paribas challenged the Commission's ratemaking decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. In a decision purporting to apply the familiar "cost causation" principle, the Commission chose incremental pricing. The court concluded that the Commission failed to offer an intelligible explanation of how its decision manifested the cost causation principle; failed to explain how or why or in what sense the historic customers' continued demand did not share, pro rata, in causing the need for the new base gas, or, how or why or in what sense the historic customers did not share proportionately in the benefits provided by the new base gas; and brushed off Paribas's invocation of a seemingly parallel set of the Commission's own decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, owners and operators of electrical power generation facilities, challenged several of the Commission's orders relating to the creation of the 2011-2014 "demand curves." NYISO holds monthly auctions to set the price of electrical power capacity in New York utilizing administratively determined demand curves. The court concluded that the Commission reasonably imposed the maximum suspension period; the Commission did not act arbitrarily by ignoring petitioners' argument that the Compliance Curves would necessarily exceed the Proposed Curves; the Commission did not exceed its section 205(e) authority under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824d(e), by suspending the Proposed Rates for longer than the five-month statutory maximum when it accepted the NYISO's voluntarily decision to delay implementation of the new curves; and the court rejected petitioners' challenge to the Commission's approval of NYISO's March 28 filing. The court also rejected petitioners' challenge to several technical aspects of the proposed curves. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's orders (1) approving PJM's method of disbursing a monetary surplus that resulted from the way it operated its markets, and (2) requiring PJM to recoup money refunded to the virtual marketers in connection with the administrative dispute over the surplus. The court held that FERC gave the virtual marketers reasonable notice that their refunds were under reconsideration, but that FERC's orders were arbitrary and capricious because they were insufficiently justified. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the Surplus Orders and granted the petition for review of the Recoupment Orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an energy trader, challenged FERC's order to pay a $50,000 civil penalty because petitioner had made false statements and material omissions in forms he filed with the Commission and a market operator the Commission regulates. The court agreed with FERC that petitioner's admissions supported summary disposition without a hearing; because petitioner's actions were worse than careless, FERC reasonably concluded that he violated Market Behavior Rule 3; petitioner's arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., were without merit; and petitioner failed to show that FERC increased his penalty to promote general deterrence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kourouma v. FERC" on Justia Law

Seeking to construct a natural gas compressor station in Maryland, Dominion applied for and received a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC. The Department subsequently twice refused to process Dominion's application for an air quality permit and Dominion sought expedited review from the court. The court granted Dominion's petition and remanded for further action because the Department's failure to act to grant, condition, or deny Dominion's air quality permit was inconsistent with federal law. View "Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, et al." on Justia Law

NRG petitioned for review of FERC's order approving a settlement between PJM, NYISO, ConEd, PSE&G, and others regarding transmission service agreements. NRG objected to the settlement, which gave ConEd transmission rights not available to other market participants. The court concluded that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving an agreement that did not conform to PJM's open-access transmission tariff and that FERC's justifications for approving the agreement were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Cumberland petitioned for review of the Commission's determination that Cumberland's failure to maintain adequate emergency lifelines in its mine's escapeways was a significant and substantial violation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 814(d)(1). The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the Commission applied the correct significant and substantial standard and that substantial evidence supported its findings. View "Cumberland Coal Resources, LP v. MSHR, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's revised emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities. In 2012, acting pursuant to sections 112(d)(6) and 112(f)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(6), (f)(2), EPA revised the 1995 emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities, reducing allowable emissions by 90% and requiring smelters to totally enclose certain "fugitive" emission sources. Industry petitioners first argued that the Secondary Lead Rule impermissibly regulated elemental lead as hazardous air pollutants (HAP). The court concluded, inter alia, that industry petitioners' first contention was time-barred and the second contention also failed because the Rule set HAP emissions standards at levels designed to attain the primary lead national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), not the converse. In regards to environmental petitioners' challenges, the court concluded that environmental petitioners have shown that their members would have standing under Article III to sue in their own right. However, environmental petitioners' challenge failed on the merits. Their primary argument that, when EPA revised emissions standards under section 112(d)(6), it must recalculate the maximum achievable control technology in accordance with sections 112(d)(2) and (d)(3), was barred by NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part the petitions for review. View "Assoc. of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law